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“All of this, down to the smallest detail, can be explained if you wish in an entirely different 
way, and it would sound even more natural.” (Dostoevsky, 1866)   
 
General Abstract 
 
The aim of this thesis was to examine how different memory-enhancing (mnemonic) 
techniques used in an interview carried out immediately after an event affected truth tellers’ 
and liars’ responses in the immediate interview and also in a delayed interview. In Studies I-
III participants took part in a specific mock intelligence scenario in which they were asked to 
take the role of an intelligence officer. They were shown a mock intelligence operation video 
of a secret break-in to an apartment. Participants were instructed either to tell the truth or lie 
about its contents in two interviews, one of which was immediately after watching the video 
and the other after an approximately two-week delay. The amount of visual, spatial, temporal, 
and action details, and between-statement consistency characteristics between the two 
interviews (reminiscences, repetitions, and omissions) in truth tellers’ and liars’ responses 
were analysed.    
In Study I (N = 143), three mnemonic techniques were tested: Context reinstatement, 
Sketch, and Event-line. In the immediate interview, participants were asked to provide a free 
recall and then asked to give further information via one of these three mnemonics. In the 
delayed interview, they were only asked to provide a free recall. Truth tellers reported more 
visual, spatial, temporal, and action details in the immediate and delayed interviews, 
regardless of which mnemonic technique was used. Truth tellers experienced more of a 
decline in reporting details after a delay than liars, thus showing more than liars, patterns of 
reporting indicative of genuine memory decay. Truth tellers and liars did not differ in terms 
of between-statement consistency. 
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In Study II (N = 49), the effects of the Sketch mnemonic on truth tellers’ and liars’ 
immediate and delayed responses were examined. Unlike Study I, in this experiment a free 
recall phase was not included in the immediate interview. Participants were only asked to 
draw a sketch of the apartment of the break-in, and to describe that sketch. In the immediate 
interviews, truth tellers reported more visual, spatial, temporal, and action details than liars. 
In the delayed interviews, truth tellers reported more spatial, temporal, and action details than 
liars. Truth tellers and liars reported a similar number of visual details in the delayed 
interviews. As in Study I, truth tellers more than liars, showed patterns indicative of genuine 
memory decay. Between-statement consistency did not differ between veracity groups. 
In Study III (N = 80), the effects of different interviewing techniques used in the 
immediate interview on truth tellers’ and liars’ delayed responses were examined. In the 
immediate interview participants were instructed either to report everything they 
remembered, or asked open-ended spatial questions related to the event. In the delayed 
interview all participants were asked to report everything they could remember. Truth tellers 
reported more visual, spatial, temporal and action details than liars, both immediately and 
after a delay, regardless of the interview technique used in the immediate interview. 
However, in the immediate interview the differences between truth tellers and liars were 
larger using the report everything mnemonic than using the spatial questions. Regarding 
between-statement consistency, truth tellers provided more reminiscences and repetitions and 
made fewer omissions than liars. 
In Study IV (N = 96), participants read the immediate and delayed statements from 
Study I and were asked to make veracity judgements. One group of participants was informed 
about the findings of Study I, and instructed to rely on these findings when making their 
veracity judgements. The other group was not informed about the findings of Study I. Results 
showed that deception detection accuracy did not differ between the informed and 
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uninformed groups. In addition, the majority of participants in both conditions based their 
decisions on unreliable cues to truth/deceit. 
The results of this thesis demonstrate that the way an interview immediately after an 
event is carried has an effect on later interviews, when it comes to discriminating between 
truthful and deceptive accounts. Practitioners need to be aware that it is important to conduct 
the first interview as soon as possible after an incident, and to use interview techniques that 
enhance complete statements from the interviewee in order to effectively detect deception in 
the further stages of the investigation. 
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Chapter 1: General Introduction 
20 
 
Deception is very much part of human behaviour. People lie because it is important 
for their survival (Goffman, 1959). Indeed, renowned German philosopher Friedrich 
Nietzsche argued that deception is necessary for our social existence (Nietzsche, 1896, as 
cited in Kaufmann, 1994). Modern research based on empirical evidence suggests that people 
lie to avoid bad feelings, to make positive impression on others, to gain psychological or 
material advantage, and/or avoid negative consequences (DePaulo, 1992; Vrij, 2008). In 
forensic settings, the latter motive is the most significant one. Interviewees may lie to protect 
themselves or others from punishment such as many years of incarceration. To examine 
effective ways to detect deception in criminal justice contexts is important for two reasons. 
First, the question of witness or suspect credibility is important for investigative and forensic 
professionals (Volbert & Steller, 2014; Vrij, 2015; Zöhner, 2011). Second, poor accuracy in 
deception detection may have severe consequences. An innocent person wrongly identified as 
telling a lie can falsely be convicted for the crime(s) she/he did not commit (Kassin, 2015). 
Conversely, a deceptive person wrongly identified as telling the truth could escape conviction 
and continue committing further crimes.    
The main question that arises is how can truths be distinguished from lies? In the 
second part of the last century, research in human behaviour mostly concentrated on the non-
verbal cues that could potentially indicate deception (Ekman & Friesen, 1969; Miller & Stiff, 
1993; Zuckerman, DePaulo, & Rosenthal, 1981). The motive to investigate non-verbal 
behaviour stemmed from the common stereotypical view that lying is morally wrong (Bok, 
1978; DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer, & Epstein, 1996; Robinson, 1994). If deception is 
considered morally wrong, then liars’ behaviour should be accompanied by typical reactions 
of nervousness, for example, gaze aversion or body movements (Inbau, Reid, Buckley, & 
Jayne, 2001). However, several meta analytical studies have shown that non-verbal cues to 
deceit are unreliable, with discrimination accuracy between truth tellers and liars typically not 
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much higher than chance level (DePaulo et al., 2003; Masip, Sporer, Garrido, & Herrero, 
2005; Sporer & Schwandt, 2006). Moreover, these studies have demonstrated that verbal cues 
are more accurate than non-verbal cues. Among one of the most diagnostic verbal cues 
typically found in deception research is the amount of detail reported (Amado, Arce, Fariña, 
& Vilarino, 2016; DePaulo et al., 2003; Vrij, 2008). That is, the more detailed the response of 
an interviewee is, the more likely it is that the response was truthful, and vice versa. 
Although the amount of details reported has been identified as one of the key cues to 
detect deception, in most studies interviews are conducted only once, typically immediately 
after an event (Vrij, 2008, 2016). However, in real-life forensic settings, the same person 
(crime victim, witness, suspect, or other source of information) is commonly interviewed 
about the same event more than once and at different points in time (Goldsmith, Koriat, & 
Pansky, 2005; Innes, 2000; Wysman, Scoboria, Gawrylowicz, & Memon, 2014). For 
example, a police officer may question the same suspect repeatedly to search for 
contradictions between his/her statements.  
Apart from time delay and the number of interviews conducted about the event in 
question, the diagnostic value of the cue ‘amount of detail’ can be affected by the questioning 
technique used during the interviewing. Researchers have shown that using specific 
techniques is more effective in eliciting verbal differences between truth tellers and liars than 
standard question-answer approaches (Hartwig, Granhag, & Luke, 2014; Mac Giolla, 
Granhag, & Vernham, 2017; Vrij, Fisher, & Blank, 2017). One of these fruitful techniques is 
memory-enhancing techniques, also called mnemonics (Fisher & Geiselman, 1992). 
Examination of mnemonic techniques is important because they are typically included in 
evidence-based investigative interviewing guidelines (Achieving Best Evidence in Criminal 
Proceedings, 2011; Meissner, Surmon-Böhr, Oleszkiewicz, & Alison, 2017). Previous studies 
have shown that use of mnemonics can be beneficial in detecting deception (Bembibre & 
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Higueras, 2011; Hernández-Fernaud & Alonso-Quecuty, 1997; Vrij et al., 2009). However, 
not many studies have focused on how they affect the amount of detail as a credibility cue in 
repeated interviews, which take part over a certain period of time. The use of mnemonic 
techniques in the immediate interview and their effects after a delay to detect deception is the 
main focus of this research.  
This thesis contains six chapters: In Chapter 1 (General Introduction), an overview of 
theoretical background and empirical evidence related to the topic of this research is 
presented. In Chapters 2-5 (Studies I-IV), the studies conducted in this thesis are presented. 
Finally, the overall findings of the thesis are discussed, and empirical considerations, 
practical recommendations, and conclusions are provided in Chapter 6 (General Discussion). 
      
1.1 The thesis 
 
In this thesis, the focus is on two periods of time of interviewing: Immediate, and 
after two-week delay. Previous research has demonstrated that high-quality (i.e., eliciting 
complete and accurate accounts) immediate interviewing can be beneficial for the delayed 
performance of truth tellers (e.g., inoculate against forgetting and result in less errors) than 
lower quality immediate interviewing (Bornstein, Liebel & Scarberry, 1998; Hope, Gabbert, 
Fisher, & Jamieson, 2014; Pansky & Nemets, 2012). In the current thesis, expansion on this 
knowledge is sought by examining whether high-quality immediate interviewing (i.e., using 
mnemonic techniques) can also be helpful to detect deception after a delay.  
The research conducted for this thesis is an effort to extend our theoretical and 
practical knowledge of deception detection in repeated interviewing across a passage of time 
using mnemonics. Regarding the theoretical perspective, the thesis contributes to the 
understanding of the reporting of information between immediate and delayed interviews by 
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truth tellers and liars. Do the patterns of reporting over time differ between truth tellers and 
liars? In other words, is the reporting of fabricated information similar to the reporting of 
information retrieved from memory of genuine experience(s), across the passage of time? 
From a practical perspective, this thesis is an attempt to examine whether mnemonics used in 
the immediate interviews could be helpful to distinguish between truthful and deceptive 
responses immediately and after a two-week delay.  
The thesis opens with an overview of theoretical background and empirical evidence 
related to the topic of this research. Specifically, Chapter 1 proceeds with Key terms and 
definitions (section 1.2) associated with memory and deception theories that were relevant for 
this research. Then, in a section 1.3 Information-gathering interviewing  different 
investigative interviewing approaches used in the criminal justice systems around the world 
and their relevance to lie detection are discussed. The next two sections are related to 
interviewing to detect deception: in 1.4 Verbal deception detection: Cognitive Credibility 
Assessment a theoretical rationale of the verbal differences between truthful and deceptive 
statements are provided, and several verbal lie detection interviewing techniques are 
introduced, and in 1.5 Detecting deception with mnemonic techniques how using memory-
enhancing techniques in interviews can contribute to verbal deception detection is reviewed. 
The following two sections are related to repeated interviewing. First, to understand how real 
memories are processed, the section 1.6 Memory and repeated interviewing: The role of 
initial interviewee’s account on delayed performance discusses how the quality of immediate 
reporting of information affects the subsequent truthful interviewee’s responses. Then, in 1.7 
Detecting deception in repeated delayed interviewing the differences between truth tellers 
and liars are reviewed in terms of two veracity cues, amount of detail, and between-statement 
consistency. The section 1.8 Accuracy in human veracity judgements discusses previous 
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research regarding laypeople’s and practitioners’ ability to detect truth and deceit. The final 
section (1.9) of Chapter 1 presents General and specific aims of this thesis. 
          
1.2 Key Terms and Definitions 
 
Deception. It is defined as a deliberate (successful or unsuccessful) attempt of a 
communicator to fabricate truthful information and present it to another person, without 
forewarning, with the purpose to make him/her believe that this information is true (Vrij, 
2008). The terms deception, deceit, lie, or fabrication will be used interchangeably in this 
thesis.    
Interviewing. In the criminal justice system, a distinction has been made between 
interviewing in law enforcement and intelligence-gathering settings (Evans, Meissner, 
Brandon, Russano, & Kleinman, 2010; Redlich, 2007). Law enforcement interviews are 
related to the questioning of a witness, victim, or suspect about a crime that occurred in the 
past. Intelligence interviews involve information-gathering from a source (e.g., informant) 
about the past, present, or possible upcoming criminal activities, which may not necessarily 
involve wrongdoing(s) by the source (Kelly, Miller, Redlich, & Kleinman, 2013). These two 
settings were not differentiated in the thesis. Verbal deception detection requires a certain 
level of cooperation from the interviewee (Vrij, 2015). It is impossible to assess credibility 
based on verbal cues when an interviewee does not say anything (e.g., a witness claims s/he 
‘does not remember anything’ about the event, or a suspect who exercises his/her right to 
remain silent). Although the studies of the thesis involved intelligence gathering scenarios as 
a stimulus material, research findings of the thesis could be applied to different real-life 
interviewing settings, as long as the interviewee produces speech.  
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Mnemonic techniques. Memory-enhancing (mnemonic) interview techniques are 
based on two key principles of human memory (Fisher & Geiselman, 1992). First, a memory 
trace has several features (e.g., visual, physical, or emotional) and the effectiveness of a 
retrieval cue is dependent on the amount of overlap between the retrieval cue and the encoded 
event (Flexser & Tulving, 1978). For example, a victim may find the name of the perpetrator 
difficult to remember when describing the incident, but recall it later when characterising 
what the offender looked like. Second, several retrieval paths to the encoded event may be 
available, so that information not accessible with one retrieval cue may become accessible 
with another (Tulving, 1974). For example, the interviewee may not report specific 
bystanders seen during an incident when asked a direct question, but may describe them 
when requested to draw a layout of that room. Four different mnemonic techniques were 
examined across the experiments conducted for this thesis: i) Context reinstatement (CR) 
(Study I) refers to asking interviewees to mentally recreate the to-be-recalled event, as well as 
their physiological, cognitive and emotional states at the time of the event (Fisher & 
Geiselman, 1992). They are typically asked to concentrate, shut their eyes, and ‘put’ 
themselves back in the situation from the very beginning of it; ii) Event-line (Study I) is 
based on the Timeline interviewing format developed by Hope, Mullis, and Gabbert (2013), 
which originally used a reporting format with a physical timeline to facilitate memory 
retrieval of multi perpetrators. The mnemonic is related to reproducing temporal context and 
sequence of actions in an event; iii) Sketch (Studies I and II) refers to making a drawing of a 
location of the event in question (Dando, Wilcock, & Milne, 2009). Sketching allows 
interviewees to initiate their own contextual retrieval cues. It is important to clarify the use of 
the term ’Sketch’ in this thesis. In the investigative interviewing literature this mnemonic is 
also known as ‘Sketch Reinstatement of Context’. However, in some sources the term 
‘Sketch’ can also be found, (e.g., Hope, Gabbert, & Fisher, 2011; Rivard, Fisher, Robertson, 
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& Mueller, 2014). In the deception literature, the term ‘Sketch’ (or ‘Drawing’) is more 
common (e.g., Roos af Hjelmsäter, Öhman, Granhag, & Vrij, 2014; Mac Giolla et al., 2017; 
Vrij et al., 2010). Therefore, it was decided to use the latter. Finally, iv) Report everything 
(Studies I and III) prompts interviewees to disclose all information they remember, whether it 
seems trivial or not. Recall of specific details may activate memories of other relevant details 
(Fisher & Geiselman, 1992; Fisher & Geiselman, 2010).      
Retrieval and reporting. Retrieval is the process of recalling information from the past 
which has been previously encoded and stored in memory (Reber, Reber, & Allen, 2009). 
This term is not equivalent to reporting of information. Reporting is characterised as verbally 
presenting the information following the interviewer’s request to do so. If an interviewee 
does not report specific details about a crime, it does not necessarily mean that s/he is unable 
to retrieve these unreported items from memory. Retrieval from memory was not examined in 
this thesis. It was focused on facilitating truth tellers’ reporting, and whether that differed 
from liars’ reporting of information. 
Delay. Also known as retention interval (e.g., Pansky, Koriat, & Goldsmith, 2005). 
Delay refers to the time from an initial exposure to a stimulus (e.g., witnessed crime) until a 
later request to recall it from memory (Reber et al., 2009).  In forensic settings, the delay time 
to recall the event in formal interviews can vary significantly (Read & Conolly, 2007). Given 
the aims of this thesis, here the delay is identified as the time interval (i.e., approx. two-
weeks) between the immediate and repeated interview. Therefore, the second (or, repeated) 
interview is referred to as the delayed interview in this research. 
Between-statement consistency. Consistency is defined as the quality of always 
behaving, performing, or happening in a similar way (Cambridge Dictionary, 2018). In 
interviewing within legal settings, consistency refers to a match of information within and/or 
between statements provided by one or a group of interviewees (Granhag & Strömwall, 1999). 
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Four types of consistency have been identified in the literature: i) consistency between details 
within one statement, called within-statement consistency; ii) consistency between different 
statements made by one person, called between-statement consistency; iii) consistency 
between statements reported by different individuals about the same event, called within-group 
consistency; and iv) consistency between the statement and evidence, called statement-
evidence consistency (Vredeveldt, van Koppen, & Granhag, 2014). As this thesis focused on 
repeated interviewing, only between-statement consistency was examined. Specifically, 
changes in the amount of details reported from the immediate to delayed interviews within 
truthful and deceptive accounts were measured in this thesis. Other types of consistency (e.g. 
statement-evidence consistency) were less associated with memory-related issues and therefore 
not measured. Three different (in)consistency characteristics typically used in deception 
studies were analysed: i) information not mentioned in one statement, but added in a subsequent 
statement (i.e., reminiscences); ii) information repeated from one statement to another (i.e., 
repetitions); and iii) information omitted from one statement to another (i.e., omissions; Deeb 
et al., 2017; Granhag, Mac Giolla, Sooniste, Strömwall, & Liu-Jonsson, 2016; Granhag & 
Strömwall, 2002). Contradictions, a fourth characteristic, do not occur often enough in most 
experimental deception research, and were therefore not included in any analyses within this 
thesis (Granhag et al., 2016).  
 
1.3 Information-gathering interviewing 
 
Credibility assessment in legal settings is usually inseparable from interviewing 
witnesses or suspects. Therefore, this thesis begins with a brief review of different 
interviewing approaches that are commonly used in criminal investigations, and their relation 
to deception detection.  
 
28 
 
Two main approaches of interviewing in legal settings have been identified: 
confession-oriented (Inbau, Reid, Buckley, & Jayne, 2013), and information-gathering 
techniques (Bull & Soukara, 2010; Meissner et al., 2014). The first questioning approach 
refers to interviews solely with suspects and focuses on obtaining a confession from the 
suspects. These techniques were derived from the psychological notions of social influence 
and persuasion (Zimbardo, 1967). The best known confession-oriented interviewing method 
is the Reid technique, created in 1947 by police officer John Reid in the United States, and 
revised repeatedly after that (Inbau et al., 2013). It typically includes accusations, 
manipulations, leading questions, and other psychologically coercive methods. With respect 
to deception, the Reid technique suggests that innocent and guilty suspects display different 
non-verbal responses during an interrogation. Suspects in denial (e.g. liars) should display 
more signs of nervousness, such as fidgeting or gaze aversion (Inbau et al., 2013). However, 
such claims are inconsistent with scientific research which found no relationship between 
non-verbal cues and deception (DePaulo et al., 2003; Vrij, 2008; Vrij, Mann, & Fisher, 
2006). Examining verbal cues to deceit, which tend to be more effective than non-verbal cues 
(DePaulo et al., 2003; Vrij, 2008), may be complicated with this approach, because the Reid 
technique encompasses interruptions and leading closed-ended questions with the only 
possible answers ‘yes’ or ‘no’. Simply put, this technique does not permit much opportunity 
to elicit full answers of what happened from an interviewee, which makes the analysis of 
verbal content difficult (Vrij, Meissner al., 2017). Overall, confession-oriented approaches 
lack sound theoretical rationale and empirical evidence and are controversial, because they do 
not meet ethical standards, are linked with false confessions, and are ineffective in terms of 
detecting deception (Hartwig, Luke, & Skerker, 2016; Meissner et al., 2014; Vrij, Meissner et 
al., 2017). 
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The second, information-gathering approach originated in England and Wales. After 
highly publicised cases of wrongful convictions, the legal framework called the Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) was introduced in 1984. This legal act imposed restrictions 
on the detention, treatment and questioning of suspects in police custody, and introduced 
mandatory tape recordings of all interrogations (Code C and Code E; Ozin & Norton, 2015). 
This approach differs from confession-based interviewing in that it focuses on yielding as 
much information as possible. In other words, the goal of information-gathering interviewing 
is to establish an account of what has happened. In this approach the questioning of suspects 
is similar to that of victims and witnesses: to aid investigators in generating an accurate and 
complete picture of what has happened (Hartwig et al., 2016). Interviewing techniques 
related to information-gathering are ethical and based on empirically tested theories about 
human communication, conversation management, and the psychology of memory (Clarke, 
Milne, & Bull, 2011). The best known information-gathering interviewing method is called 
the PEACE model, an acronym identifying five stages of an interview: Planning and 
preparation, Engage and explain, Account, Closure, and Evaluation (Milne & Bull, 1999). 
The PEACE model is widely accepted in Western Europe and in some countries outside 
Europe (e.g., Australia, New Zealand, and Canada; Snook, Eastwood, Stinson, Tedeschini, & 
House, 2010). It is non-accusatory, focusing on the importance of honesty, rapport building, 
active listening, and appropriate questioning to search for the truth (Oxburgh, Fahsing, 
Haworth, & Blair, 2016). With respect to verbal deception detection, information-gathering 
interviewing is more useful than the confession-based approach for verbal lie detection 
purposes. Interviewing techniques related to gathering of information elicit detailed responses 
from interviewees which subsequently can be used to infer the interviewee’s credibility. 
Interviewing techniques (including mnemonics) that fit the PEACE model have been 
created or adapted for verbal lie detection purposes (Gozna & Horvath, 2009; Vrij et al., 2017). 
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The next section will provide the theoretical background of verbal differences between truth 
tellers and liars and will introduce specific interviewing techniques that contribute to effective 
deception detection.  
 
1.4 Verbal deception detection: Cognitive Credibility Assessment 
 
1.4.1 Theoretical background 
The theoretical rationale regarding the amount of detail reported as a credibility cue is 
based on the assumption that truth tellers and liars have different mental states during an 
interview (Granhag & Hartwig, 2015; Vrij, 2008). The approach, called Cognitive Credibility 
Assessment (CCA; Vrij, 2018), proposes that in interview settings lying is typically more 
mentally demanding than truth telling (Zuckerman et al., 1981; Buller & Burgoon, 1996), and 
that this difference can be further enhanced through specific interventions (Vrij, 2008, 2015). 
Elements that contribute to a liar’s enhanced cognitive load are preparing a convincing story 
(Hartwig, Granhag, & Strömwall, 2007), suppressing the truth (Verschuere, Spruyt, Meijer, 
& Otgaar, 2011), remembering what was said earlier (Granhag & Strömwall, 1999), 
controlling their verbal and non-verbal behaviour (DePaulo & Kirkendol, 1989; Baumeister, 
1998), monitoring an interviewer’s reactions (Buller & Burgoon, 1996; Schweitzer, Brodt, & 
Croson, 2002), reminding themselves to act and role-play (DePaulo et al., 2003), and 
providing justification for their lies (Levine, Kim, & Hamel, 2010).  
Regarding the amount of detail reported, truth tellers often provide more details than 
liars (Amado et al., 2016), influenced by the different strategies used by truth tellers and liars 
in an interview (Hartwig et al., 2007). Truth tellers typically employ a forthcoming strategy 
to achieve the goal of being believed (Granhag & Hartwig, 2008). They may hold a belief in 
a just world (Lerner, 1980) which suggests that people believe that the world is fair and that 
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someone receives what s/he deserves. Therefore, truth tellers may believe that if they are 
forthcoming, they will be believed (Feather, 1999). In addition, according to the illusion of 
transparency (Gilovich, Savitsky, & Medvec, 1998; Savitsky & Gilovich, 2003), people 
believe that their true feelings and intentions will be apparent to others. Therefore, when 
being forthcoming truth tellers may believe that their honesty will be evident to the 
interviewer. Liars also share the goal of being believed during the interview. However, they 
do not take their credibility for granted. Therefore, they employ counter-interrogation 
strategies to achieve their goal (Hartwig et al., 2007). Liars tend to experience an 
information-management dilemma (Granhag & Hartwig, 2008). Feigning memory loss or 
providing only ‘I don’t know’ answers will not give leads to investigators but may hamper 
their credibility because it results in statements that lack detail. Therefore, liars need to 
provide details to make a convincing impression, but they need to withhold from reporting 
some details to avoid the risk of getting caught.  
Counter-interrogation strategies used by liars can be understood through the lens of 
self-regulation theory (Carver & Sheier, 2002). Psychology of self-regulation refers to a 
conscious personal management of processes (thoughts, behaviours, and feelings) aimed at 
controlling and directing the person towards desired goals or away from undesirable 
outcomes (Fiske & Taylor, 2008). The desired goal for liars is to convince the interviewer 
that the statement is true, and undesired outcome for them is to get caught in lying. It can be 
argued that under some circumstances truth tellers can also experience an information-
management dilemma during the interview. For example, an innocent person suspected of 
rape can avoid mentioning that s/he was indeed flirting, because such information could raise 
suspicion. However, research with both laypeople and individuals with a criminal history 
have shown that truth tellers were more likely to use forthcoming strategies, and liars more 
commonly used counter-interrogation strategies (Granhag & Hartwig, 2008).  
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1.4.2 Interviewing with CCA to detect deceit  
Probably the two main interviewing approaches to elicit differences between truth 
tellers and liars identified in the literature are: The Strategic Use of Evidence (SUE; Granhag 
& Hartwig, 2015) and CCA (Vrij, 2018). The SUE interviewing technique refers to 
interviews with suspects and is based on the idea of asking questions related to the evidence 
without making the suspect aware that the investigator possesses this evidence. In this thesis 
the focus will be on CCA because using mnemonics is related to this verbal lie detection 
interviewing approach.  
The CCA comprises three interviewing techniques: Imposing cognitive load, asking 
unexpected questions, and encouraging interviewees to say more (Vrij, 2018). Imposing 
cognitive load refers to situations where investigators can exploit the different mental states 
of truth tellers and liars by making interview settings cognitively more challenging. For 
example, interviewees can be asked to engage in a concurrent, second, task when reporting 
the event (e.g., telling what happened while gripping an object, Visu-Petra, Varga, Miclea, & 
Visu-Petra, 2013). Mental resources of liars are more depleted than truth tellers. Therefore, 
they tend to be less able to cope with additional requests than truth tellers (Debey, 
Verschuere, & Crombez, 2012). Another technique, asking unexpected questions, is based on 
the assumption that liars prepare themselves to answer the questions they expect to be asked 
(Hartwig et al., 2007). Therefore, liars experience more difficulties when responding to 
unexpected than to expected questions or tasks, whereas truth tellers answer either with 
similar ease because they rely on their real experiences (Lancaster, Vrij, Hope, & Waller, 
2013). Finally, the encouraging interviewees to say more technique is related to creating a 
setting in which interviewees are encouraged to provide more details. Truth tellers then tend 
to report more details than liars, because liars are not inclined to say much out of fear that the 
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additional details they report will give leads to investigators and hence give their lies away 
(Granhag & Hartwig, 2008; Nahari, Vrij, & Fisher, 2014).  
Using mnemonics is part of the CCA approach to encouraging interviewees to say 
more. A recent meta-analysis examined the effectiveness of the CCA approach (Vrij et al., 
2017) and showed that encouraging interviewees to say more techniques produced better 
discrimination between truth tellers and liars than standard interviewing approaches. 
           
1.4.3 Verbal content of the statements 
To examine differences between truth tellers and liars using the CCA approach, the 
verbal content in their reports is analysed. Statements provided by interviewees contain 
different types of detail. Two most widely used and scientifically examined statement analysis 
tools are criteria-based content analysis (CBCA; Steller & Köhnken, 1989) and reality 
monitoring (RM; Johnson & Raye, 1981). CBCA is based on the hypothesis, originally stated 
by German psychologist Udo Undeutsch, that a statement derived from memory of an actual 
experience differs in content and quality from a statement based on invention or fantasy, known 
as the Undeutsch hypothesis (Undeutsch, 1967). The tool consists of 19 criteria (e.g., logical 
structure, contextual embeddings, quantity of details, and descriptions of interactions), and 
trained evaluators judge the presence or absence of these criteria (Vrij, 2008, 2015). The core 
idea of CBCA is that the presence of each criterion strengthens the hypothesis that the statement 
is based on genuine personal experience. Although the tool was originally designed to assess 
children’s credibility when they may be victims of sexual abuse and is used as evidence in 
court, for example, in Germany, it now also has applications for adult witnesses or suspects 
(Vrij, 2008).  
Another tool, RM, is the detail scoring method typically used in deception studies (Vrij, 
2015). The core idea of RM is that memories of real experiences differ from memories based 
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on imagination (Johnson & Raye, 1981). Genuine experiences are obtained through perceptual 
processes and, therefore, are likely to contain sensory (e.g., visual, auditory, or olfactory), 
contextual (e.g., spatial, temporal), and affective (details about people’s feelings) information. 
Such memories are usually clear and vivid. In contrast, recollections of imagined events 
originate from an internal source, and are therefore, likely to involve cognitive operations, such 
as thoughts and reasonings (e.g., ‘I must have stayed at home that day as I was waiting for a 
parcel delivery’). Memories of imagined events are typically vaguer and less concrete than 
memories of real events (Vrij, 2008, 2015).  
RM deception researchers argued that truth tellers’ reports are based on real memories 
and liars’ reports are based on imagined memories. Experimental research using the RM 
approach has shown differences between truth tellers and liars in terms of reporting RM 
criteria (Masip et al., 2005; Vrij, 2008). Specifically, it was found that truth tellers reported 
more perceptual, spatial, and temporal information than liars. However, the RM approach has 
an important limitation. The main assumption of this concept is related to differentiation 
between real experiences and imagined events, yet it is known that not all lies are complete 
fabrications which a person did not at some time experience (Vrij, 2008, 2015). A liar can 
describe an actually experienced event by just changing and/or omitting some crucial details. 
For example, a suspect can tell the truth about spending the night in a bar, but avoid 
mentioning his/her involvement in the fight there. Or someone can report an event (e.g. going 
to a restaurant) completely and truthfully but lie about when the visit to the restaurant 
occurred. Research has shown that liars tend to include truthful parts in their stories (Hartwig 
et al., 2007; Harvey, Vrij, Leal, Hope, & Mann, 2017) and the more truthful a deceptive 
statement is, the more difficult it can be for RM to distinguish such a deceptive statement 
from an entirely truthful statement. 
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In studies examining the CCA approach, RM details have often been analysed 
(Lancaster et al., 2013; Porter et al., 2018; Vrij et al., 2009). Four RM types of detail were used 
in this thesis to examine reports from  truth tellers and liars: Visual details, specific 
items/description of items seen by the interviewee (e.g., ‘table’, ‘phone’, ‘wallet’); spatial 
details, information about locations or spatial arrangements of people or objects (e.g., ‘to the 
left’, ‘behind’, ‘upstairs’); temporal details, refer to the sequence of activities, their duration, 
or information when something happened (e.g., ‘in the beginning’, ‘for five minutes’, ‘it was 
late evening’); and action details, information about the actions carried out by people in the 
event (‘picked up’, ‘walked’, ‘talking to her’).  Other types of RM detail were not examined 
because they were absent from the stimulus material (e.g., auditory, olfactory, and tactile 
details) used in the studies of this thesis, or found to be unreliable for distinguishing truthful 
and deceptive statements in previous deception research (e.g., cognitive operations; Masip et 
al., 2005).  
 
1.5 Detecting deception with mnemonic techniques 
 
Originally, specific mnemonic techniques were created to improve investigative 
interviewing with cooperative witnesses (Fisher & Geiselman, 1992). Research over the last 
few decades has shown that compared to standard interview approaches, the Cognitive 
Interview (CI) - which consists of mnemonic techniques - increased the amount of correct 
information without the cost of increased error rate from the interviewees (Köhnken, Milne, 
Memon, & Bull, 1999; Memon, Meissner, & Fraser, 2010). Given these documented benefits 
of using memory-enhancing techniques with truthful individuals, it can be hypothesised that 
these techniques could be effective in detecting deception. The rationale behind this 
assumption is that using mnemonics should help truth tellers to report more information, 
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whereas it should not result in the same amount of additional information from liars because 
they typically face information-management issues during interviews, as described above. 
Previous findings have shown that the use of mnemonics differentiate between 
truthful and deceptive statements. In one study, truth tellers and liars were interviewed with 
the CI, or with a standard interview protocol that did not contain mnemonics (Hernández & 
Alonso-Quecuty, 1997). Truth tellers reported more spatial, temporal, and sensory details 
than liars, particularly when the CI was used. In another study, results suggested that the CI 
was more efficient than a standard interview in discriminating between truth tellers and liars 
when examining actions and objects details (Bembibre & Higueras, 2011). In a recent study 
using three different samples from Russia, USA, and Republic of Korea, the instruction to 
sketch while narrating the story produced more new details from truth tellers than liars, 
whereas no difference was found between veracity groups in reporting details when no 
instruction to sketch was given (Vrij et al., 2018). Some other studies have demonstrated the 
effectiveness of the CI to detect deception, although they did not include comparison 
(control) groups. For example, in a study where interviewees were questioned with the CI one 
week after a mock theft event, truthful accounts contained more details than deceptive 
accounts (Colwell, Hiscock-Anisman, Memon, Taylor, & Prewett, 2007). In another study, 
when context reinstatement and the report everything mnemonics were used, temporal and 
auditory details were more frequent in truthful than in deceptive accounts (Memon, Fraser, 
Colwell, Odinot, & Mastroberardino, 2010). Recently, a version of the CI for use with 
suspects adapted by Geiselman (2012) was examined (Logue, Book, Frosina, Huizinga, & 
Amos, 2015). This version contained the sketch mnemonic. Truth tellers reported more 
visual, spatial, temporal, auditory, cognitive, and affective details than liars. In summary, 
previous findings suggest that mnemonics can aid in effective discrimination between truthful 
and deceptive accounts. As this thesis focuses on deception detection using mnemonic 
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techniques in repeated interviewing, it is first important to discuss how the quality of 
immediate interviewing affects the memories of truth tellers in delayed interviews.  
  
1.6 Memory and repeated interviewing: The role of initial interviewee’s account on 
delayed performance 
 
Immediate interviewing is relevant because items of information are more accessible 
in interviewees’ memory shortly after an event than over longer periods of time. From early 
memory research it is known that learned information tends to be forgotten over time when 
there are no attempts to retain it (Ebbinghaus, 1885/1913; Lawson & London, 2015; Turtle & 
Yuille, 1994). When the information has not been ‘used’ (retrieved), memory traces weaken 
and the amount of recalled information can systematically decrease after a time delay 
(Pansky et al., 2005; Rubin & Wenzel, 1996). Different studies have shown a significant 
decrease of recalled information in the absence of retrieval practice (Evans & Fisher, 2011; 
Odinot & Wolters, 2006; Schacter, 1999). Retrieval practice, or testing effect, refers to an act 
of recalling to mind a previously experienced event or learned information (Roediger & 
Butler, 2011). Research has shown that memory testing soon after an event may have 
beneficial effects of ‘inoculating’ witness memory against forgetting (Bornstein et al., 1998; 
Gabbert, Hope, & Fisher, 2009; Pansky & Nemets, 2012).        
The quality of immediate recall can also influence reporting of information later on. 
The spreading activation theory of memory suggests that memory functions as a network 
system with associative links (Anderson, 1983). The activation of specific items during 
retrieval strengthens memory traces of these items. Moreover, memories of associated but not 
practiced pieces of information are also strengthened. An immediate, high-quality, recall 
enhances subsequent recall attempts from episodic memory because it strengthens activation 
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levels of items and the associations between them (Anderson, 1983). Hence, the more 
information is represented at the immediate attempt, the more it is accessible at the repeated 
retrieval attempts. Conversely, incomplete initial recall attempts can impair later recall. 
Specifically, if an initial account of the interviewee contains little detail, the quantity of 
information may be impeded in his/her delayed account because of reduced accessibility to 
information that was not recalled initially (Hope et al., 2014; Levy & Anderson, 2002). Thus, 
if initial accounts are not as complete as possible, there is a risk of substantial loss of 
information when the event is reported at later occasions (Macleod, 2002). In interviewing 
settings, it can result in an interviewee’s impaired memory of the important information for a 
case (Shaw, Bjork, & Handal, 1995). 
Previous research has demonstrated that appropriate immediate interviewing can help 
to elicit more information and produce fewer errors from the interviewee than immediate 
questioning eliciting less complete accounts. In a study with police call centre handlers it was 
found that the report everything instruction elicited significantly more information from 
interviewees than both the ‘five Wh- questioning strategy’ and a control condition (in which 
they were simply asked to provide brief details about the incident), with no differences in 
accuracy rates of reported information across conditions (Pescod, Wilcock, & Milne, 2013). 
Previous studies also found that interview formats that elicit high-quality (i.e. complete and 
accurate) initial accounts enhanced the amount and accuracy of reported information after a 
delay. For example, in one experiment participants viewed a film about an attempted car 
break-in (Gabbert et al., 2009). Half of the participants provided initial reports with the Self-
Administered Interview (SAI) tool comprising five different sections of instructions (CR, 
report everything, person descriptions, sketch, and other information) that were designed to 
facilitate the reporting of information. The other half of witnesses was not interviewed 
immediately. When all participants were requested to complete a free recall test after a one 
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week delay, the SAI group reported more information than the witnesses without an initial 
interview. However, a limitation of this study was that it did not contain any other immediate 
interview format as a comparison to the SAI. A follow-up study addressed this issue (Hope et 
al., 2014). Mock witnesses either initially provided an account with the SAI, or made a free 
recall, or did not report information. All participants were then interviewed with the CI after 
one week. The initial accounts of participants were more complete using the SAI than the free 
recall. Also, the SAI group provided more detailed accounts after the delay than participants 
in the other two conditions. Overall, scientific evidence has shown that the immediate and 
high-quality interviewing can be beneficial for the delayed interviewees’ memory 
performance. The next section will overview the role of immediate interviewing on delayed 
reporting of information with regard to deception detection.    
 
1.7 Detecting deception in repeated delayed interviewing 
 
Lie detection in the context of repeated interviews with respect to the cues typically 
examined in verbal deception research will be discussed: Amount of details reported in a 
statement, and between-statement consistency (Amado et al., 2016; Vrij et al., 2017; 
Vredeveldt et al., 2014).    
  
1.7.1 Amount of reported details in the accounts 
Only a few deception studies examined the amount of details in repeated statements 
that were reported over different periods of time. In one study, participants witnessed a staged 
robbery (Granhag & Strömwall, 2002). They were interviewed three times about that event, 
the same day, after four days, and after seven days. The results showed no differences in the 
number of visual, temporal, auditory, and location details reported by liars and truth-tellers in 
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any of the three interviewing sessions. In another study, pairs of truth tellers and pairs of liars 
were tasked to have lunch together, or create a story of having had lunch together (Granhag, 
Strömwall, & Johnson, 2003). They were interviewed immediately after the alleged lunch 
and again after a one-week delay. Truthful statements contained more information than 
deceptive statements during both interviews. A limitation of those studies was that the 
participants were not tasked to do their best to be believable during the interviews, a 
condition necessary to mirror real life situations. Research has shown that truthful responses 
differ from deceptive responses more when interviewees are motivated to be believed 
(DePaulo et al., 2003). In a more recent study in which this motivation requirement was met, 
participants were asked to either carry out non-criminal activities (truth tellers), or commit a 
mock theft which they then should deny during the interview (liars) (Nahari, 2018). In a 
condition where suspects were interviewed repeatedly, truth tellers reported more perceptual 
and contextual details than liars, both immediately and after a two-week delay.  In general, 
given the findings of these few studies it is difficult to make any conclusions about the role of 
immediate interviewing to detect deception after a delay.  
Although the effects of immediate interviewing on deception detection in subsequent 
interviewing are unknown, there is research evidence about the negative effects of delay 
(without immediate testing) to differentiate between truth tellers and liars. In one study, pairs 
of participants were asked either to have lunch together (truth tellers), or commit a mock theft 
and then create an alibi of having had lunch together (liars) (Vrij et al., 2009). Participants 
were interviewed either immediately, or after a one-week delay. Results showed that truthful 
pairs reported more details than deceptive pairs in the immediate interview, however, this 
difference was no longer significant in the delayed interview. Similarly, in a recent study, in 
which participants carried out a mock intelligence operation, it was found that truth tellers 
reported more details than liars when they were interviewed immediately, but there was no 
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difference in the amount of details after a three-week delay (Harvey et al., 2017). In Nahari 
(2018), it was found that truth tellers demonstrated larger variability than liars in the amount 
of details they reported across different delay periods. Specifically, truth tellers provided 
more information when they were interviewed immediately compared to when they were 
interviewed two weeks after the event. However, liars reported a similar amount of details, 
regardless of the retention interval between the incident and the interview. Moreover, some 
studies have shown that delay can negatively affect the efficacy of credibility assessment 
tools. For example, when examining the accuracy of discriminating truth tellers from liars 
using physiological electrodermal measure and symptom validity tests (Nahari & Ben-
Shakhar. 2011) it was found that the tools were more efficient in detecting truth tellers and 
liars for reporting peripheral (unrelated to the crime) details, when participants were tested 
immediately than after a one-week delay. In another study, the verbal quality of statements 
provided by truth tellers and liars was assessed using two credibility tools, RM and CBCA 
(McDougall & Bull, 2015). Truthful statements achieved higher RM and CBCA scores than 
deceptive statements, but only when interviews were conducted shortly after the mock crime 
event. The RM and CBCA scores did not differ across veracity conditions when interviewees 
were questioned after 7-10 days.  
Overall, previous research suggests that a time delay between an event and interview 
may hamper discrimination between truthful and deceptive accounts based on the amount of 
provided details. A possible explanation for this is that delay affects memories of truth tellers, 
i.e., they remember less information over time, but that fabricated accounts do not depend to 
the same extent on the passage of time after the event, because liars have the opportunity to 
fabricate information. A study of Nahari (2018) demonstrated that liars were less dependent 
on time delay than truth tellers. Specifically, when liars incorporate truthful elements in their 
stories, they could also experience a decline in truthful details after the delay. However, liars 
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fixed the problem by adding false (unverifiable) details to their stories to make an honest 
impression (Nahari, 2018). Liars’ tendency to add details could be explained through ‘the 
stability bias’. Liars typically experience difficulties in understanding the real nature of 
memory, including the effects of a time delay (Harvey et al., 2017). It is more important for 
liars to bear in mind a sufficient amount of detail in their story as an important factor to be 
believed by the interviewer (Hartwig et al., 2007; Nahari et al., 2014). Therefore, they may be 
unwilling to reduce the amount of detail after the delay below a threshold perceived as 
necessary to appear genuine. A solution is to add fabricated details.  
If passage of time does not affect the quantity of details liars report, it is worth 
exploring ways to facilitate truth tellers reporting more information and thus maintaining 
richness of detail as a diagnostic credibility cue even after a delay. In this thesis whether 
using mnemonic techniques in the immediate interview can show this potential in detecting 
deception after a delay was investigated.  
 
1.7.2 Between-statement consistency 
When an interviewee is questioned several times about one incident, the question of 
consistency between his/her statements is often raised by legal professionals (de Keijser, 
Malsch, Kranendonk, & de Gruijter, 2011; Granhag & Strömwall, 2001; Krix, Sauerland, 
Lorei, & Rispens, 2015). Practitioners tend to believe that consistency is an indicator of 
truthfulness, and inconsistency is a sign of lying (Bogaard, Meijer, Vrij, & Merckelbach, 
2016; de Keijser et al., 2011). However, research has revealed that truth tellers can be equally 
or even less consistent than liars (Vredeveldt et al., 2014). For example, in an experiment 
with pairs of suspects, no differences were found between truth tellers and liars in terms of 
the amount of reported repetitions and omissions, however, truth tellers reported more 
reminiscences than liars (Granhag et al., 2003). Other research has shown that truth tellers 
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were equally or less consistent than liars when interviewees were children (Strömwall & 
Granhag, 2005); when the interviewee was or was not very familiar with the environment of 
the event (Deeb et al., 2018); or when suspects were interviewed about future intentions 
(Granhag et al., 2016). 
A theoretical rationale to account for liars‘ tendency to be consistent between their 
statements was proposed by Granhag and Strömwall (1999): the repeat vs. reconstruct 
hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, liars believe that being consistent is important in 
order to make an honest impression. Liars are therefore keen to repeat their original story 
when they are interviewed again. In contrast, truth tellers are less concerned with what they 
reported in previous interviews. They try to remember the event in question again when 
asked about it and, due to the reconstructive nature of human memory, add, omit or alter 
details in the repeated interview (Baddeley, Eysenck, Anderson & Anderson, 2009; Loftus, 
2003). Specifically, repeated retrieval attempts may lead to the recall of previously 
inaccessible memories, although some previously remembered information may also be 
likely to be unreported. In sum, the repeat vs. reconstruct hypothesis suggests that the ‘repeat’ 
strategy used by liars during interviews should promote consistencies, and the 
‘reconstructive’ nature of truth tellers’ reporting of information should promote various 
inconsistencies between their responses (Odinot & Wolters, 2006; Roediger, McDermott, & 
Goff, 1997; Turtle & Yuille, 1994). 
Liars can be less consistent than truth tellers when specific interviewing techniques 
are used (Vredeveldt et al., 2014), often related to imposing cognitive load on the interviewee 
(Vrij, 2008, 2015). For example, research suggests that liars become less consistent than truth 
tellers when the question format changes between interviews (Deeb et al., 2017; Leins, 
Fisher, & Vrij, 2012). In one experiment, truth tellers were requested to enter a room and 
perform a few tasks, whereas liars were asked to pretend and convince the interviewer that 
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they performed the same tasks as the truth tellers (Leins et al., 2012). Participants were 
interviewed twice, and were asked to report information either verbally or through sketching 
the scene. Liars were less consistent than truth tellers between the interviews, and this 
difference was larger when the modalities from the first to the second interview changed 
(verbal-sketch, or vice versa). In a recent study, participants were interviewed twice about 
two mock intelligence events (Deeb et al., 2017). Truth tellers were asked to describe both 
events truthfully, whereas liars were asked to tell the truth about one event but to lie about the 
other event. Three different interview formats were used in the study: a request to provide a 
free recall, questions about one event at a time, or questions about the two events in random 
order. Participants were interviewed repeatedly either using the same (provide free recall 
twice), or different interview formats (first free recall, then either sequential or random order 
questions). Liars were less consistent (i.e., reported fewer repetitions) than truth tellers, when 
interviews changed from free recall to randomly ordered questions about the two events. 
These findings can be explained in terms of cognitive flexibility (Leins et al., 2012). As truth 
tellers’ statements are based on real memories which are typically multi-dimensional, their 
ability to report details consistently should not be constrained by the interviewing format. 
However, liars’ cognitive flexibility should be affected by the interview format. Specifically, 
when questioning formats are the same across interviews, liars should not experience 
difficulties in maintaining their ‘repeat’ strategy in order to be consistent.  However, when 
the modalities differ between interviews, liars should have more difficulty to use this 
strategy, thus, constraining consistency between the statements. In sum, previous research 
suggests that truth tellers can be equally or less consistent than liars when the interviewer 
employs the same questions/instructions across the interviews. However, liars may 
experience more difficulties to be as consistent as truth tellers, when questioning is not 
identical across the interviews.  
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   In this thesis, not only the effects of mnemonic techniques on eliciting differences 
between truth tellers’ and liars’ responses were of interest, but also the ability of observers to 
detect these differences. The following section discusses the accuracy of human judgements 
about truths and lies. 
 
1.8 Accuracy in human veracity judgements 
 
In real life practitioners make credibility judgements based on the statement(s) 
provided by the interviewee. If statistical analyses indicate that using specific interviewing 
techniques are effective in distinguishing truth tellers from liars, it does not necessarily mean 
that these differences will be detected by an interviewer with the same success in a particular 
interviewee. Researchers have shown that both laypeople and professionals are typically poor 
at detecting lies, with accuracy rates not much higher than chance level (Bond & DePaulo, 
2006). One reason for this low accuracy is that most cues to deception are weak, and people 
tend to make veracity judgements based on these unreliable cues (Global Deception Research 
Team, 2006; Hartwig & Bond, 2011; Vrij, 2008). 
Detection of deception can improve when people rely on the correct verbal cues. In 
one study it was found that police officers’ accuracy rates were positively associated with 
their decisions having been based on content-related cues (Mann, Vrij, & Bull, 2004). 
Another study showed that undergraduate students and police officers with better insight into 
verbal cues to deception increased their accuracy in identifying truthful statements (Bogaard 
& Meijer, 2018). A recent meta-analysis showed that training into cues to deception 
improved lie detection accuracy, but only if the training was based on verbal content cues 
(Hauch, Sporer, Michael, & Meissner, 2016). Finally, in a study where some college students 
and police officers were coached to look at consistencies or evasive answers in repeated 
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statements (Masip et al., 2018), it was found that coached participants performed better in 
identifying truthful and deceptive statements than uninstructed individuals. 
 
To summarise the introduction of this thesis, scientific evidence has demonstrated that 
specific interviewing techniques (e.g., mnemonics) can be effective in verbal lie detection. 
However, such benefits are typically achieved when an interview is conducted shortly after 
the event in question. A time delay between an incident and the first interview can impair 
differentiation between truth tellers and liars with respect to the amount of reported 
information. Not much is known about how mnemonic techniques used in the immediate 
interview can affect the delayed statements of truth tellers and liars. In addition, it is 
important to extend the knowledge about between-statement (in)consistency of truth tellers 
and liars, and observers’ lie detection accuracy in the context of using mnemonics in repeated 
interviewing. 
 
1.9 General and specific aims 
 
The thesis has four general aims: i) to examine how mnemonic techniques used in the 
immediate interview affected immediate and delayed statements of truth tellers and liars; ii) 
to assess how the amount of details reported changed between immediate and delayed 
interviews within truthful and deceptive statements; iii) to examine the consistency of truth 
tellers’ and liars’ statements across interviews; and iv) to examine the extent to which 
observers can distinguish truths from lies in the repeated statements, when applying 
mnemonic techniques in the immediate interview. 
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Table 1.1  
Overview of the studies of this thesis 
Study 
No. 
N Location Independent variables Dependent variables 
I 143 University of 
Portsmouth, 
United Kingdom 
Between-subjects factors: 
Veracity (Truthful vs. Deceptive) 
Immediate Mnemonic (Context 
Reinstatement  vs. Sketch vs. Event-line) 
 
Within-subjects factor: 
Time of Interview (Immediate vs. Delayed)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Types of detail: 
Visual, spatial, temporal, 
and action details 
 
Between-statement 
consistency: 
Reminiscences, 
repetitions, and 
omissions 
 
 
II 
 
 
49 University of 
Portsmouth, 
United Kingdom 
Between-subjects factor: 
Veracity (Truthful vs. Deceptive) 
 
Within-subjects factor: 
Time of Interview (Immediate vs. Delayed) 
III 80 University of 
Gothenburg, 
Sweden 
Between-subjects factors: 
Veracity (Truthful vs. Deceptive) 
Immediate interview (Report Everything vs. 
Spatial Questions) 
 
Within-subjects factor: 
Time of Interview (Immediate vs. Delayed) 
IV 96 University of 
Portsmouth, 
United Kingdom 
Between-subjects factor: 
Instruction (Informed group vs. Uninformed 
group) 
Veracity judgements 
 
Self-reported cues to 
truth/deceit 
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Table 1.2  
Instructions of mnemonic techniques used in the thesis 
Interview instruction Study 
Report everything: 
“Report all details that you can remember about the break-in, including descriptions of objects 
and locations, the sequence of actions, and information about any people that were involved, 
including other witnesses or passers-by. Do not guess about details that you cannot remember.” 
Study I, 
Study III 
CR: 
“I want you to take me back to the very start of that event, to the moment you entered the 
community centre. Take a few moments to picture in your mind where you were and what you 
saw at the time. Think about who you were with and what you could see during the event, 
including descriptions of objects and locations, and the sequence of actions. Give yourself plenty 
of time to concentrate, and visualise what happened during that event. It may help to shut your 
eyes while you remember the event. Now tell me everything you remember.” 
Study I 
Sketch: 
“I will ask you to make a sketch of the community centre you have broken into. Making a sketch 
of the scene may help you to remember details – and provide further information about the 
community centre. Please use as much space as you need to sketch it as you remember it. You 
should include as many details as possible, including as much information as you can about 
where different objects were in relation to other objects. You can use labels and notes within 
your sketch to indicate features of the scene, or to indicate if you are not certain of something. 
This is not a test of your drawing ability – we are only interested in the layout of the apartment, 
that is, what you saw, and where. Sketch it in silence. After participant made the sketch, the 
following instruction was given: 
“I now want you to describe your sketch to me in so much detail that I would be able to make 
your sketch based on what you said. Thus, use words rather than just pointing at your sketch.” 
Study I, 
Study II 
Event-line: 
“Now we are going to ask you to complete an ‘Event-line’. The purpose of the event-line is to 
help you organise your memory of the break-in. Importantly, it should help you put your account 
of the incident in the right order. This will be an initial account of the period of time you spent in 
the building, from the beginning until the end. You should use this opportunity to recall and 
report what activities you engaged in and when these took place along the event-line. Write down 
what happened in the empty space below the event-line and then put an arrow on the event-line 
indicating the time of the activity. Complete the event-line in silence. After participant completed 
the event-line, the following instruction was given: “I want you to describe your event-line to me 
in so much detail that I would be able to make your event-line based on what you said.” 
Study I  
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In the experiments (Studies I, II, and III) conducted for this thesis participants were 
interviewed twice: immediately after the event and after a two-week delay. Different 
mnemonic techniques were employed in the immediate interviews. Regarding the specific 
aims, Study I investigated how three mnemonic techniques (context reinstatement, sketch, or 
event-line) employed in an interview conducted immediately after an event affected truth 
tellers’ and liars’ responses when they were interviewed again after a two-week delay.  
The aim of Study II was to assess how the sketch mnemonic technique affected 
truthful and deceptive immediate and delayed statements. The aim of Study III was to 
examine how two different types of interviewing (report everything mnemonic vs. spatial 
open-ended questions) used in an interview conducted shortly after an event affected truth 
tellers’ and liars’ responses when they were interviewed again after a two-week delay. In 
Studies I, II, and III, the number of visual, spatial, temporal and action details, and the 
number of consistency characteristics (reminiscences, repetitions, and omissions; Granhag & 
Strömwall, 2002; Granhag et al., 2016; Deeb et al., 2017) were analysed in the statements of 
truth tellers and liars. Finally, the aim of Study IV was to examine whether the differences 
between truth tellers and liars found in Study I could be accurately detected by participants 
who read the statements of that study. Table 1.1 shows an overview of studies conducted in 
the thesis. In Table 1.2 instructions of each mnemonic technique given to participants are 
presented.  
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Abstract 
 
It was experimentally investigated how different mnemonic techniques employed in 
an interview conducted immediately after an event affected truth tellers’ and liars’ responses 
when they were interviewed again after a two-week delay. How verbal accounts changed 
over time within truth tellers and liars were also compared, and how consistent both groups 
were. Participants (n = 143) were shown a mock intelligence operation video and instructed 
either to tell the truth or lie about its contents in two interviews, one of which was 
immediately after watching the video and the other after a two-week delay. In the immediate 
interview they were asked to provide a free recall and then asked to provide further 
information via one of three mnemonics: Context Reinstatement, Sketch, or Event-line. In the 
delayed interview they were asked to provide only a free recall. Truth tellers reported more 
visual, spatial, temporal, and action details than liars both immediately and after a delay. 
Truth tellers and liars experienced a decline in reporting some details after a delay, and this 
decline was affected by the mnemonic used. Truth tellers and liars were equally consistent 
between their immediate and delayed statements.  
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2.1 Introduction 
 
Deception researchers have started to address memory-related factors affecting the 
statements of both truth tellers and liars in repeated and delayed statements (McDougall & 
Bull, 2015; Vrij et al., 2009; Harvey et al., 2017). In interviewing contexts, memory-related 
issues are important for two reasons: First, complete and accurate statements provided by 
cooperative witnesses or suspects are one of the main goals of investigative interviews 
(Geiselman et al., 1984; Kebbel & Milne, 1998; Pansky & Nemets, 2012). Memory retrieval 
for original information becomes more difficult over time, which can result in less complete 
statements compared to accounts reported after a short retention interval. A decrease in 
forensically relevant reported information may negatively affect a criminal investigation. 
Second, a vaguer content can raise doubts about someone’s credibility. Previous studies with 
police officers have shown that the amount of information provided is an important cue for 
them to decide whether or not an interviewee is credible (Akehurst, Köhnken, Vrij, & Bull, 
1996; Strömwall & Granhag, 2003).     
One factor that could facilitate retrieval of information even after long retention 
intervals is the use of memory-enhancing techniques (or ‘mnemonics’) (Fisher & Geiselman, 
1992). Using mnemonics is valuable in real life because truthful interviewees can provide a 
lot of details valuable for criminal investigations, including descriptions of people, times of 
the criminal activities, locations of various crime related objects, etc. It is also important to 
understand whether deceptive interviewees tend to respond differently to mnemonics after 
different retention intervals. How different mnemonics affected immediate reports by truth 
tellers and liars and how these mnemonics affected their responses when they were 
interviewed again after a two-week delay was examined in this study. 
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2.1.1 Mnemonics and deception 
Research has shown the advantage of using mnemonics over standard question-
answer interviewing techniques in terms of eliciting more complete statements, without the 
cost of an inflated amount of inaccurate information (Davis, McMahon & Greenwood, 2005; 
Fisher, Geiselman, & Amador, 1989; Memon, Meissner, & Fraser, 2010). 
Different types of mnemonic techniques have been adapted for use in investigative 
interviewing, three of which are introduced in this study. Context reinstatement (CR) requires 
witnesses to mentally place themselves back in the experienced event (Fisher & Geiselman, 
1992). Studies have shown memory improvement in recalling details when using this 
mnemonic in both children and adults (Priestley, Roberts, & Pipe, 1999; Wong & Read, 
2011). Another technique, making a Sketch of the crime scene, has also resulted in a more 
complete account of an event compared to standard questioning procedures (Dando, Wilcock, 
Behnkle, & Milne, 2011; Dando et al., 2009). Finally, the Event-line mnemonic technique, is 
based on the Timeline interviewing format developed by Hope et al. (2013), which is related 
to reproducing temporal context and sequence of actions in an event. The Timeline facilitated 
more correct information than a free recall both immediately after an event and after a two-
week delay (Hope et al., 2013). In this study, CR was positioned as a generic mnemonic 
which is known as an effective memory-enhancing technique (Dando et al., 2009; Emmett, 
Clifford, & Gwyer, 2003; Fisher & Geiselman, 1992). The effects of more specialised 
mnemonics (sketch and event-line) that target specific types of information (spatial or 
temporal) and contrast them with performance on a generic CR was also sought to examine.   
Previous findings suggest that the use of mnemonics can aid in discriminating 
between truthful and deceptive statements (Bembibre & Higueras, 2011; Mac Giolla et al., 
2017; Vrij et al., 2010), because truth tellers benefit more from such memory enhancement 
techniques than liars. Liars may lack the imagination to report as many (plausible) details as 
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truth tellers, or they may be unwilling to do so out of fear that these additional details give 
checkable leads to investigators (Vrij et al., 2017).  
Regarding real life interviewing settings, the application of mnemonics can be 
valuable because they do not require many resources (e.g., in contrast to polygraph 
machines), and are easy to implement and analyse (Mac Giolla et al., 2017; Vrij et al., 2010). 
Thus, these techniques can be useful for practitioners to make inferences about the credibility 
of interviewees. As yet it is unknown how different mnemonics affect not only immediate, 
but also delayed statements reported by truth tellers and liars.     
In this study, the effects of three mnemonics on truth tellers’ and liars’ immediate 
statements and repeated statements after a two-week delay were examined: CR mnemonic, 
spatial mnemonic (using sketch), and temporal mnemonic (using event-line). In the 
immediate interview, truth tellers and liars were first invited in a free recall to report 
everything they could remember about the event. After the free recall, a mnemonic was 
introduced and the interviewees were again invited to report all they could remember. Truth 
tellers and liars were then interviewed again after a two-week delay (free recall phase only).  
 
2.1.2 Hypotheses 
In this study, the interest was in the differences between the report content of truth 
tellers and liars in immediate and delayed interviews. As a result of retrieval practice in the 
CR condition, it was expected that neither truth tellers nor liars would show a memory 
decline in reporting detail after a delay, and that truth tellers would report even more visual, 
spatial, temporal, and action details than liars after a delay in the CR condition (Hypothesis 
1). In the Sketch condition it was predicted that truth tellers would report more visual and 
spatial details than liars after a delay as a result of practising these details in the sketch. It was 
also expected that truth tellers, but not liars, would show a memory decline in temporal and 
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action details after a delay, as these details would be less practiced in the sketch (Hypothesis 
2). In the Event-line condition, it was predicted that truth tellers would report more temporal 
and action details than liars after a delay as a result of practising these details in the event-
line. Truth tellers, but not liars, would show a memory decline in visual and spatial details 
after a delay, as these details would be less practiced in the event-line (Hypothesis 3). Finally, 
how consistent truth tellers and liars would be in immediate and delayed interviews was also 
of interest. In line with the above reasoning, it was predicted that truth tellers would produce 
more reminiscences and omissions than liars between immediate and delay interviews 
(Hypothesis 4). 
The immediate interview included two parts, a free recall phase and a mnemonic 
phase, which was introduced due to its operational relevance. Specifically, in real life 
situations it is arguably more typical to start with a general open-ended request and then ask 
for more specific information, than to start by asking more specific questions then ask a 
general open-ended request. Furthermore, the recent investigative interviewing guidelines 
suggest using free recall first and follow with mnemonic techniques (Milne & Bull, 1999; 
Milne, Shaw, & Bull, 2007). In the analyses of the immediate and delayed reports, 
comparisons were made only between the free recall phases of the immediate and delayed 
interviews (the delayed interview only included a free recall phase). The information 
provided in the mnemonic phase of the immediate interview was not considered for two 
reasons: First, comparisons between immediate and delayed statements within conditions 
would be difficult in terms of the amount of details. In all experimental conditions, immediate 
statements would obviously be richer in detail because immediate interviews contain two 
phases whereas delayed statements only contain one. Second, different mnemonics could 
elicit different amounts of information due to their specifics. Therefore, it would also make 
comparisons of immediate and delayed reports complicated. 
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Although hypotheses related to participants’ performance during the mnemonic part 
of the immediate interview were not specifically formulated, it was considered important to 
report the outcomes of this phase of the interview, as it gives further insight into how truth 
tellers and liars respond to mnemonics.  
 
2.2 Method 
 
2.2.1 Participants 
A total of 143 participants took part in the study. A post hoc power analysis showed 
that this study had enough power (Cohen, 1992) of 0.99 to obtain medium effect sizes. The 
mean age of participants was 25.57 years (SD = 12.55) and 35.7% were male. In the sample, 
80.4% were undergraduate and postgraduate students, and 18.6% were members of the 
general public. Participants were recruited via posters, flyers, online participant pool system, 
and online advertisements on the University’s staff portals. As the experiment focused on the 
verbal content of the statements, native English speakers were prioritised to take part. The 
majority of participants (93.7%) were English native speakers; the remaining participants 
were fluent in English. Participants were awarded two course credits or £10 for taking part in 
the study. In addition, all participants were entered into a draw to win a single prize worth 
£150 on completion of the experiment. The study was approved by the Science Faculty 
Ethics Committee of the University. 
 
2.2.2 Design 
A 2 (Veracity: Truthful vs deceptive) X 3 (Mnemonic type: CR vs sketch vs event-
line) X 2 (Interview time: Immediate vs delayed) experimental design was used with Veracity 
and Mnemonic as between-subjects factors and Interview as within-subjects factor. 
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Participants were randomly assigned as truth tellers (n = 70) and liars (n = 73). Truth tellers 
were randomly allocated to the CR (n = 24), sketch (n = 23), or event-line conditions (n = 
23). Similarly, liars were randomly assigned to one of the three mnemonic conditions (CR, n 
= 23; sketch, n = 26; and event-line, n = 24). All participants were interviewed on two 
occasions, immediately after the stimulus event and (approximately) two weeks later. Not all 
participants were available to be interviewed again after exactly 14 days and so the delay 
period for the second interview varied between 8 and 21 days (M = 14.10, SD = 1.46, Mode 
= 14 (61.5% of cases). 
 
2.2.3 Materials 
Stimulus event. Participants were instructed to watch a video about a simulated 
break-in. They were instructed to imagine they were taking the role of an intelligence officer 
working undercover with another officer.  They were told their task was to break into an 
apartment and secure some important intelligence information. This ‘special task’ was 
recorded from the perspective of the person (e.g. participant) who followed the other ‘officer’ 
throughout the break-in. Participants were explicitly instructed that they were ‘following their 
colleague’ during the break-in.   
The video event (lasting five minutes) shows a man entering a basement floor from 
the outside of the building. He then walks about ten metres through a corridor and tries to 
break into one of the doors at the end of the corridor. After a couple of attempts to open the 
door with a key, he walks into the room. The man in the video searches the room (desks, 
shelves, cupboards, clothes, etc.). He takes two mobile phones from a desk, jewellery 
(necklace and two rings) from a cupboard, a laptop from a dining table, and a driving licence, 
debit card, 35 euros and 20 dollars in cash from a wallet in a jacket. He then leaves the room 
with these items. As the man walks back along the corridor on his way out, a neighbour 
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opens a door, witnesses him leaving, and immediately closes the door. The man who broke in 
stops and briefly looks around by the building exit. Finally, he leaves. 
Mnemonics. Three different memory-enhancing techniques used in this study are 
explained below.  
CR . In this study participants were instructed to (mentally) go back to the very start 
of the break-in, take a few moments to picture in their mind where they were, who they were 
with and what they could see during the event including the descriptions of objects, locations, 
and the sequence of actions. Participants were asked to give themselves plenty of time to 
concentrate and visualise what happened during the break-in. Also, they were requested to 
shut their eyes while trying to remember the event.  
Sketch. Interviewees were asked to sketch the event and then use that drawing to 
describe what they had experienced. The participants made their drawing on an A3 sized 
blank sheet of paper. They were requested to use as much space as they needed to sketch the 
apartment as they remembered it. Participants were instructed to include as many details as 
possible about where different objects were in relation to other objects. They could also use 
labels and notes within their sketch to indicate the features of the scene or to indicate if they 
were not certain of something. After making the sketch, participants were asked to describe in 
as much detail as possible what they had witnessed during the break-in.   
Event-line. In this study participants were instructed to write on an A3 sized sheet of 
paper with a graphical line (a grid divided into minutes) all actions from the event they could 
remember and to indicate on that line at what time these actions occurred. The grid was 
divided into six scale points (from 0 minutes to 5 minutes) because the actual break-in lasted 
5 minutes and 15 seconds. The grid was located on the top of the page allowing enough space 
for participants to write underneath it. Participants were asked to write in the empty space and 
then put arrows on the event-line indicating the time of the specific activities. After 
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completing the event-line, participants were instructed to describe the event-line in as much 
detail as possible. 
 
2.2.4 Procedure 
Pre-interview phase. After watching the break-in, each participant was instructed 
either to tell the truth or to lie during the interview. Truth tellers and liars were given almost 
identical instructions. To minimise the risk of liars telling an embedded lie (for example, by 
describing the apartment they genuinely lived in), all interviewees were told that the 
apartment they broke in was a staff room of a community centre. Truth tellers were told that 
the break-in was successful and that they would be interviewed by a fellow agent to continue 
the intelligence investigation. They were asked to report truthfully during the interview 1) the 
interior of the staff room in the video, and 2) what they took from there. Liars where also told 
that the break-in was successful. However, they were told that they would be interviewed by 
an agent from a hostile organisation and that their task was, therefore, to mislead that agent. 
They were told that if the hostile agent came to know where exactly they broke in and exactly 
what was taken from the apartment, the entire investigation would be in jeopardy. They were 
instructed to tell the hostile agent a cover story that they broke into a different staff room in a 
different community centre. Therefore, liars were instructed to lie about 1) the interior of the 
apartment in the video, and 2) what they took from there. To motivate all participants to do 
well in the interviews they were told that they would receive two course credits or £10, and 
would only be entered in the draw to win £150 value prize if they were convincing during the 
interview. They were further told that if the interviewer thought that they did not report 
everything they remembered, they would only receive one course credit or £5, would be 
excluded from the draw, and would be asked to write down a full account of what happened 
in the video.     
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After the instructions to tell the truth or lie, participants were given unlimited time to 
prepare for the interview. They were given a blank sheet of paper and pen in case they needed 
to use whilst their preparation. However, they were not allowed to take any notes they made 
to the actual interview afterwards. When participants indicated that they had prepared 
themselves, they were given a pre-interview questionnaire in which both truth tellers and liars 
were requested to answer the questions truthfully. In the questionnaire participants were 
asked to rate on 7-point scales their preparation for the interview. They were asked to indicate 
how i) well they were prepared (1 = very poor, 7 = very good); and how ii) sufficient (1 = 
insufficient, 7 = sufficient); and iii) complete (1 = incomplete, 7 = complete) their preparation 
was. These three preparation items were into one variable, Preparation quality, since 
Cronbach’s alpha  (.86) indicated high consistency. The pre-interview questionnaire also 
included questions on how iv) stressed (1 = not at all, 7 = very stressed); v) motivated (1 = 
not at all, 7 = totally), and vi) confident (1 = not at all, 7 = totally) the participants felt about 
being convincing in the upcoming interview. This pre-interview questionnaire was 
administered twice, both before the immediate and delayed interviews.  Cronbach’s alpha for 
the preparation quality cluster was .86 for the delay interview.   
Interviews. Participants were questioned by an interviewer who was blind to the aims 
of the study, stimulus material, and veracity conditions. At the beginning of the immediate 
interview, participants in all experimental conditions were given the same free recall (FR) 
instruction. They were asked to report everything they could remember from the break-in, 
including descriptions of objects and locations, the sequences of actions, and information 
about any people that were involved.  After completion of this initial report, one of the three 
mnemonics (CR, sketch or event-line) was administered. Then participants were asked for a 
second report, i.e. to verbally reinstate the context, describe the sketch, or describe the event-
line. 
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 After the immediate interview all participants were told that they would have to come 
back again in two weeks’ time. At the beginning of this delayed interview, the same 
procedure was used as in the immediate interview (instruction to tell the truth/lie, preparation, 
and pre-interview questionnaire). Participants were then asked to provide a free recall 
account about the break-in. 
It was aimed the same interviewer would conduct both interviews to avoid the risk of 
an interviewer influencing an interviewee’s accounts. However, some participants were 
interviewed by different interviewers due to time management issues (e.g. availability of 
participants, research assistants or interviewers). The majority of participants (81.1%) were 
interviewed both times by the same interviewer and two interviewers conducted the majority 
of the interviews (72.0%). To test possible random interviewer effects, total details of the 
delayed accounts between participants who were questioned by the same interviewer during 
both interviews with participants who were questioned by the different interviewer during the 
delayed interview were compared. The difference was not significant, t(141) = 0.83, p = .408, 
d  = .19. 
To achieve that interviewees followed identical instructions during pre-interview and 
interview phases, scripts were prepared that were required to use in every interview by the 
research assistants and interviewers.     
Post-interview questionnaire. After the delayed interview, participants were asked 
to fill out a post-interview questionnaire. As with the pre-interview questionnaire, truth tellers 
and liars were requested to respond truthfully. The post-interview questionnaire included 
questions to assess (again, on 7-point Likert scales) what they thought the likelihood was of 
getting two credits or £10 and having to write a statement (1 = not at all, 7 = very likely). In 
addition, as previous research has shown that active repetition of learned information can 
buffer against memory decline, participants were asked in an open-ended question how many 
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times they had tried to remember the break-in (truth tellers)/cover story (liars) in the time 
between the two interviews. Lastly, participants were asked to assess the extent to which they 
i) told the truth, and ii) lied during the interview. Answers were given on an 11-point Likert 
scale ranging from 0% (not at all) to 100% (totally). These two questions were asked twice to 
assess the truthfulness in both the immediate and delayed interviews. 
After completing the questionnaire, participants were thanked and fully debriefed. All 
participants were paid £10 or given two credits for participation. After completing data 
collection, one participant was randomly selected as the £150 prize winner. 
Noteworthy, to minimise the potential effects of participant collaboration, each 
interviewee was explicitly instructed to keep the content of the experiment confidential after 
the immediate interview, also after the completion of the whole study. Each participant was 
told that revealing the details of the study to the other potential participants may affect their 
responses in the interviews and, thus, hamper the outcomes of the experiment. 
Furthermore, a document was created, in which the names of participants were filled 
in to avoid possible duplications of volunteers in the further studies.   
   
2.2.5 Coding 
Type of details. Interviews were transcribed verbatim. All statements were coded for 
the details provided by interviewees. Details were counted separately for responses to: 1) free 
recall (FR); 2) one of three mnemonics in the immediate interviews; and 3) FR in the delayed 
interviews. Each detail was counted once per question response. For example, if the word 
‘table’ was mentioned twice during the FR in the immediate interview (and had the meaning 
of the same ‘table’), it was counted only once. However, if the same detail was mentioned in 
the different parts of the interview or different interviews, it was counted separately. Four 
types of detail were coded: i) visual detail; for example, ‘He1 walked through a double2 
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brown3 door4’ contains four visual details; ii) spatial details; for example, ‘There were two 
doors on either side1 of the corridor and one door in front2, and I was walking behind my 
colleague 3’ contains three spatial details; iii) temporal details; ‘When1 we got there, it took us 
about a minute2 to open the door, then3 we quickly4 searched the room’ contains four 
temporal details; and iv) action details; ‘He picked up1 a laptop, we then walked over2 to the 
entrance door and left3 through that door’ contains three action details. This coding system is 
based on the Reality Monitoring approach (Johnson & Raye, 1981) and has been used 
frequently in previous deception research (Vrij, 2008).  
Two coders carried out the coding. Both coders were trained by a senior member in 
the research lab.  They received definitions and examples of the to-be-coded variables and 
were asked to code some practice statements. The trainer gave feedback on the coding and 
gave the coders a few more practice statements. The coders were given permission to start 
coding the interviews when the trainer was satisfied with their coding of the practice 
statements. 
The first coder, the author of this study, marked all transcripts. The second coder, 
blind to the hypotheses, stimulus event, and veracity of the statements, marked a random 
sample of 29 interview scripts (20.28%) to measure reliability. Inter-rater reliabilities 
between the two coders for the frequency of detail in the immediate and delayed statements 
were measured via interclass correlation coefficients (ICC). The ICC revealed excellent inter-
rater values of the immediate statements, .98, CI [.95,.99] for visual details; .97, CI [.87,.99] 
for spatial details; .89, CI [.77,.95] for temporal details; and .95, CI [.73,.98] for action 
details; and delayed statements, .98, CI [.96,.99] for visual details; .96, CI [.89,.98] for spatial 
details; .91, CI [.74,.96] for temporal details; and .96, CI [.88,.98] for action details.   
Between-statement consistency. Consistency in the responses between the 
immediate FR and delayed FR was measured. The RM details coded previously were used 
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for consistency analysis. This time details were not split into visual, spatial, temporal, and 
action details, but the total amount of RM details were examined. A distinction between 
repetitions (details reported in both immediate and delayed FR), reminiscences (details 
reported in the delayed FR but not in the immediate FR), and omissions (details reported in 
the immediate FR but not in the delayed FR) was made. These measures are typically used in 
deception studies analysing consistencies, as contradictions1 (the fourth aspect of 
consistency) do not occur often enough in most experimental deception research to be used in 
the statistical analyses (e.g. Deeb et al., 2017; Granhag et al., 2016; Granhag & Strömwall, 
2002).   
The coders only marked reminiscences. Repetitions and omissions were obtained by 
using arithmetic calculations. Details were coded as reminiscent in the delayed interview if 
they were not present in the FR of the immediate interview. Repetitions were computed by 
deducting reminiscences from the total amount of details in the delayed interview and 
omissions were calculated by deducting repetitions from the total amount of details in the 
immediate FR.  
The same two coders who marked the RM details were used for the consistency 
coding. The consistency training they received followed a similar format as the training they 
received for the RM details. Again, the first coder marked all transcripts and the second coder 
marked 20.28% of the interviews. Inter-rater reliability for reminiscences was only examined 
because that was the only measure coded manually. The analysis revealed acceptable ICC of 
.71, CI [.36,.86] reminiscences in the delayed vs. immediate FRs.  
 
                                                                
1 One or more contradictions were only present in 42.9% of truthful and in 64.4% of deceptive statements. 
Although liars’ reports (M = 2.00, SD = 2.00) contained more contradictions than truth tellers’ reports (M = 
0.69, SD = 1.06),  t(141) = 4.53, p < .001, d  = 0.82, there were too few of them in comparison with the other 
consistency measures in both veracity conditions to make any meaningful conclusions. 
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2.3 Results 
 
2.3.1 Manipulation checks 
Mixed ANOVAs with Interview as the within-subject factor and Veracity as the 
between-subjects factor were used for all the manipulation checks. Table 2.1 shows mean 
scores, standard deviations and confidence intervals for truth tellers and liars to the pre- and 
post- questionnaires. 
The Veracity main effect was significant for Stress (liars felt more stressed than truth 
tellers, F(1, 138) = 6.47, p = .012, d = 0.43), Confidence to convince the interviewer (truth 
tellers felt more confident than liars in their ability to convince the interviewer that they were 
telling the truth, F(1, 136) = 28.13, p < .001, d = 0.90), and How many times they thought 
about the event/story before the second interview (liars thought more often about the event 
than truth tellers, F(1, 140) = 3.92, p = .020, d = 0.40). These results reflected the theoretical 
assumption of deception that lying is more mentally taxing task than truth telling (Vrij, 2015). 
The Veracity main effect was also significant for Extent of truthfulness (truth tellers were 
more truthful than liars during both the immediate, F(1, 139) = 89.05, p = .010, d = 6.29 and 
delayed interviews, F(1, 139) = 65.54, p = .01, d = 5.98), indicating that participants 
followed the instructions. All other Veracity main effects were not significant, all F’s < 9.14, 
all p’s > .165, see Table 2.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
66 
 
Table 2.1 
Means, standard deviations and confidence intervals for the answers to pre-interview and 
post-interview questionnaires 
 Truth Lie 
Measure M SD 95% CI M SD 95% CI 
Motivation to convince the 
interviewer 
6.15 0.81 5.94,6.35 6.00 0.78 5.82,6.20 
Preparation quality 5.19 1.00 4.94,5.43 5.05 0.79 4.86,5.25 
Preparation time (sec.) 233.68 129.20 203.34,265.37 221.49 135.59 190.26,254.52 
Stress before the interview* 3.29 1.47 2.94,3.69 3.89 1.30 3.58,4.19 
Confidence to convince the 
interviewer* 
5.42 1.02 5.17,5.67 4.48 1.06 4.22,4.74 
Likelihood to receive  £10/2 
credits* 
5.21 1.23 4.92,5.50 4.32 1.32 4.01,4.60 
Likelihood to write a 
statement 
3.51 1.69 3.12,3.90 3.86 1.24 3.55,4.15 
Times thought about the 
event/story* 
2.23 1.27 1.96,2.51 2.85 1.75 2.44,3.27 
Extent of truthfulness in the 
immediate interview* 
99.41 2.37 98.78,100.00 20.82 17.14 16.96,25.46 
Extent of truthfulness in the 
delayed interview* 
98.53 4.32 97.41,99.55 20.82 17.93 16.53,25.37 
p < .05  
 
Main Interview effects emerged for Motivation, F(1, 137) = 4.39, p = .038, d = 0.16. 
Participants were slightly more motivated before the immediate interview (M = 6.15, SD = 
0.81, 95% CI [5.96,6.35]) than before the delayed interview (M = 6.01, SD = 0.93, 95% CI 
[5.82,6.19]). However, the means showed that participants were highly motivated before both 
interviews as their scores were at the upper end of the motivation scale. The Interview main 
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effect was significant for: Preparation quality, F(1, 126) = 13.12, p < .001, d = 0.32; 
Participants rated their preparation level higher before the immediate interview (M = 5.27, 
SD = 0.98, 95% CI [5.10,5.44]) than before the delayed interview (M = 4.96, SD = 0.93, 
95% CI [4.77,5.15]); Preparation time, F(1, 132) = 21.59, p < .001, d = 0.40.  
Participants used more preparation time before the immediate interview (M = 258.34, 
SD = 157.85, 95% CI [231.28,285.39]) than before the delayed interview (M = 196.81, SD = 
148.50, 95% CI [171.56,222.06]); and Stress, F(1, 138) = 6.48, p = .012, d = 0.19. 
Participants felt more stressed before the immediate interview (M = 3.74, SD = 1.59, 95% CI 
[3.48,4.00]) than before the delayed interview (M = 3.44, SD = 1.56, 95% CI [3.18, 3.70]).  
The Interview main effect for Confidence was not significant, F(1, 136) = 0.03, p = 
.869, d = 0.02. Interview effects on quality of preparation, time for preparation, and stress 
level were probably found because participants were less familiar with the settings before the 
immediate interview than before the delayed interview. 
Significant Veracity x Interview interaction effects emerged for Preparation time, F(1, 
132) = 4.33, p = .039, 𝜂p
2 = .03. However, simple effect ANOVAs revealed no differences 
between truth tellers and liars in the immediate, F(1, 132) = 0.34, p = .576, d = 0.10,  and 
delayed interviews, F(1, 132) = 2.43, p = .122, d = 0.27.  All other Veracity x Interview 
interaction effects were not significant, all F’s < 3.93, p > .050. 
A one-way ANOVA with Incentive as the dependent variable revealed a significant 
main effect for Veracity. Truth-tellers were more convinced than liars that they would receive 
the full incentive of £10/2 credits, F(1, 140) = 17.49, p < .001, d = 0.70, see Table 2.1. A 
one-way ANOVA with Likelihood to write a statement as dependent variable revealed no 
significant main effect for Veracity, F(1, 140) = 1.92, p = .170, d = 0.23, see Table 2.1. In the 
two latter analyses, Interview was not included as a factor as the question referred to the two 
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interviews combined. In summary, the results showed that the manipulations in this study 
were successful.  
 
2.3.2 Effects of Veracity, Mnemonic type and Interview time on the type of details  
To examine whether the amount of information changed between the immediate and 
delayed interviews, a mixed ANOVA was carried out with Veracity (Truth tellers vs. Liars) 
and Mnemonic (FR in the CR vs. Sketch vs. Event-line) as the between-subjects factors and 
Interview (Immediate vs. Delayed) as the within-subject factor. With visual details as 
dependent variable a significant main effect emerged of Veracity, F(1, 137) = 22.54, p < 
.001, d  = 0.79. Truth tellers (M = 103.09, SD = 35.04, 95% CI [95.38,110.74]) reported more 
visual details than liars (M = 74.40, SD = 37.34, 95% CI [66.73, 83.98]). The main effect of 
Interview was also significant, F(1, 137) = 14.12, p < .001, d  = 0.18. Interviewees reported 
more visual details immediately after watching the video (M = 60.74, SD = 26.90, 95% CI 
[56.55,64.93]) than after a two-week delay (M = 55.98, SD = 27.17, 95% CI [51.73, 60.22]).   
The Mnemonic main effect was not significant, F(2, 137) = 0.46, p = .633, 𝜂p
2   = .01, neither 
were the Veracity x Interview, F(1, 137) = 0.06, p = .633, 𝜂p
2   = .01, Mnemonic x Interview, 
F(2, 137) = 0.30, p = .744, 𝜂p
2   = .004, and Veracity x Mnemonic x Interview, F(2, 137) = 
0.71, p = .495, 𝜂p
2  = .01, interaction effects.  
A mixed ANOVA with Veracity and Mnemonic as between-subjects factors and 
Interview as within-subject factor and spatial detail as the dependent variable revealed a 
significant main effect for Veracity, F(1, 137) = 49.07, p < .001, d  = 1.17. Truth tellers (M = 
56.42, SD = 23.71, 95% CI [51.23, 62.14]) reported more spatial details than liars (M = 
32.16, SD = 17.45, 95% CI [28.43, 36.27]). The main effects for Mnemonic, F(2, 137) = 
1.34, p = .265, 𝜂p
2 = .02, Interview, F(1, 137) = 0.23, p = .636, d  = 0.02, and the Veracity x 
Interview, F(1, 137) = 0.03, p = .858, 𝜂p
2   = .00, Mnemonic x Interview, F(2, 137) = 0.70, p = 
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.500, 𝜂p
2   = .004, and Veracity x Mnemonic x Interview, F(2, 137) = 1.12, p = .329, 𝜂p
2   = .02, 
interaction effects were all not significant.  
The same mixed ANOVA with temporal details as the dependent variable revealed a 
significant main effect for Veracity, F(1, 137) = 82.78, p < .001, d  = 1.56. Truth tellers 
reported more temporal details (M = 26.59, SD = 12.09, 95% CI [23.69, 29.58]) than liars (M 
= 10.99, SD = 7.42, 95% CI [9.33, 12.63]). The Mnemonic main effect was not significant, 
F(2, 137) = 0.33, p = .721, 𝜂p
2   = .01. The Veracity x Interview interaction effect was 
significant, F(1, 137) = 7.76, p = .006, 𝜂p
2   = .05. Truth tellers reported more temporal details 
in the immediate interview (M = 18.32, SD = 8.61, 95% CI [16.71, 19.94]) than in the 
delayed interview (M = 16.58, SD = 8.10, 95% CI [14.89, 18.27]), F(1, 141) = 8.83, p = 
.003, d  = 0.21, whereas for liars the amount of temporal information reported did not differ 
between the immediate (M = 7.19, SD = 4.86, 95% CI [5.61, 8.78]) and delayed interviews 
(M = 7.73, SD = 6.32, 95% CI [6.07, 9.39]), F(1, 141) = 0.85, p = .358, d  = 0.10. There was 
also a significant Mnemonic x Interview interaction effect, F(2, 137) = 3.79, p = .025, 𝜂p
2   = 
.05. Interviewees reported more temporal details in the immediate (M = 12.77, SD = 8.22, 
95% CI [10.68, 14.63]) than in the delayed interview (M = 11.07, SD = 7.25, 95% CI [9.01, 
13.13]) in the CR condition, F(1, 140) = 4.98, p = .027, d  = 0.22, whereas the difference in 
the sketch condition between the immediate (M = 13.53, SD = 10.54, 95% CI [11.59, 15.47]) 
and delayed interview (M = 12.33, SD = 9.66, 95% CI [10.31, 14.36]), F(1, 140) = 2.50, p = 
.116, d  = 0.12, and in the event-line condition between the immediate (M = 12.08, SD = 
7.80, 95% CI [10.11, 14.06]) and delayed interview (M = 13.07, SD = 8.39, 95% CI [11.00, 
15.13]), F(1, 140) = 1.90, p = .170, d  = 0.12, were not significant. The Veracity x Mnemonic 
x Interview interaction effect was not significant, F(2, 137) = 0.09, p = .914, 𝜂p
2 = .001. 
A mixed ANOVA with Veracity and Mnemonic as the between-subjects factors, 
Interview as the within-subject factor and action details as the dependent variable revealed a 
 
70 
 
significant main effect for Veracity, F(1, 137) = 79.09, p < .001, d  = 1.48. Truth tellers 
reported more action information (M = 37.30, SD = 14.59, 95% CI [34.33, 40.26]) than liars 
(M = 18.63, SD = 10.16, 95% CI [15.73, 21.54]). Interview main effect was also significant, 
F(1, 137) = 10.78, p = .001, d  = 0.15. Participants reported more action details in the 
immediate (M = 28.93, SD = 16.16, 95% CI [26.29, 31.56]) than in the delayed interview (M 
= 26.55, SD = 16.23, 95% CI [23.89, 29.24]). The Mnemonic x Interview interaction effect 
was also significant, F(2, 137) = 3.21, p = .043, 𝜂p
2   = .05. In the sketch condition, 
interviewees reported more action details in the immediate interview (M = 31.06, SD = 
18.88, 95% CI [28.18, 35.41]) than in the delayed interview (M = 26.41, SD = 18.95, 95% CI 
[23.21, 30.98]), (F(1, 140) = 14.33, p < .001, d  = 0.25, whereas no differences emerged 
between the interviews in the CR, F(1, 140) = 2.93, p = .089, d  = 0.15, and event-line, F(1, 
140) = 0.04, p = .852, d  = 0.02, conditions. The Veracity x Interview, F(2, 137) = 2.69, p = 
.103, 𝜂p
2 = .02 and Veracity x Mnemonic x Interview interaction effects, F(2, 137) = 0.12, p = 
.885, 𝜂p
2 = .002, were not significant. 
 
2.3.3 Hypotheses testing  
Amount of details in the CR mnemonic. Hypotheses 1 to 3 predicted that in the 
delayed interview specific differences between truth tellers and liars would emerge as a 
function of mnemonic. Table 2.2 shows the results. As predicted in Hypothesis 1, truth tellers 
reported more visual, spatial, temporal, and action details than liars in the CR condition after 
a delay. All effect sizes were substantial (from 0.58 to 1.19). 
In the CR condition, simple effect ANOVA analyses revealed that truth tellers 
reported significantly fewer temporal details in the delayed than in the immediate FR, F(1, 
137) = 8.32, p = .005, d  = 0.42 (for means, standard deviations and confidence intervals, see 
Tables 2.2 and 2.3). For truth tellers, no significant differences emerged between the 
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immediate and delayed interview for visual, F(1, 137) = 2.49, p = .117, d  = 0.36, spatial, F(1, 
137) = 0.43, p = .515, d  = 0.12, and action details, F(1, 137) = 3.42, p = .066, d  = 0.33. Liars 
in the CR condition did not show a significant difference in reporting visual, F(1, 137) = 
1.90, p = .171, d  = 0.44, spatial, F(1, 137) = 0.09, p = .228, d  = 0.09, temporal, F(1, 137) = 
0.09, p = .765, d  = 0.09, or action details, F(1, 137) = 3.42, p = .066, d  = 0.19 between the 
immediate and delayed interviews. These results partially support Hypothesis 1, in which it 
was predicted that in the CR condition neither truth tellers nor liars would produce a memory 
decline in reporting detail after a delay. 
Amount of details in the sketch mnemonic. Truth tellers reported significantly more 
visual, spatial, temporal, and action details in the sketch condition than liars, which was not 
predicted in Hypothesis 2. All effect sizes were substantial (from 0.73 to 1.76), see Table 2.2 
(significant findings highlighted in bold). 
In the sketch condition, simple effect ANOVAs revealed that truth tellers reported the 
same amount of visual, F(1, 137) = 0.17, p = .680, d  = 0.07, and spatial details, F(1, 137) = 
0.01, p = .909, d  = 0.02 in the immediate and delayed interviews. However, truth tellers 
reported less temporal, F(1, 137) = 5.72, p = .018, d  = 0.60, and action details, F(1, 137) = 
9.32, p = .003, d  = 0.50 in the delayed interview than in the immediate interview. Liars in the 
sketch condition reported less visual, F(1, 137) = 4.08, p = .045, d  = 0.30 and action details, 
F(1, 137) = 5.41, p = .022, d  = 0.50 in the delayed interview than in the immediate interview. 
Liars showed no difference in reporting spatial, F(1, 137) = 1.47, p = .228, d  = 0.24, 
and temporal details, F(1, 137) = 0.002, p = .968, d  = 0.001, between the immediate and 
delayed interviews. This provides support for Hypothesis 2 in which it was predicted that in 
the sketch condition truth tellers, but not liars, would show memory decline in temporal and 
action details after a delay.  
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Table 2.2 
RM details in delayed FR as a function of veracity and mnemonic condition 
 Truth Lie    
Detail M SD 95% CI M SD 95% CI F p d 
CR  
Visual 62.58 25.21 52.23,72.94 47.09 28.26 36.51,57.66 4.29 .040 0.58 
Spatial 31.83 13.82 25.73,37.93 21.22 14.89 14.99,27.45 5.80 .017 0.74 
Temporal 14.83 7.19 11.95,17.72 7.30 5.06 4.36,10.25 13.03 <.001 1.21 
Action 32.83 12.93 27.29,38.38 17.70 12.41 12.03,23.36 14.27 <.001 1.19 
Sketch 
Visual 70.26 35.05 59.69,80.36 48.27 24.53 38.32,58.22 8.97 .003 0.73 
Spatial 41.35 21.63 35.12,47.58 22.50 10.43 16.64,28.36 18.99 <.001 1.11 
Temporal 18.78 8.87 15.84,21.73 5.89 5.36 3.11,8.66 39.72 <.001 1.76 
Action 38.30 19.35 32.64,43.97 15.89 10.72 10.56,21.21 32.53 <.001 1.43 
Event-line 
Visual 64.52 20.28 53.95,75.10 43.13 17.20 32.77,53.48 8.18 .005 1.14 
Spatial 40.87 15.92 34.64,47.10 21.08 12.20 14.98,27.18 20.14 <.001 1.40 
Temporal 16.13 8.04 13.18,19.08 10.00 7.73 7.11,12.89 8.64 .004 0.78  
Action 35.44 14.08 23.77,41.10 20.54 11.67 15.00,26.09 13.81 <.001 1.15 
 
Amount of details in the event-line mnemonic. Truth tellers reported significantly 
more visual, spatial, temporal, and action details than liars in the event-line condition, which 
was not predicted in Hypothesis 3. All effect sizes were substantial (from 0.78 to 1.40), see 
Table 2.3. 
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Table 2.3 
RM details in the immediate FR as a function of veracity and mnemonic condition 
 Truth Lie    
Detail M SD 95% CI M SD 95% CI F p d 
CR           
Visual 67.46 28.84 57.25,77.67 51.44 32.81 41.00,61.86 4.71 .032 0.52 
Spatial 33.04 14.04 27.36,38.73 21.78 13.07 15.98,27.59 7.51 .007 0.83 
Temporal 17.71 7.81 14.95,20.47 7.61 4.80 4.79,10.43 25.56 <.001 1.56 
Action 36.08 12.21 30.93,41.23 18.70 9.38 13.43,23.96 21.81 <.001 1.60 
Sketch          
Visual 71.57 23.57 61.14,82.00 54.27 27.46 44.46,64.08 5.71 .018 0.68 
Spatial 41.13 18.49 35.36,46.94 20.35 11.75 14.89,25.81 26.59 <.001 1.34 
Temporal 21.22 9.29 18.40,24.04 5.85 4.68 3.19,8.50 61.52 <.001 2.09 
Action 43.78 17.93 38.52,49.04 19.81 10.98 14.86,24.76 43.08 <.001 1.61 
Event-line          
Visual 71.74 22.00 61.31,82.17 47.96 19.96 37.75,58.17 10.38 .002 1.13 
Spatial 38.39 14.54 32.59,44.20 22.00 11.87 16.32,27.68 15.92 <.001 1.23 
Temporal 16.04 8.87 13.22,18.87 8.13 5.36 5.36,10.89 15.71 <.001 1.08 
Action 37.35 14.75 32.09,42.61 19.17 9.48 14.02,24.32 23.84 <.001 1.47 
 
In the event-line condition, simple effect ANOVAs showed that truth tellers reported 
significantly less visual details, F(1, 137) = 5.22, p = .024, d  = 0.56, in the delayed interview 
than in the immediate interview. Truth tellers showed no difference in reporting spatial, F(1, 
137) = 1.72, p = .192, d  = 0.24, temporal, F(1, 137) = 0.01, p = .932, d  = 0.02, or action 
details, F(1, 137) = 1.14, p = .288, d  = 0.20 between the immediate and delayed interviews. 
Liars showed no difference in reporting visual, F(1, 137) = 2.45, p = .120, d  = 0.40, spatial, 
F(1, 137) = 0.25, p = .621, d  = 0.13, temporal, F(1, 137) = 3.54, p = .062, d  = 0.39, or action 
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details, F(1, 137) = 0.61, p = .435, d  = 0.19 between the immediate and delayed interview. 
These results partially support Hypothesis 3, in which it was predicted that in the event-line 
condition, truth tellers, but not liars, would show a memory decline in visual and spatial 
details after a delay. 
 
Consistency between the immediate and delayed interviews. A 2 (Veracity) x 3 
(Mnemonic) analysis of covariance was conducted with reminiscences as the dependent 
variable and Total detail at immediate FR as a covariate2. The reason for including this 
covariate was that the number of reminiscences in the delayed interview depends on the 
amount of detail provided in the FR part of the immediate interview. That is, the more detail 
provided in the immediate FR, the less opportunity to add new detail in the delayed 
interview. Veracity, F(1, 131) = 0.61, p = .437, d  = .14, and Mnemonic, F(2, 131) = 1.50, p = 
.228, 𝜂p
2   = .02 main effects, or Veracity x Mnemonic interaction effect, F(2, 131) = 0.95, p = 
.388, 𝜂p
2   = .01 were not significant. This showed no support for Hypothesis 4. 
A 2 (Veracity) x 3 (Mnemonic) analysis of covariance with repetitions in the delayed 
interview as dependent variable and Total detail in the immediate FR as covariate did not 
result in significant main effects for Veracity, F(1, 131) = 0.71, p = .680, d = .07, and or 
Mnemonic, F(2, 131) = 0.19, p = .831, 𝜂p
2   = .003. Although the Veracity x Mnemonic 
interaction effect was significant, F(2, 131) = 4.28, p = .016, 𝜂p
2   = .06, simple effect analyses 
showed no significant differences. That is, in the CR condition, truth tellers provided a 
similar amount of  repetitions (M = 100.21, SD = 43.24, 95% CI [85.60,117.29]) to liars (M 
= 105.84, SD = 52.87, 95% CI [87.73,122.38]), F(1, 43) = 0.68, p = .415, d = 0.12; in the 
sketch condition, truth tellers provided a similar amount of repetitions (M = 106.27, SD = 
62.36, 95% CI [87.57,128.42]) to liars (M = 91.64, SD = 32.27, 95% CI [76.52,120.50]), F(1, 
                                                                
2 Veracity effects without entering Total detail at immediate FR as a covariate are presented in Table 2.4 
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45) = 4.05, p = .05, d = 0.29; and in the event-line condition, truth tellers reported a similar 
amount of repetitions (M = 111.26, SD = 43.74, 95% CI [96.61,125.14]) to liars (M = 
117.29, SD = 41.20, 95% CI [86.71,119.29]), F(1, 43) = 1.11, p = .297, d = 0.14.  
 
Table 2.4 
Between-statement consistency characteristics as a function of veracity and mnemonic 
condition (without the addition of covariates) 
 Truth Lie    
Measure M SD 95% CI M SD 95% CI F p d 
CR  
Reminiscence 22.33 13.42 16.35,28.32 13.00 8.55 6.89,19.11 4.66 .033 0.83 
Repetition 119.75 43.24 101.16,138.35 80.30 52.87 61.31,99.30 8.61 .004 2.07 
Omission 34.54 28.03 25.14,43.95 19.22 14.72 9.61,28.83 5.08 .26 0.62 
Sketch 
Reminiscence 23.61 20.96 17.50,29.72 20.00 17.01 14.25,25.75 0.72 .397 0.19 
Repetition 145.09 62.36 126.09,164.08 72.42 32.27 54.56,90.29 30.36 <.001 1.46 
Omission 32.61 21.89 23.00,42.22 27.85 30.00 18.81,36.88 0.51 .476 0.18 
Event-line 
Reminiscence 19.61 13.86 13.50,25.72 16.92 11.86 10.93,22.90 0.39 .535 0.21 
Repetition 137.43 43.74 118.44,156.43 77.83 37.64 59.24,96.43 19.66 <.001 1.46 
Omission 26.09 23.46 16.48,35.70 19.42 16.67 10.01,28.82 0.96 .328 0.33 
 
As the number of omissions was derived from the number of total details minus 
number of repetitions, a 2 (Veracity) x 3 (Mnemonic) analysis of covariance with omissions 
as the dependent variable and Total detail at immediate FR as covariate resulted in identical 
effect sizes (not significant) as in the analysis of repetitions. Thus, Hypothesis 4 was not 
supported.  
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2.3.4 Exploratory analysis of type of details in mnemonics 
A 2 (Veracity) X 3 (Mnemonic) ANOVA with the number of visual details in the 
mnemonic part of the immediate interview as the dependent variable revealed a significant 
main effect for Mnemonic, F(2, 137) = 6.88, p = .001, 𝜂p
2   = .09. Tukey post-hoc tests showed 
that interviewees reported significantly more visual details in the sketch condition (M = 
52.63, SD = 28.46, 95% CI [45.86,60.41]) than in the CR condition (M = 32.68, SD = 27.45, 
95% CI [25.43,41.90]). Participants in the event-line condition (M = 46.43, SD = 26.03, 95% 
CI [39.90,53.79]) also reported significantly more visual details than participants in the CR 
condition. There was no significant main effect for Veracity, F(1, 137) = 2.25, p = .136, d  = 
0.22, or a significant Veracity x Mnemonic interaction, F(2, 137) = 1.96, p = .145, 𝜂p
2   = .03. 
A 2 (Veracity) X 3 (Mnemonic) ANOVA with the number of spatial details in the 
mnemonic part of the immediate interview as the dependent variable revealed a main effect 
for Veracity, F(1, 137) = 9.59, p = .002, d  = 0.45. Truth tellers gave more spatial information 
(M = 26.87, SD = 20.33, 95% CI [22.25, 31.80]) than liars (M = 19.00, SD = 14.04, 95% CI 
[15.97, 22.11]). The Mnemonic main effect was also significant F(2, 137) = 12.10, p < .001, 
𝜂p
2   = .15. Post-hoc tests revealed that interviewees provided more spatial details in the sketch 
(M = 28.67, SD = 16.07, 95% CI [24.39, 32.94]) and event-line conditions (M = 25.87, SD = 
19.51, 95% CI [20.58, 31.91]) than in the CR condition (M = 13.77, SD = 14.02, 95% CI 
[10.38, 17.50]). The Veracity x Mnemonic interaction effect was not significant, F(2, 137) = 
3.04, p = .051, 𝜂p
2   = .04. 
A 2 (Veracity) X 3 (Mnemonic) ANOVA with the number of temporal details in the 
mnemonic part of the immediate interview as the dependent variable revealed a significant 
main effect for Veracity, F(1, 137) = 10.35, p = .002, d  = 0.45. Truth tellers reported more 
temporal details (M = 10.96, SD = 11.07, 95% CI [8.16, 13.84]) than liars (M = 6.75, SD = 
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7.43, 95% CI [6.01,8.84]). In addition, the Mnemonic main effect was significant F(2, 137) = 
31.85, p < .001, 𝜂p
2   = .32. Post-hoc tests showed that more temporal details were reported in 
the event-line condition (M = 16.21, SD = 9.80, 95% CI [13.29, 19.22]) than in the CR (M = 
5.53, SD = 6.81, 95% CI [3.87,7.38]) and sketch conditions (M = 4.86, SD = 7.44, 95% CI 
[2.98,6.89]). The Veracity x Mnemonic interaction effect was not significant, F(2, 137) = 
2.76, p = .067, 𝜂p
2 = .04.  
 A 2 (Veracity) X 3 (Mnemonic) ANOVA with the number of action details as the 
dependent variable revealed a significant main effect for Veracity, F(1, 137) = 9.66, p = .002, 
d  = 0.46. Truth tellers mentioned more action details (M = 21.63, SD = 21.45, 95% CI 
[17.21,26.59]) than liars (M = 13.40, SD = 13.60, 95% CI [10.33,16.77]). The Mnemonic 
main effect was also significant, F(2, 137) = 20.12, p < .001, 𝜂p
2   = .23. Post-hoc tests 
revealed that in the event-line (M = 29.28, SD = 17.97, 95% CI [24.31,34.50]) condition, 
interviewees reported more information about actions than in the CR (M = 12.77, SD = 
17.01, 95% CI [8.46,17.68]) and sketch conditions (M = 10.53, SD = 13.98, 95% CI 
[7.04,14.55]). The Veracity x Mnemonic interaction effect was not significant, F(2, 137) = 
2.21, p = .113, 𝜂p
2   = .03.  
None of the interaction effects were significant. However, these interaction effects do 
not necessarily reflect the specific type of interaction of particular: Comparing the details 
between truth tellers and liars for the three mnemonic parts of the interview separately. In 
alignment with Nahari and Ben-Shakhar (2011) and previous deception literature (e.g. Deeb 
et al., 2017; Shaw et al., 2015) this justifies further examination of the data, specifically, 
examining the simple Veracity effects for the three mnemonic parts of the interview 
separately. The results are provided in Table 2.5 (significant findings highlighted in bold).  
No significant differences between truth tellers and liars in reporting visual, spatial, 
temporal, and action details in the CR condition were found. In the Sketch condition, truth 
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tellers reported more spatial and temporal details than liars. Other mean differences were not 
significant in this mnemonic group. In the event-line condition, truth tellers provided more 
visual, spatial, temporal, and action details than liars.  
 
Table 2.5 
Details in the different mnemonic conditions in the immediate interview 
 Truth Lie    
Detail M SD 95% CI M SD 95% CI F p d 
CR           
Visual 31.29 28.43 22.13,41.86 34.13 26.94 24.88,46.23 0.13 .720 0.10 
Spatial 13.58 15.68 8.55,20.19 13.96 12.40 9.46,18.90 0.01 .936 0.03 
Temporal 5.54 7.62 3.59,10.39 5.52 6.02 3.41,8.20 0.00 .993 0.002 
Action 13.92 20.41 6.72,22.47 11.57 12.90 7.23,17.61 0.26 .610 0.14 
Sketch          
Visual 54.96 24.46 44.90,65.87 50.58 31.93 40.66,62.55 0.32 .573 0.15 
Spatial 30.70 15.47 27.35,40.33 24.27 15.54 19.99,29.62 4.29 .04 0.61 
Temporal 7.61 8.88 4.05,11.31 2.42 4.88 1.04,4.13 5.45 .021 0.72 
Action 14.00 14.26 8.35,19.82 7.46 13.24 3.48,12.82 2.10 .15 0.48 
Event-line          
Visual 56.24 28.25 46.63,67.20 37.21 20.27 30.11,45.89 5.40 .018 0.77 
Spatial 33.91 22.51 26.00,42.87 18.17 12.25 13.77,23.46 11.42 .001 0.87 
Temporal 19.96 12.62 16.76,23.16 12.63 7.31 9.83,15.88 5.45 .021 0.68 
Action 37.30 20.53 29.43,45.64 21.58 10.78 17.78,25.76 11.68 .001 0.96 
 
2.4 Discussion 
 
This study examined how different mnemonic techniques employed in an immediate 
interview affected delayed statements. In the CR condition, truth tellers provided more visual, 
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spatial, temporal and action details than liars after a delay. This finding was in line with 
Hypothesis 1. In addition, as predicted, liars did not show a decline in reporting details over 
time. Truth tellers, however, showed a decline in reporting temporal details over time, which 
was not expected, as it was thought that the CR mnemonic would ‘buffer’ the truth tellers  
against forgetting. 
In line with Hypothesis 2, in the sketch condition truth tellers reported more visual 
and spatial details than liars in the delayed accounts. In addition, truth tellers, but not liars, 
showed a decline in reporting temporal and action details over time. Two findings were not 
predicted. First, truth tellers also reported more temporal and action details than liars after a 
delay, suggesting that when the sketch technique was used, truth tellers provided richer 
reports in terms of all types of detail. Second, liars also showed a decline in reporting visual 
and action details. According to the ‘repeat vs reconstruct hypothesis’ (Granhag & 
Strömwall, 1999), liars show a tendency to repeat their stories when interviewed repeatedly. 
The findings suggest that liars experienced difficulties in mimicking natural memory retrieval 
that should be produced by truth tellers. A sketch facilitates retrieval of visual and spatial 
details. Liars did not consider that if the sketch facilitates retrieval of such details, their 
memories for these details should be less affected than for action and temporal details after a 
delay (the pattern shown by truth tellers in this study).   
In the event-line condition, truth tellers again reported more visual, spatial, temporal, 
and action details than liars after a delay. As predicted in Hypothesis 3, truth tellers showed a 
decline in providing visual details, but the predicted decline in reporting spatial details did 
not occur. In support of Hypothesis 3, liars reported a similar amount of visual, spatial, 
temporal and action details both immediately and after a delay. Again, truth tellers showed to 
some extent a natural decline of the details that were less prominent with the event-line 
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technique (visual details), but liars did not consider that after a delay some details should be 
better remembered than others.  
With regard to consistency between the immediate and delayed statements, no 
differences in consistency between truth tellers and liars were found, and Hypothesis 4 was 
therefore rejected. In alignment with previous research (Granhag & Strömwall, 2002; 
Vredeveldt et al. 2014, Granhag et al., 2016) but in contrast to the widely held stereotypical 
view (Bogaard et al., 2016), this study showed that truth tellers and liars can be equally 
consistent in their statements. 
Although the study concentrated on comparisons between immediate and delayed 
accounts, comparisons between the initial and mnemonic parts of the immediate interview 
were also reported. In brief, it was found that participants in the CR mnemonic performed the 
worst in eliciting additional detail, and the event-line mnemonic the best. Also, in terms of 
the ability to discriminate between truth tellers and liars, the CR mnemonic was the least, and 
the event-line was the most effective mnemonic. Perhaps the event-line mnemonic was the 
most effective in eliciting information and in distinguishing between truth tellers and liars 
because the stimulus event (break-in) was dynamic. The entire 5 minute video was full of 
different activities, and in such a situation the event-line technique might be very helpful for 
truth tellers in facilitating recall of actions and events, and their temporal order. Liars 
typically experience an information management dilemma (Granhag & Hartwig, 2008). They 
are typically motivated to report some information, but not too much. This dilemma might 
exist even when mnemonics are used in interviews.  
The differences between truth tellers and liars were substantial (i.e. effect sizes were 
high) across all conditions. The findings thus revealed that the ‘richness of detail’ verbal cue 
remains a diagnostic cue to deceit, even after longer delay periods. This is a novel finding 
compared with previous studies that showed that truth tellers’ and liars’ accounts became 
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similar over time (Harvey et al., 2017; Vrij et al., 2009). The important difference between 
those studies and the current study is that in those studies participants were interviewed only 
once, either immediately or after the delay, whereas in the current study they were 
interviewed twice. Perhaps the immediate interview in truth tellers served as a buffer for 
forgetting in the delayed interview. The use of mnemonics in the immediate interview may 
have further strengthened this buffer effect. 
The findings have important practical implications. First of all, they suggest that using 
mnemonic techniques during the first interview is helpful in terms of information gathering 
during subsequent interviews with the interviewee. Furthermore, using mnemonic techniques 
during the first interview can aid discriminating between truth tellers and liars in subsequent 
interviews. 
The main limitation of this study was that immediate interview across the 
experimental conditions contained two, report everything and mnemonic, parts. Thus, direct 
effects of mnemonic techniques used in the immediate interview on delayed statements of 
truth tellers and liars are unknown. This question will be addressed in Study II of this thesis. 
In conclusion, results of this study showed the potential of mnemonic techniques used 
in the immediate interview to differentiate between truth tellers and liars in the delayed 
interview based on the amount of detail reported. Also, truth tellers and liars showed similar 
between-statement consistency. 
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Chapter 3: Facilitating memory-based lie detection in immediate 
and delayed interviewing: The role of sketch mnemonic (Study II) 
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Abstract 
 
Memory enhancing techniques, or mnemonics, are typically recommended in 
evidence-based investigative interviewing guidelines. In the current study, the use of a sketch 
mnemonic and its effect on the responses of truth tellers and liars was examined. Participants 
(n = 49) watched a mock intelligence operation video. They were instructed to tell the truth or 
lie about this operation in an interview immediately afterwards, and again after a two-week 
delay. In both interviews participants were requested to make a sketch of the location of the 
mock operation, and then to verbally describe the drawing. Results revealed that truth tellers 
reported more visual, spatial, temporal, and action details than liars in the immediate 
interview. Truth tellers also reported more spatial, temporal and action details than liars in the 
delayed interview. Truth tellers experienced a decline in reporting action details after the 
delay, whereas liars did not show a decline in reporting any details over time. Thus, truth-
tellers showed patterns of reporting indicative of genuine memory decay, whereas liars 
produced patterns reflecting a ‘stability bias’. Between-statement consistency did not differ 
across veracity conditions.  
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3.1 Introduction 
 
To clarify how the sketch mnemonic was examined in the current study, only 
participants’ verbal descriptions of the drawings they made were focused on. It was 
considered that the analysis of verbal details rather than of the sketch itself had higher 
practical relevance. In an applied setting in which sketching during an interview would be 
used, it is more likely to expect that the interviewer would ask the interviewee to explain the 
drawing, than to expect that the interviewer would try to analyse and interpret the drawing 
him/herself without asking the interviewee to explain the drawing.  
The current experiment is an elaboration of Study I (Izotovas et al., 2018) of this 
thesis. As discussed in Chapter 2 (i.e. Study I), it was found that in each of the three 
mnemonic conditions, the immediate as well as the delayed truthful statements contained 
more details than the deceptive statements. However, in Study I the immediate interview 
consisted of two parts, a free recall phase and a mnemonic phase. Therefore, it was unclear 
whether the differences between truth tellers and liars in the delayed statements were affected 
by the free recall, the mnemonic technique or both. In the current study, the effects of a 
mnemonic technique (sketch) on the delayed statements of truth tellers and liars was directly 
tested.     
Here the sketch technique, in particular, was chosen to examine for three reasons. 
First, sketching could have more practical value than other mnemonics (for example, 
traditional context reinstatement) in real life forensic applications. It can be less cognitively 
demanding for an interviewer to administer a sketch instruction than to formulate questions, 
and can be protective against incompatible, suggestive/leading questions or retrieval cues 
during interviews (Dando et al., 2009; Vrij et al., 2010). In one study, the sketch instruction 
resulted in shorter interviews and, in terms of memory performance, was as effective as the 
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mental reinstatement of context instruction, and more effective than a standard questioning 
procedure (Dando et al., 2009). In another study, a sketch produced less confabulations in 
interviewees’ accounts than standard ‘question-answer’ interviewing approaches (Dando et 
al., 2011). Similar results were found for a sample of alleged child victims of sexual abuse. 
Children in the drawing condition disclosed more central details about people, actions, times, 
and locations of the abusive events than children in the standard interviewing condition (Katz 
& Hershkowitz, 2010). Furthermore, the sketch mnemonic is positively evaluated by 
practitioners. For example, in one study, intelligence officers perceived sketching as one of 
the most effective components of the CI in eliciting information from sources (Rivard et al., 
2014). 
Second, sketching could be helpful in deception detection because truth tellers should 
benefit more from specific spatial memory enhancement techniques than liars. The sketch 
mnemonic should facilitate the retrieval of information for truth tellers. In contrast, liars may 
lack the imagination or be reluctant to reveal as much information as truth tellers because of 
the risk that it can be checked by the police (Vrij et al., 2017; Vrij, Fisher, Blank, Leal, & 
Mann, 2016). In addition, liars tend to plan interviews by anticipating certain questions and 
preparing answers to them. They may find an interviewer’s request to draw unexpected and, 
therefore, cognitively demanding to provide detailed accounts after such a request (Vrij et al., 
2009).  
Third, previous research suggests that sketching aids in eliciting information about the 
event in question and leads to a better discrimination between truthful and deceptive accounts 
than standard questions (Vrij et al., 2010; Vrij, Mann, Leal, & Fisher, 2012). A recent review 
of sketching studies has shown that, in general, this task can promote differences between 
truth tellers and liars in terms of the amount of provided information (Mac Giolla et al., 
2017). However, it is as yet unknown what type of information in a sketch will differentiate 
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truth tellers from liars the most. In theory, the request to sketch a layout of a crime scene not 
only forces an interviewee to reveal visual details of objects and/or people, but also to 
indicate the spatial location of these objects/people (Vrij et al., 2012). Thus, truth-tellers’ 
memory retrieval of visual or spatial information should be facilitated (Fisher & Geiselman, 
1992). Regarding liars’ accounts, sketching can create problems for them because sketching 
and describing specific objects at specific locations increases the risk of getting caught (Vrij 
et al., 2012). Therefore, liars may decide to avoid mentioning some visual and spatial details 
in their accounts. Although previous studies show the efficacy of the sketch to differentiate 
truth tellers from liars in a single interview (Mac Giolla et al., 2017), it is yet unknown 
whether this mnemonic can be helpful to detect deception in repeated interviewing contexts. 
Hence, this was addressed during this experiment.    
                       
3.1.1 Sketching and consistency as a cue to deceit 
Deception research using sketches and how they affect consistency in truth tellers’ 
and liars’ accounts is limited. In one study, truth tellers and liars were interviewed about a 
lunch they supposedly had in a nearby restaurant (Leins, Fisher, Vrij, Leal, & Mann, 2011). 
They were asked to sketch the layout of the restaurant and to answer a few spatial questions. 
The consistency between verbal reports and sketches made by truth tellers and liars was 
examined. Liars were less consistent than truth tellers and more than 80% of truth tellers and 
70% of liars were classified correctly based on their consistency scores (Leins et al., 2011). In 
another study, it was found that drawings elicited less consistent answers from pairs of 
deceptive suspects than from pairs of truthful suspects, whereas no difference in consistency 
was found in verbal responses (Vrij et al., 2009). In another experiment, adolescent 
participants had to either tell the truth or lie in groups of three about an alleged event (Roos af 
Hjelmsäter et al., 2014). The difference in consistency between truth tellers and liars was 
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larger for the sketch task than for the verbal descriptions, and triads of liars were less 
consistent than triads of truth tellers.  
It is important to consider that, depending on the interview style, consistency can be 
either a cue of deceit or a cue of truthfulness (Leins et al., 2010). When a passive interview 
style is employed (e.g. asking a suspect the same questions from one interview to another), 
liars are more consistent than truth tellers as a result of liars’ strategies (e.g. planning 
interviewers’ questions and foreseeing answers to them; Hartwig et al., 2007), and the nature 
of truth tellers’ memory (Schacter, 1999). In contrast, active interview styles (e.g. asking 
unanticipated questions, changing interviewing modalities from verbal to pictorial 
descriptions) constrains liars from using the ‘repeat’ strategy and typically induces 
inconsistent answers (Leins et al., 2011). Therefore, consistency becomes a diagnostic cue of 
credibility.  
 
3.1.2 Hypotheses 
In this experiment, all participants made a sketch, which they subsequently described. 
Of interest was the differences between truth tellers and liars in the contents of their 
descriptions in immediate and delayed interviews. It was expected that truth tellers would 
report more visual, spatial, temporal, and action details than liars in the immediate accounts 
(Hypothesis 1). The following two hypotheses were derived from previous findings (Izotovas 
et al., 2018). As truth tellers could sketch and report these details (i.e., have memory practice) 
in a sketch, it was further predicted that truth tellers would report more visual and spatial 
details than liars after a delay (Hypothesis 2). It was expected that truth tellers, but not liars, 
would show a memory decline in temporal and action details after a delay. Truth tellers 
would show a decline in such details because of a lack of practicing temporal and action 
details in sketch descriptions (Hypothesis 3). Regarding between-statement consistency 
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characteristics, the interviewing approach employed was considered as passive. Although 
participants were requested to sketch the layout of an incident, only verbal descriptions of the 
sketches were examined. Moreover, participants were asked the same question twice. In line 
with the reasoning above, it was predicted that truth tellers would be less consistent than liars: 
to include the same number of repetitions, but more reminiscences and omissions than liars in 
the delayed interviews (Hypothesis 4). 
 
3.2 Method 
 
3.2.1 Participants 
A total of 49 university students took part in the study. A post hoc power analysis 
showed that this study had enough power (Cohen, 1992) of 0.93 to obtain medium effect 
sizes. The mean age of participants was 19.65 years (SD = 3.36) and 79.6% were female. 
Participants were recruited via posters, flyers, the online participant pool system, and online 
advertisements on the University’s staff portals. As the experiment focused on the verbal 
content of the statements, native English speakers were prioritised to take part. The majority 
of participants (93.9%) were English native speakers and the remaining participants were 
fluent in English. Participants were awarded with two course credits or £10 after they 
completed the experiment. In addition, all participants were entered into a draw to win a 
single prize worth £150 after completion of data collection for this study. The experiment 
was accepted by the Science Faculty Ethics Committee of the University. 
 
The possibility of the duplication of participants was eliminated by checking the 
documented list of individuals who participated in Study I and making sure they were not 
invited to participate in Study II. Hence, the current study were volunteers who had not 
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participated in the previous study. A document with the names of participants of this study 
was also created for the same purpose.     
 
3.2.2 Design 
A 2 (Veracity: Truthful vs deceptive) X 2 (Time of Interview: Immediate vs delayed) 
experimental design was used with Veracity as between-subjects factor and Time of 
Interview as within-subjects factor. Dependent variables were visual, spatial, temporal, and 
action details. Interviewees were randomly assigned as truth tellers (n = 25) or liars (n = 24). 
All participants were interviewed on two occasions, immediately after the stimulus event and 
two weeks later. As not all participants were available exactly 14 days after the first 
interview, the delay period for the second interview varied between 12 and 18 days (M = 
13.90, SD = 0.82, Mode = 14 (81.6% of cases). The delay period between truth tellers (M = 
13.84, SD = 0.55, 95% CI [13.61, 14.05]) and liars (M = 13.96, SD = 1.04, 95% CI [13.58, 
14.43]) was not significantly different, t(47) = 0.50, p = .620, d  = .14.  
 
3.2.3 Materials 
Stimulus event. Participants watched the same filmed event showing a simulated 
break-in as in Study I. They were instructed to take the role of an intelligence officer working 
undercover with another officer. They were told their task was to break into an apartment and 
secure some important information for intelligence gathering. This special task was recorded 
from the perspective of the participant who followed the other intelligence officer throughout 
the break-in. To minimise the possibility of liars telling an embedded lie (for example, by 
describing the apartment they genuinely lived in), all interviewees were told that the 
apartment they broke into was a staff room of a community centre.   
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3.2.4 Procedure 
Pre-interview phase. After watching the break-in video participants were randomly 
assigned to the truth telling or lying condition. Truth tellers were told that the break-in was 
successful and that they would be interviewed by a fellow agent to continue the intelligence 
investigation. They were asked to tell the truth during the interview about 1) the interior of 
the staff room in the video, and 2) what they took from there. Liars where also told that the 
break-in was successful. However, they were told that they would be interviewed by an agent 
of a hostile organisation and that their task was to create a convincing cover story because if 
the hostile officer came to know where exactly they broke in and exactly what was taken 
from the apartment, the entire investigation would be in danger. Therefore, liars were 
instructed to tell the hostile officer that they broke into a different staff room in a different 
community centre. They had to lie about 1) the interior of the apartment in the video, and 2) 
what they took from there. To increase participants’ motivation to be convincing in the 
interviews, they were told that only if they were convincing during the interview, would they 
receive two course credits or £10 and entered in the draw to win a £150 worth prize. 
Participants were also informed about the consequences for not being believed in the 
interviews. Specifically, they were told that if the interviewer thought that they did not report 
everything they remembered, they would only receive one course credit or £5, would be 
excluded from the draw, and would be asked to write a full statement of what happened in the 
video.     
After the instructions to tell the truth or lie, participants were requested to prepare for 
the interview. They were given unlimited preparation time. After preparation, they were 
given a pre-interview questionnaire. Truth tellers and liars were requested to respond 
truthfully. In the questionnaire participants were asked to rate on 7-point scales their 
preparation for the interview. They were asked to indicate how well they were prepared (1 = 
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very poor, 7 = very good) and how sufficient (1 = insufficient, 7 = sufficient); and complete (1 
= incomplete, 7 = complete) their preparation was. These three preparation items were 
clustered into one variable, Preparation quality (Cronbach’s alpha is .91 for the immediate 
and .93 for the delayed interviews). The pre-interview questionnaire also included questions 
about stress, motivation, and confidence the participants felt about being convincing in the 
upcoming interview. These answers were rated on 7-point scales (1 = not at all, 7 = totally).  
Interviews. Sketch Task. One interviewer, blind to the aims of the study, stimulus 
material, and veracity conditions, questioned the participants. In the beginning of the 
immediate interview truth tellers and liars were asked to sketch the layout of the community 
centre they broke into. The participants made their drawing on an A3 sized blank sheet of 
paper. They were requested to use as much space as they needed to sketch the scene as they 
remembered it. Participants were instructed to include as many details as possible about 
where different objects were in relation to other objects. They could also use labels and notes 
within their sketch to indicate the features of the scene or to indicate if they were not certain 
of something. After making the sketch, participants were asked to describe it in as much 
detail as possible.  
After the immediate interview all participants were told that the second part of the 
experiment would be in two weeks’ time. When they came back for the second session, 
participants were again given the same sketch task, and, afterwards, asked to verbally 
describe their sketch.  
Post-interview questionnaire. Participants were asked to fill out a post-interview 
questionnaire after the delayed interview only. The post-interview questionnaire included 
questions about what they thought the likelihood was of getting two credits or £10 and having 
to write a statement (1 = not at all, 7 = very likely). As previous research has found that active 
repetition of learned information can prevent memory decline (Bornstein et al., 1998), 
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participants were also asked in an open-ended question how many times they had tried to 
remember the break-in (truth tellers)/cover story (liars) between the two interviews. Lastly, 
participants were asked about the extent to which they i) told the truth, and ii) lied during the 
interview. Participants indicated on 11-point Likert scales ranging from 0% (not at all) to 
100% (totally). These two questions were asked twice to assess the truthfulness in both the 
immediate and delayed descriptions of the sketch. As with the pre-interview questionnaire, 
truth tellers and liars were requested to be honest with their responses. 
After completing the post-interview questionnaire, all participants were thanked, fully 
debriefed, and paid £10 or given two credits for participation in the experiment. After full 
data collection, one participant was randomly selected as a lottery winner. 
Noteworthy, to minimise the potential effects of participant collaboration, each 
interviewee was explicitly instructed to keep the content of the experiment confidential after 
the immediate interview, and again after completion of the whole study.    
 
3.2.5 Coding 
Verbal details. Interviews were transcribed verbatim. All statements were coded for 
the details provided by interviewees in the 1) immediate sketch description and 2) delayed 
sketch description. Each detail was counted once per description of sketch. For example, if 
the same word ‘desk’ (or a synonym) was mentioned twice in one interview (and had the 
meaning of the same ‘desk’), it was counted only once. However, if the same detail was 
mentioned in the different interviews, it was counted separately. Four types of detail were 
coded: visual, spatial, temporal, and action details.  
Two coders carried out the coding. Both coders were trained by a senior member in 
the research lab. They received definitions and examples of the to-be-coded variables and 
were asked to code some practice statements. The trainer gave feedback on the coding and 
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gave the coders a few more practice statements. The coders were given permission to start 
coding the study interviews when the trainer was satisfied with their coding of the practice 
statements. 
The first coder, the author of this study, coded all transcripts. The second coder, blind 
to the hypotheses, stimulus event, and veracity of the statements, coded a random sample of 
12 interview scripts (24.5%) to measure reliability. Inter-rater reliabilities between the two 
coders for the frequency of detail in both (immediate and delayed) statements were measured 
via intraclass correlation coefficients (ICC). The ICC revealed acceptable inter-rater values of 
the immediate statements, .70, CI [-.27,.91] for visual details; .94, CI [.82,.99] for spatial 
details; .71, CI [.10,.92] for temporal details; and .82, CI [.40,.95] for action details; and 
delayed statements, .83, CI [.40,.95] for visual details; .77, CI [.17,.93] for spatial details; .67, 
CI [-.06,.91] for temporal details; and .85, CI [.51,.96] for action details.   
  
Between-statement consistency. Consistency in the responses between the 
immediate and delayed verbal descriptions of sketch was measured. The details coded 
previously were used for consistency analysis. The total amount of details (visual, spatial, 
temporal, and action details combined) was examined. Repetitions (details reported in both 
immediate and delayed sketch), reminiscences (details reported in the delayed but not in the 
immediate sketch), and omissions (details reported in the immediate but not in the delayed 
sketch) were analysed3.  
The coders only coded reminiscences. Arithmetic calculations were used to obtain 
repetitions and omissions. Reminiscent details in the delayed interview were coded if they 
were not present in the immediate interview. Repetitions were computed by deducting 
                                                                
3 As in Study I, contradictions, the fourth measure of consistency, did not occur often enough in the reports of 
truth tellers and liars. One or more contradictions were present in 36.0% of truthful statements and 50.0% of 
deceptive statements. They were rare for truth tellers (M = 0.44, SD = 0.65) and liars (M = 0.79, SD = 0.93), and 
did not differ significantly across veracity groups, t(141) = 1.53, p = .131, d  = 0.51. 
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reminiscences from the total amount of details in the delayed interview and omissions were 
calculated by deducting repetitions from the total amount of details in the immediate 
interview.  
Again, two coders were used for the consistency coding. The consistency training 
they received followed a similar format as the training they received for the details coding. 
The first author marked all transcripts and the second coder marked 11 interview scripts, 
22%. Inter-rater reliability for reminiscences was examined only because that was the only 
measure coded manually. The analysis revealed high ICC of .87 for reminiscences in the 
delayed vs. immediate reports. 
 
3.3 Results 
 
3.3.1 Manipulation checks 
Mixed ANOVAs with Time of Interview as the within-subjects factor and Veracity as 
the between-subjects factor were used for all the manipulation checks. Table 3.1 shows mean 
scores, standard deviations and confidence intervals for truth tellers and liars to the pre- and 
post- questionnaires. 
There was a significant main effect of Veracity on self-reported stress levels, F(1, 47) 
= 6.44, p = .014, d = 0.72. Liars reported feeling a higher level of stress than the truth tellers 
did. There was also a significant main effect of Veracity on confidence in convincing the 
interviewer, F(1, 47) = 7.54, p = .016, d = 0.65. Truth tellers felt more confident than liars in 
their ability to convince the interviewer that they were telling the truth. A significant main 
effect of Veracity was found on how many times interviewees thought about the event/story 
before the second interview, F(1, 46) = 3.41, p = .028, d = 0.63). Liars thought more often 
about the event than truth tellers. There were also significant main effects of Veracity on 
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extent of truthfulness during the immediate interview, F(1, 47) = 52.10, p < .001, d = 5.8, and 
the delayed interview, F(1, 46) = 91.90, p < .001, d = 5.57.  
 
Table 3.1 
Means, standard deviations and confidence intervals for the answers to pre-interview and 
post-interview questionnaires from truth-tellers and liars 
 Truth tellers Liars 
Measure M SD 95% CI M SD 95% CI 
Motivation to convince the 
interviewer 
6.04 0.72 5.77,6.30 5.96 1.00 5.52,6.39 
Preparation quality 4.96 0.80 4.67,5.24 4.85 1.27 4.29,5.37 
Preparation time (sec.) 198.85 98.27 165.56,234.03 207.34 78.82 174.87,243.26 
Stress before the interview* 3.39 1.33 2.90,3.93 4.35 1.37 3.77,4.96 
Confidence to convince the 
interviewer* 
5.17 1.01 4.78,5.56 4.40 1.19 3.92,4.90 
Likelihood to receive £10/2 
credits 
5.23 1.21 4.73,5.71 4.67 1.13 4.21,5.12 
Likelihood to write a 
statement 
3.46 1.48 2.86,4.06 4.17 1.31 3.63,4.65 
Times thought about the 
event/story* 
2.19 1.27 1.73,2.67 3.13 1.67 2.48,3.76 
Extent of truthfulness in the 
immediate interview* 
98.46 6.13 95.83,100.00 18.26 18.50 11.82,24.44 
Extent of truthfulness in the 
delayed interview* 
98.92 6.24 94.49,99.11 17.50 19.39 10.45,24.46 
*p < .05 
 
In both interviews, truth tellers were more truthful than liars. All other main effects of 
Veracity were not significant, all F’s < 9.14, all p’s > .165, see Table 3.1. 
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A main effect of Time of Interview emerged only for preparation time, F(1, 46) = 
14.80, p < .001, d = 0.59. Participants used more preparation time before the immediate 
interview (M = 234.14, SD = 99.69, 95% CI [208.54, 260.49]) than before the delayed 
interview (M = 178.45, SD = 99.69, 95% CI [154.14, 201.83]). All other main effects of 
Time of Interview were non-significant, all F’s < 3.70, all p’s > .060. All Veracity x Time of 
Interview interaction main effects were not significant, all F’s < 1.45, p > .234. 
An independent t test revealed no significant main effect of Veracity on incentive 
ratings. Truth tellers were equally convinced as liars about getting a £10/2 credits reward, 
F(1, 38) = 0.02, p = .10, d = 0.48. Finally, an independent t test revealed no significant main 
effect of Veracity on the likelihood of writing a statement ratings, F(1, 38) = 1.89, p = .10, d 
= 0.49, see Table 3.1 (In the two latter analyses time of interview was not included as a factor 
as the question referred to the two interviews combined). In summary, the results showed that 
manipulations in this study were successful.  
 
3.3.2 Verbal details in the immediate and delayed interviews  
To examine whether the amount of information changed between the immediate and 
delayed interviews, mixed ANOVAs were carried out with Time of Interview as the within-
subject factor and Veracity as the between-subjects factor. With visual details as dependent 
variable, there was a significant main effect of Veracity, F(1, 47) = 6.73, p = .013, d  = 0.74, 
with truth tellers (M = 106.56, SD = 46.58, 95% CI [89.73, 126.19]) reporting more visual 
details than liars (M = 75.79, SD = 35.31, 95% CI [62.17, 91.80]). The main effect of Time 
of Interview, F(1, 47) = 0.05, p = .817, d  = 0.03, and Veracity x Time of Interview 
interaction, F(1, 47) = 3.95, p = .053, 𝜂
p
2  = .08, were not significant. Simple effects analysis 
for Veracity revealed that truth tellers reported more visual details than liars in the immediate 
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interview, whereas the difference was not significant in the delayed interview, see Table 3.2. 
The other simple effects for Veracity or Time of Interview did not reach significance.  
A significant main effect of Veracity emerged for reporting spatial details, F(1, 47) = 
15.97, p < .001, d  = 1.15. Truth tellers (M = 56.40, SD = 30.47, 95% CI [45.54, 68.92]) 
reported more spatial details than liars (M = 28.54, SD = 15.73, 95% CI [22.30, 35.50]). The 
main effect of Time of Interview was not significant, F(1, 47) = 0.05, p = .820, d  = 0.01, but 
the Veracity x Time of Interview interaction effect, F(1, 47) = 5.27, p = .026, 𝜂p2
  = .10, was 
significant. Simple effects showed that truth tellers reported more spatial details than liars in 
both the immediate and delayed interviews (Table 3.2).  
A significant main effect of Veracity emerged for temporal details, F(1, 47) = 8.50, p 
= .005, d  = 0.84. Truth tellers (M = 14.76, SD = 19.74, 95% CI [8.05, 23.86]) reported more 
temporal details than liars (M = 2.79, SD = 3.91, 95% CI [1.30, 4.39]). The Time of 
Interview main effect, F(1, 47) = 0.04, p = .840, 𝑑 = .01, and Veracity x Time of Interview 
interaction effect , F(1, 47) = 1.00, p = .323, 𝜂
p
2  = .02, were not significant. Simple effects 
revealed that truth tellers reported more temporal details than liars in both the immediate and 
delayed interviews (Table 3.2). 
A significant main effect of Veracity emerged for action details, F(1, 47) = 10.78, p = 
.001, d  = 0.98. Truth tellers (M = 32.84, SD = 36.47, 95% CI [20.12, 48.87]) mentioned 
more action details (M = 6.92, SD = 8.56, 95% CI [3.81, 10.21]) than liars. The Time of 
Interview main effect was not significant, F(1, 47) = 1.89, p = .176, d  = .08, but the Veracity 
x Time of Interview interaction effect was significant, F(1, 47) = 5.42, p = .024, 𝜂p2
  = .10. 
Simple effects revealed that truth tellers provided more action details than liars in both the 
immediate and delayed interviews, see Table 3.2.  
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Table 3.2 
Details in the immediate and delayed sketch reports as a function of veracity condition 
 Truth Lie    
Detail M SD 95% CI M SD 95% CI F p d 
Immediate interview 
Visual 55.68 27.19 45.87,67.36 36.00 16.27 30.30,41.50 5.15 .004 0.88 
Spatial 29.24 16.51 23.36,36.22 13.00 7.47 10.43,15.64 9.47 <.001 1.27 
Temporal 7.60 9.69 4.28,11.90 1.25 1.87 .63,1.96 19.81 .003 0.91 
Action 18.04 20.68 10.90,27.00 3.04 4.51 1.59,4.56 28.69 .002 1.00 
Delayed interview 
Visual 50.88 20.90 43.55,58.92 39.79 22.38 32.11,48.47 .57 .079 0.51 
Spatial 27.16 14.77 22.44,32.70 15.54 9.54 11.96,19.18 2.91 .002 0.93 
Temporal 7.16 10.24 4.00,10.76 1.54 2.62 .57,2.70 9.91 .013 0.75 
Action 14.80 16.32 9.39,21.20 3.88 4.91 2.00,6.04 13.12 .003 0.91 
 
In summary, as predicted in Hypothesis 1, truth tellers reported significantly more 
visual, spatial, temporal, and action details than liars in the immediate statements, with large 
Cohen’s d effect sizes for independent samples ranging from 0.88 to 1.21. Truth tellers also 
reported significantly more spatial, temporal, and action details after a delay. The effect sizes 
samples were again large, ranging from 0.75 to 0.93. There was no difference between truth 
tellers and liars in the amount of visual details after a delay. Thus, Hypothesis 2 was 
supported for spatial details, but rejected for visual, temporal, and action details.  
Hypothesis 3 predicted a memory decline in truth tellers for temporal and action 
details after a delay. Truth tellers showed a significant decline in reporting action details, F(1, 
47) = 7.00, p = .045, d  = .42 (Cohen’s d for paired samples), but no difference in reporting 
visual, spatial, and temporal details emerged between immediate and delayed statements, all 
F’s < 2.52, p’s > .088, d’s < 0.38. There was no difference between liars’ immediate and 
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delayed statements in the amount of any type of (visual, spatial, temporal, or action) detail, 
all F’s < 3.13, p’s > .080, d’s < 0.37. Thus, Hypothesis 3 was supported for action details, but 
rejected for temporal details.  
Reporting patterns of different type of details over time in the statements of truth 
tellers and liars are shown in Figure 3.1. Although not significant (except for action details), 
truth tellers showed a tendency to report a lower amount of details in the delayed than in the 
immediate interviews. In contrast, liars showed a non-significant tendency to report more 
visual, spatial, temporal, and action details in the delayed than in the immediate interviews. 
 
Figure 3.1. Amount of reported details with 95% confidence intervals in the immediate and 
delayed statements across veracity conditions. 
* p < .005 
 
To support overall patterns of reporting details over time, it was considered important 
to examine the effects on total details across veracity groups. A mixed ANOVA was carried 
out with Time of Interview as the within-subject factor and Veracity as the between-subjects 
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factor and total details as the dependent variable. There was a significant Veracity x 
Interview interaction main effect for total details, F(1, 47) = 6.30, p = .016, 𝜂
p
2  = .12. Truth 
tellers reported significantly more total details in the immediate statements (M = 110.56, SD 
= 70.87, 95% CI [86.57, 140.43]) than in the delayed statements (M = 99.96, SD = 58.79, 
95% CI [79.58, 123.75]), t(24) = 2.26, p = .034, d  = .45. Liars showed no difference in 
reporting total details between the immediate statements (M = 53.46, SD = 25.15, 95% CI 
[43.56, 62.96]) and delayed statements (M = 60.75, SD = 34.13, 95% CI [47.77, 75.83]), 
t(23) = 1.36, p = .189, d  = .28. 
    
3.3.3 Consistency between the immediate and delayed interviews           
An ANCOVA with Veracity as the between-subjects factor was conducted with 
reminiscent details as the dependent variable and amount of detail provided at the immediate 
interview as a covariate. The reason for including this covariate was that the number of 
reminiscent details in the delayed interview is related to the amount of detail provided in the 
immediate interview. That is, the more detail provided in the immediate interview, the less 
opportunity there is to add new additional detail in the delayed interview. The main effect of 
Veracity was not significant, F(1, 45) = 1.89, p = .176, d  = .54. Truth tellers (M = 18.41, SD 
= 25.20, 95% CI [13.41, 23.76]) and liars (M = 30.71, SD = 36.20, 95% CI [17.46, 53.60]) 
provided a similar number of reminiscent details in the delayed interview.  
The same ANCOVA with repetitions in the delayed interview as the dependent 
variable and amount of detail provided at immediate interview as a covariate did not result in 
a significant main effect of Veracity, F(1, 46) = 0.20, p = .654, d = .22. Truth tellers (M = 
59.41, SD = 14.65, 95% CI [46.90, 73.28]) and liars (M = 55.43, SD = 21.07, 95% CI [43.12, 
68.82]) reported a similar number of repetitions in the delayed interview.  
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The ANCOVA with omissions as the dependent variable and Total detail at the 
immediate interview as a covariate showed no significant effect of Veracity either, F(1, 46) = 
0.20, p = .654, d = .22. Truth tellers (M = 23.12, SD = 14.65, 95% CI [16.06, 30.37]) and 
liars (M = 27.17, SD = 21.07, 95% CI [20.28, 37.18]) omitted a similar number of details in 
the delayed interview4.  Thus, Hypothesis 4 was not supported. 
 
3.4 Discussion 
 
In this experiment, the effects of a sketch mnemonic on immediate and delayed 
statements of truth tellers and liars were examined. Analysis of the immediate descriptions of 
the sketch revealed that truth tellers reported significantly more visual, spatial, temporal, and 
action details than liars. This result is in line with previous findings showing that truth tellers, 
especially when interviewed immediately after an event, report more information than liars 
(Vrij, 2005, 2008, 2016). 
In the delayed sketch descriptions, truth tellers provided more spatial, but not more 
visual details than liars. Moreover, the statements of truth tellers were comparatively richer in 
terms of temporal and action details than the liars’ statements.  
Two conclusions can be derived from the findings for the delayed statements. First, 
the credibility cue richness of detail remained diagnostic after a delay (except for visual 
details). These findings differed from those obtained in some other studies (e.g., Harvey et 
al., 2017; Vrij et al., 2009) in which truth tellers did differ from liars in the amount of 
                                                                
4 When the amount of total detail in the immediate interview was not included as a covariate, an independent t 
tests revealed that truth tellers (M = 19.44, SD = 11.39, 95% CI [15.38, 23.80]) and liars (M = 24.63, SD = 
31.13, 95% CI [14.86, 38.56]) reported a similar number of reminiscent details in the delayed interview, F(1, 
47) = 0.61, p = .439, d = 0.22. Truth tellers (M = 80.52, SD = 55.87, 95% CI [59.54, 104.69]) provided 
significantly more repetitions than liars (M = 36.13, SD = 18.68, 95% CI [28.87, 43.89]) in the delayed 
interview, F(1, 47) = 13.68, p = .001, d = 1.07. Also, truth tellers (M = 30.04, SD = 24.20, 95% CI [21.19, 
39.96]) made significantly more omissions than liars (M = 17.33, SD = 11.98, 95% CI [12.75, 21.52] in the 
delayed interview, F(1, 47) = 5.35, p = .025, d = 0.67.     
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information provided when interviewed immediately, but not after a delay. Noteworthy, in 
those studies participants were interviewed only once, and no mnemonic was used. Thus, the 
presence of an immediate interview and/or the use of a mnemonic may have strengthened 
memory in truth tellers and, subsequently, made richness of detail a diagnostic cue to deceit 
even in delayed interviews.  
Second, the absence of a difference in the amount of visual details across veracity 
conditions in the delayed interviews could be explained by different reporting strategies. 
Truth tellers might have been forthcoming in their delayed statements and simply reported 
what they remembered. Liars might have found it easier to report more visual details than the 
other types of detail. Providing visual information is relatively safe as it does not give too 
many leads to investigators and implicate the interviewee. For example, liars can provide 
visual details that are typically found in a staff room e.g. information about furniture, kitchen 
utensils, or electric devices. Accounts with such information are less likely to contradict the 
factual evidence. However, reporting too many spatial, temporal or action details might have 
put liars at risk of revealing self-incriminating evidence. For example, information about 
locations of objects, specific times and/or activities can be potentially checked by 
investigators (e.g. CCTV records or asking neighbours who could have witnessed the event in 
question). It is known that liars tend to avoid reporting self-incriminating evidence (Granhag 
& Hartwig, 2008). More research is needed to support this explanation with more confidence. 
It was further found that truth tellers showed a significant decline in providing action 
and total details between the immediate and delayed interviews. Liars showed no decrease in 
reporting any type of details in this study. It supports the evidence that truth tellers 
experienced genuine decline in memory over time (Ebbinghaus, 1885/1913; Penrod et al., 
1982; Schacter, 1999), whereas liars failed to take into account genuine memory decay and 
produced the reporting pattern reflecting a ‘stability bias’ (Harvey et al., 2017).  
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Finally, there was no difference in between-statement consistency across veracity 
conditions. As in previous research (Granhag & Strömwall, 2002; Vredeveldt et al. 2014, 
Granhag et al., 2016), this experiment showed that truth tellers and liars were equally 
consistent in their statements. This finding is in contrast with the widely held stereotypical 
view that truth tellers are more consistent than liars (Bogaard et al., 2016). Two explanations 
can be derived from the lack of difference in consistency between truth tellers and liars in 
their repeated statements. First, truth tellers could not only add or omit, but also repeat a lot 
of details because their immediate and delayed statements were rich in detail, in general.  
Second, and in line with previous research (Leins et al., 2012), liars may not experience 
difficulty in being consistent between their statements because a passive interviewing style 
(identical request of making a sketch during both interviews) was employed in this study. The 
modalities of interview were not changed, therefore, liars were not constrained to use the 
‘repeat’ strategy during the delayed interview.  
 A limitation of this study was that it did not contain a control condition. It is therefore 
difficult to identify whether the immediate use of sketch did produce differences between 
truth tellers and liars after a delay. The immediate interviewing, regardless of the techniques 
used in it, could also similarly affect delayed accounts of truth tellers and liars. This issue will 
be addressed in Study III of this thesis. 
 In conclusion, the results of this experiment showed that the sketch mnemonic was 
helpful to differentiate between truthful and deceptive statements in the immediate and 
delayed interviews. In addition, truth tellers showed a decline in reporting some of the details 
between the immediate and delayed interviews. Liars, instead, provided a similar amount of 
detail over time. Finally, truthful and deceptive statements did not differ in terms of between-
statement consistency.    
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Chapter 4: Deception detection in repeated interviews: The 
effects of immediate type of questioning on delayed accounts 
(Study III) 
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Abstract 
 
In criminal investigation settings, the proper use of interviewing techniques is 
important to gather relevant and reliable information, and to effectively infer the credibility of 
an interviewee’s account. In this study, how different types of interviewing used in an 
interview conducted shortly after an event affected truth tellers’ and liars’ responses when 
they were interviewed again after a two-week delay was investigated. Participants (n = 80) 
were shown a mock intelligence operation video and instructed either to tell the truth or lie 
about its contents in two interviews, one of which took place immediately after watching the 
video and the other after a two-week delay. In the immediate interview participants were 
instructed either to report everything they remembered, or asked open-ended spatial 
questions related to the event. In the delayed interview all participants were asked to report 
everything they could remember. Truth tellers reported more visual, spatial, temporal and 
action details than liars, both immediately and after a delay in both interviewing groups. 
However, the differences between truth tellers and liars were slightly larger in the report 
everything than spatial questions condition. Truth tellers provided more reminiscences and 
repetitions, but made fewer omissions than liars in the delayed accounts. Results suggest that 
an immediate ‘report everything’ mnemonic technique can provide a buffer against truth-
tellers’ decline in reporting details after a delay, and effectively discriminate between truthful 
and deceptive accounts.  
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4.1 Introduction 
 
The goal of any successful police investigation is to obtain reliable evidence for court 
proceedings (Gabbert, Hope, Carter, Boon, & Fisher, 2016; Milne & Bull, 1999). The 
testimony of witnesses and victims plays an important role in criminal investigations, and so 
information collected from them in interviews must be both accurate and relevant to the case 
(Walsh & Oxburgh, 2008). Research has shown that the way in which a witness is questioned 
can affect the quality of his/her statement (Loftus & Palmer, 1974; Memon, Meissner, & 
Fraser, 2010). Inappropriate questioning during the investigative interview may result in 
memory distortions or incomplete or erroneous reports from interviewees, which may 
significantly deteriorate an investigation (Clarke & Milne, 2001; Oxburgh, Myklebust & 
Grant, 2010). Moreover, poor questioning can impair possibilities to reliably discriminate 
between truthful and deceptive reports, meaning lies remain undetected (Vrij & Granhag, 
2012).  
In the legal system interviewees tend to be interviewed multiple times about the target 
event, often after long delay periods (Pansky et al., 2005; Wysman et al., 2014). In the current 
research, how the initial type of questioning affects the content and credibility of the 
subsequent delayed accounts was examined. 
 The current experiment is an elaboration of Study I (Chapter 2; Izotovas et al., 2018) 
and Study II (Chapter 3) of this thesis. Specifically, although the results of Studies I and II 
indicated that mnemonic techniques used in the immediate interview can be helpful in 
differentiating truth tellers from liars after a delay, it cannot be said with certainty what effect 
was a consequence of the mnemonics used. That is, the effects obtained may have been the 
result of mere retrieval practice, regardless of the quality of initial questioning. In Study III 
these factors were disentangled. The report everything mnemonic technique (i.e. eliciting 
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more complete accounts) was compared with the spatial questions (i.e. eliciting less detailed 
statements) to examine how these types of questioning used in the immediate interviews 
affected the delayed statements of truth tellers and liars. 
 
4.1.1 Delay and deception detection 
Engaging in a high-quality (i.e., complete and accurate) initial recall attempt can be a 
protective factor to prevent memory decay (Bornstein et al., 1998; Hope et al., 2014; Pansky 
& Nemets, 2012). However, incomplete immediate accounts can negatively affect not only 
memory (Hope et al., 2014; Macleod, 2002; Shaw et al., 1995), but also credibility 
assessment. First, deception research has shown that richness of detail in a statement is one of 
the most diagnostic cues to credibility, with truthful statements typically containing more 
details than deceptive ones (DePaulo et al., 2003; Vrij, 2008, 2015). Second, interviewers 
often associate lack of detail with poor credibility (Akehurst et al., 1996; Bogaard et al., 
2016; Strömwall & Granhag, 2003). Although the role of type of questioning in human 
memory has been extensively researched (Memon, Meissner, & Fraser, 2010), it is as yet 
unknown how it affects discrimination between truth tellers and liars in a repeated 
interviewing (immediately and after a delay) context.  
If the passage of time can undermine discrimination between truth tellers and liars 
(Harvey et al., 2017), in this study the focus was to discover whether immediate interviewing 
could assist in later distinguishing truthful from deceptive accounts after the delay. In 
addition, the effectiveness of two immediate interviewing strategies (complete and less 
complete) to detect deception in the delayed accounts was compared. In the current study two 
immediate types of interview were compared, i) report everything (promoting complete 
retrieval) and ii) spatial open-ended questions (promoting selective retrieval), and examined 
how these questioning types affected the delayed reports of truth tellers and liars.  
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The report everything instruction was chosen because it is considered best practice in 
investigative interviewing (Fisher & Geiselman, 1992; Milne & Bull, 1999; Hope et al., 
2011). The report everything instruction is a mnemonic technique that prompts interviewees 
to disclose all information they remember, whether it seems trivial or not (Fisher & 
Geiselman, 2010). This technique is valuable because details that an interviewee considers to 
be irrelevant may be important for the investigation, and recall of some details may activate 
memories of other relevant details (Fisher & Geiselman, 1992).  
Regarding spatial open-ended questioning, spatial details are important because they 
give valuable knowledge about directions of movement, locations of people or objects, or the 
layout of crime scene (Hope et al., 2011). However, when the interviewer puts emphasis only 
on questioning about one aspect of the event (spatial information), but neglects to ask 
questions about the other aspects (e.g., descriptions about actions of people during the crime), 
there is a risk to elicit less complete statements at the initial interview and after a delay 
(Gabbert et al., 2016). Furthermore, spatial questions, specifically, were chosen in Study III 
for the sake of coherence within this whole thesis of research. That is, in Study II, the effects 
of sketch mnemonic focused on elicitation of spatial information and so I aimed to keep this 
consistent in the current study.    
It is important to note that in the current study, both interview types involved initial 
retrieval practice (a term also known as ‘testing effect’), an act of recalling information to 
induce better retention in memory (Roediger & Butler, 2011; Roediger & Karpicke, 2006). 
Also, research in human memory has shown that activation of some information produces 
facilitative effects on later retrieval of related, but not initially reported information (Chan, 
McDermott, & Roediger, 2006). Although it was not intended to test how immediate 
reporting of some details enhanced the delayed reporting of associated, but previously not 
mentioned details, it was speculated that the less complete initial interviewing (spatial 
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questions) would produce fewer associative links, and, as a result, less detailed accounts than 
the more complete interviewing (report everything mnemonic). Therefore, the difference 
between truth tellers and liars is likely to be reduced with the interview type eliciting less 
complete truthful accounts.        
 
4.1.2 Hypotheses 
It was predicted that truth tellers would report more visual, spatial, temporal and 
action details than liars after a delay in the report everything condition (Hypothesis 1). 
Compared to liars, truth tellers would report more visual and spatial details and an equal 
amount of temporal and action details in the delayed statements of the spatial questions 
condition (Hypothesis 2). As truth tellers should benefit more from the report everything 
mnemonic technique than from the spatial questioning interview, an interaction was 
expected: differences between truth tellers and liars would be larger in the report everything 
than the spatial questions condition in the delayed statements (Hypothesis 3). Truth tellers, 
but not liars, would show patterns indicative of genuine memory decay (Hypothesis 4). Truth 
tellers would produce more reminiscences and omissions than liars after a delay in both the 
report everything and spatial questions initial reporting conditions (Hypothesis 5).  
 
4.2 Method 
 
4.2.1 Participants 
 A total of 81 volunteers took part in the study. This study had enough power (Cohen, 
1992) of 0.93 to obtain medium effect sizes. The mean age of participants was 31.81 years 
(SD = 10.12), 72.8% were female and 27.2% were male. Participants were recruited via 
posters, flyers, and a volunteer database. Fluent English speakers were required to take part in 
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the study because verbal content of the statement was examined. The majority of participants 
were not English native speakers, therefore, they were asked to rate their fluency in language 
before the beginning of the experiment5. One person was excluded because of language 
issues (e.g. the participant experienced difficulties in understanding the instructions and 
expressing him/herself during the interview). Thus, the final sample included 80 volunteers. 
They were awarded with shopping vouchers worth 100 SEK (approx. €10) after they 
completed the experiment. In addition, all participants were entered into a draw to win a 
single prize worth 1000 SEK. 
 This experiment was conducted in a different country from Studies I and II, therefore, 
the possibility of duplication of participants was highly unlikely.    
 
4.2.2 Design 
A 2 (Veracity: Truthful vs deceptive) × 2 (Initial Interview: Report everything vs 
spatial questions) × 2 (Time of Interview: Immediate vs delayed) experimental design was 
used with Veracity and Initial Retrieval as between-subject factors and Time of Interview as 
within-subjects factor. Visual, spatial, temporal, and action details were the dependent 
variables for the type of details analysis; reminiscences, repetitions, and omissions were the 
dependent variables for the consistency analysis. Participants were randomly assigned to the 
Veracity and Initial Interview conditions (report everything: truth tellers, n = 18; liars, n = 20; 
spatial questions: truth tellers, n = 22; liars, n = 20). All participants were interviewed twice, 
immediately after the stimulus event and two weeks later. Not all participants were available 
                                                                
5 English proficiency level scale was adapted from the London School of English (2018). The scale consisted of 
six categories: i) Elementary (“I can say and understand a few things in English”); ii) Pre-intermediate (“I can 
communicate simply and understand in familiar situations, but only with some difficulty”); iii) Intermediate (“I 
can speak and understand reasonably well and can use basic tenses, but have problems with more complex 
grammar and vocabulary”); iv) Upper-intermediate (“I speak and understand well, but still make mistakes and 
fail to make myself understood occasionally”); v) Advanced (“I speak and understand very well, but sometimes 
have problems with familiar situations and vocabulary”); and vi) Very advanced (“I speak and understand 
English completely fluently”). Participants classified themselves as Intermediate 6.3%, Upper-intermediate 
25%, Advanced 37.5%, and Very advanced 31.3%.  
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exactly 14 days after the first interview, therefore, the delay time for the second interview 
varied between 8 and 27 days (M = 14.66, SD = 3.67). The delay time for the majority of 
participants (45%) was 14 days.    
 
4.2.3 Materials 
Stimulus event. Same as in Studies I and II, a filmed event depicting a simulated 
break-in was used.  
 
4.2.4 Procedure 
 Pre-interview phase.  In the beginning, participants were instructed to consider that 
they were in the video described above, and they were following the other person in that 
video. They were also given the instruction to take the role of intelligence officer working 
undercover with another officer who was seen in the video. They were told their task was to 
break into an apartment with that officer and secure important information for intelligence 
gathering. All participants were instructed that the apartment they broke into was a staff room 
of a community centre. This special task was recorded from the perspective of the person 
who followed the other man throughout the break-in. Therefore, the participants were 
instructed ‘to follow' the intelligence officer seen in the recording. 
After watching the break-in video, participants were randomly assigned to the 
veracity conditions. Truth tellers were informed that the break-in was successful and they 
would be interviewed by a fellow agent to continue the investigation. They were asked to tell 
the truth during the interview about 1) the interior of the staff room in the video, and 2) what 
they took from there. Liars were also informed that the break-in was successful. However, 
they were instructed that they would be interviewed by an agent of a hostile agency and that 
their task was to create a convincing cover story. If the hostile officer came to know about the 
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exact place they broke into and what was taken from there, the entire investigation would be 
in danger. Therefore, liars were instructed to fabricate details about 1) the interior of the staff 
room in the video, and 2) what they took from there. 
 To increase participants’ motivation to be convincing in the interviews, they were told 
that if they were convincing during the interviews, they would receive a full 100 SEK reward 
and be entered in the draw to win 1000 SEK worth prize. If they were not convincing enough, 
i.e. the interviewer thought they did not report everything they remembered, they were told 
that they would only receive 50 SEK, would be excluded from the draw, and would have to 
write a full statement of what happened in the video. 
 After the veracity instructions, participants were offered unlimited time to prepare for 
the interview. After preparation, a pre-interview questionnaire was administered. Participants 
were requested to respond truthfully. In the questionnaire participants were asked to rate on 
7-point scales their preparation for the interview. They were asked to indicate how well they 
were prepared (1 = very poor, 7 = very good); and how sufficient (1 = insufficient, 7 = 
sufficient) and complete (1 = incomplete, 7 = complete) their preparation was. These three 
preparation items were clustered into one variable, Preparation quality (Cronbach’s alpha was 
.95 for the immediate and .90 for the delayed interviews). The pre-interview questionnaire 
also included questions about their levels of stress and motivation, and subjective confidence 
in being convincing in the upcoming interview. These answers were also rated on 7-point 
scales (1 = not at all, 7 = totally). 
 Interviews. The participants were questioned by an interviewer who was blind to the 
aims of the study, stimulus material, and veracity conditions.  
In the immediate interview of the report everything condition, truth tellers and liars 
were asked to provide a free recall, i.e. to report everything they could remember from the 
break-in, including descriptions of objects and locations, the sequences of actions, and 
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information about any people that were involved.  They were also asked to not guess about 
details that they could not remember. 
In the immediate interview of the spatial questions condition, truth tellers and liars 
were not invited to give a free recall, but were asked five open-ended questions related to 
spatial characteristics of the break-in instead. The questions asked by the interviewer were: i) 
Describe the corridor of the apartment you broke into; ii) Describe the interior of the staff 
room; iii) Describe distinguishing features of the staff room; iv) Describe the outside area of 
the building you entered into; and v) Which items were taken and describe where they were 
taken from? 
After the immediate interview, the first session of the experiment was completed. All 
participants were told that the second part of the experiment would be after two weeks. When 
participants returned for the second interview, interviewees in all conditions were asked to 
provide a free recall, report everything. 
Post-interview phase. Participants completed a post-interview questionnaire after the 
delayed interview only. As with the pre-interview questionnaire, truth tellers and liars were 
requested to be honest with their responses. The post-interview questionnaire included 
questions about what they thought the likelihood was of i) receiving the 100 SEK, and ii) 
having to write a statement (1 = not at all, 7 = very likely). As previous research has found 
that active repetition of learned information can prevent memory decline (Bornstein et al., 
1998), participants were also asked to estimate how many times they had tried to remember 
the break-in (truth tellers)/cover story (liars) between the two interviews. Lastly, participants 
were asked about the extent to which they i) told the truth, and ii) lied during the interview. 
Participants indicated on 11-point Likert scales ranging from 0% (not at all) to 100% 
(totally). These two questions were asked on both occasions to assess the truthfulness in both 
the immediate and delayed accounts.  
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After completing the post-interview questionnaire, all participants were thanked, fully 
debriefed, and rewarded with a shopping voucher worth 100 SEK for participation in the 
experiment. After full data collection, one participant was randomly selected as the lottery 
winner. 
Noteworthy, after the immediate interview and, again, after the completion of the 
whole study each participant was explicitly instructed to keep the content of the experiment 
confidential.  
 
4.2.5 Coding 
 Verbal details. Interviews were audio recorded and then transcribed verbatim. All 
statements were coded for the details provided in both the immediate and delayed accounts. 
Each detail was counted once per interview. As in previous studies of this thesis, visual, 
spatial, temporal, and action details were coded. 
 The first coder, the author of this study, coded all transcripts. The second coder, blind 
to the hypotheses, stimulus event, and veracity of the statements, coded a random sample of 
16 (20.0%) interview scripts to assess reliability. Inter-rater reliabilities between the two 
coders for the frequency of detail in both (immediate and delayed) statements were measured 
via intraclass correlation coefficients (ICC). The ICC revealed excellent inter-rater values: 
.95, CI [.22,.99] for visual details; .96, CI [.76,.99] for spatial details; .97, CI [.85,.99] for 
temporal details; and .99, CI [.97,1.00] for action details.  
Between-statement consistency. The coded details were used for a consistency 
analysis. The total amount of details (visual, spatial, temporal, and action details combined) 
was examined for consistency in the responses between the immediate and delayed 
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statements. Again, three consistency measures were analysed: Reminiscences, repetitions, 
and omissions6.  
Identically to Study I and II, the coders only coded reminiscences and arithmetic 
calculations were used to obtain repetitions and omissions.  
Again, two coders were used for the consistency coding. The first coder marked all 
transcripts and the second coder marked a random sample of 15 (18.8%) interview scripts. As 
before, the second coder was blind to the hypotheses, stimulus event, and veracity of the 
statements. Inter-rater reliability for reminiscences was examined because that was the only 
measure coded manually. The analysis revealed excellent ICC of .93, CI [.71,.98] for 
reminiscences in the delayed vs. immediate reports. 
 
4.3 Results 
 
4.3.1 Manipulation checks 
 Mixed ANOVAs with Veracity as the between-subjects factor and Time of Interview 
as the within-subject factor were used for all the manipulation checks. Mean scores, standard 
deviations and confidence intervals for truth tellers and liars are presented in Table 4.1. 
There was a main effect of Veracity condition on self-reported truthfulness. Truth 
tellers reported that they were more truthful than did the liars during both the immediate, F(1, 
78) = 257.82, p < .001, d = 3.59 and delayed interviews, F(1, 78) = 350.77, p < .001, d = 
4.19, indicating that participants complied with the instructions given. No significant 
Veracity main effects were found regarding the other manipulation measures, all F’s < 2.81, 
all p’s > .09, see Table 4.1. Although Veracity differences have been found in previous 
                                                                
6 Сontradictions, the fourth measure of consistency, did not occur often enough in the reports of truth tellers and 
liars. One or more contradictions were present only in 22.5% of truthful statements and 32.5% of deceptive 
statements.  
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similar studies (Ewens et al., 2016; Vrij et al., 2009), no reason can be identified as to why 
the absence of a Veracity effect would be detrimental for this experiment.  
 
Table 4.1 
Means, standard deviations and confidence intervals for responses to pre-interview and post-
interview questionnaires 
 Truth Lie 
Measure M SD 95% CI M SD 95% CI 
Extent of truthfulness in the 
immediate interview* 
99.00 3.04 97.75,99.83 29.25 27.31 21.50,37.05 
Extent of truthfulness in the 
delayed interview* 
99.50 2.21 98.75,100.00 26.50 24.55 18.70,35.25 
Preparation time (sec.) 123.35 102.47 86.19,163.36 168.87 156.49 113.53,238.09 
Preparation quality 5.39 1.15 4.99,5.78 5.04 1.13 4.56,5.48 
Stress before the interview 2.65 1.24 2.21,3.10 3.24 1.48 3.64,3.88 
Motivation to convince the 
interviewer 
6.12 1.20 5.64,6.50 5.83 1.32 5.27,6.33 
Confidence to convince the 
interviewer 
5.13 0.84 4.81,5.41 4.87 1.12 4.42,5.35 
Times thought about the 
event/story 
3.37 4.12 2.47,5.56 3.39 3.07 2.32,4.72 
Likelihood to receive 100 
SEK 
5.33 1.42 4.81,5.81 5.35 1.32 4.72,5.90 
Likelihood to write a 
statement 
2.90 1.75 3.32,3.52 3.52 1.38 3.00,4.08 
* p < .001   
   
 The Time of Interview main effect was significant for Preparation time, F(1, 73) = 
11.73, p = .001, d = 0.34. Participants took longer to prepare before the immediate interview 
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(M = 165.48, SD = 148.07, 95% CI [132.72,199.32]) than before the delayed interview (M = 
121.11, SD = 127.38, 95% CI [94.86,147.36]). This makes sense because participants were 
less familiar with the settings before the immediate interview than before the delayed 
interview. The other Time of Interview main effects were not significant, all F’s < 3.12, all 
p’s > .081.  
A significant Veracity × Time of Interview interaction effect emerged for Motivation, 
F(1, 74) = 6.31, p = .014, 𝜂p
2  = .08. Truth tellers (M = 6.30, SD = 0.94, 95% CI [5.93,6.67]) 
expressed higher levels of motivation than liars (M = 5.72, SD = 1.37, 95% CI [5.34,6.11]) 
before the immediate interview, t(74) = 2.17, p = .033, d  = 0.49. However, the means show 
that participants in both groups were highly motivated as their scores were at the upper end of 
the motivation scale. The motivation level of truth tellers and liars did not differ before the 
delayed interview, t(74) = 0.18, p = .861, d  = 0.04. The Veracity × Time of Interview 
interaction effect was also significant for Preparation time, F(1, 73) = 6.92, p = .010, 𝜂p
2  = 
.09. Liars (M = 201.54, SD = 150.84, 95% CI [154.14,248.94]) took longer than truth tellers 
to prepare before the immediate interview (M = 130.50, SD = 138.40, 95% CI 
[83.73,177.27]), t(73) = 2.13, p = .037, d  = 0.49, whereas the Preparation time for truth 
tellers and liars was similar before the delayed interview, t(73) = 0.04, p = .971, d  = 0.01. 
Again, this may be due to liars being less familiar with the settings before the immediate 
interview than before the delayed interview. All other Veracity × Time of Interview 
interaction effects were not significant, all F’s < 3.29, p’s > .075.  
         Finally, one-way ANOVAs with Veracity as the sole factor and (i) Times thought about 
the event/story before the second interview, (ii) Incentive (likelihood of getting 100 SEK), 
and iii) Likelihood to write a statement as dependent variables revealed no significant main 
effects for Veracity, F’s < 2.34, p’s > .131. In the three latter analyses Interview was not 
included as a factor as the questions referred to the two interviews combined. Again, although 
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previous research showed differences between truth tellers and liars regarding these variables 
(Ewens et al., 2016; Vrij et al., 2009), there is no clear theoretical reason as to why the 
absence of a Veracity effect would be detrimental.   
 
4.3.2 The effects of the immediate reports on the number of details in the delayed 
accounts (Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3)  
 To examine whether the number of reported details differed between truthful and 
deceptive statements in the delayed interview, a MANOVA with Veracity and Initial 
Interview as the between-subjects factors and visual, spatial, temporal, and action details as 
the dependent variables revealed a significant multivariate Veracity main effect, F(4, 73) = 
25.82, p < .001, 𝜂p
2   = .59. Univariate Veracity main effects were significant for visual, F(1, 
76) = 55.66, p < .001, 𝜂p
2   = .42, spatial, F(1, 76) = 53.14, p < .001, 𝜂p
2   = .41, temporal, F(1, 
76) = 69.05, p < .001, 𝜂p
2   = .48, and action details, F(1, 76) = 90.09, p < .001, 𝜂p
2   = .54. 
There was a significant multivariate Initial Interview main effect, F(4, 73) = 6.73, p < .001, 
𝜂p
2   = .27. At a univariate level, the Initial Interview main effects were significant for spatial, 
F(1, 76) = 11.67, p = .001, 𝜂p
2   = .13, temporal, F(1, 76) = 9.79, p = .002, 𝜂p
2   = .11, and action 
details, F(1, 76) = 24.66, p < .001, 𝜂p
2   = .25, but not significant for visual details, F(1, 76) = 
16.20, p = .059, 𝜂p
2   = .05. A multivariate Veracity × Initial Interview interaction effect was 
not significant, F(4, 73) = 4.31, p = .222, 𝜂p
2   = .07. At a univariate level, the interaction 
effects were significant for visual, F(4, 76) = 4.31, p = .041, 𝜂p
2   = .05, and action details, F(4, 
76) = 4.88, p = .030, 𝜂p
2   = .06 (see Figure 4.1). The interaction effects were not significant 
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for spatial, F(4, 76) = 3.14, p = .080, 𝜂p
2   = .04, and temporal details, F(4, 76) = 1.38, p = 
.244, 𝜂p
2   = .02. 
Figure 4.1. Illustration of the veracity and type of interview interaction effect in the delayed 
interview. 
 
To examine the hypothesis concerning differences in reporting the number of details 
between truth tellers and liars across initial interview conditions in the delayed interviews, 
simple effects analyses were conducted. Table 4.2 shows that truth tellers reported 
significantly more visual, spatial, temporal, and action details than liars in the report 
everything condition after the delay. Hypothesis 1 was supported. Truth tellers also reported 
significantly more visual, spatial, temporal, and action details than liars in the spatial 
questions condition after the delay. Hypothesis 2 was partially supported because it was 
predicted that truth tellers would only report more visual and spatial details than liars in the 
spatial questions condition after the delay. 
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Table 4.2 
Details in the delayed interview as a function of veracity and initial retrieval condition 
 Truth Lie    
Detail M SD 95% CI M SD 95% CI F p d 
Report everything  
Visual 65.78 24.36 57.70,73.85 29.00 10.67 21.34,36.66 43.30 <.001 1.96 
Spatial 33.11 15.36 28.15,38.07 11.65 8.45 6.94,16.36 39.09 <.001 1.73 
Temporal 12.78 6.18 10.85,14.71 4.05 2.74 2.22,5.88 42.81 <.001 1.83 
Action 37.22 14.57 32.78,41.67 12.40 7.26 8.19,16.62 65.17 <.001 2.16 
Spatial questions 
Visual 50.36 16.24 43.06,57.67 29.60 15.74 21.94,37.26 15.26 <.001 1.30 
Spatial 20.82 10.17 16.33,25.30 7.75 7.05 3.05,12.46 16.03 <.001 1.49 
Temporal 8.82 4.16 7.08,10.56 2.25 2.57 0.42,4.08 26.81 <.001 1.90 
Action 22.00 7.63 17.98,26.02 6.55 7.15 2.34,10.77 27.92 <.001 2.09 
 
 In Hypothesis 3, it was predicted that the difference between truthful and deceptive 
reports will be larger in the report everything condition than in the spatial questions condition 
during the delayed interviews. Although the multivariate Veracity × Initial Interview 
interaction effect was not significant, at a univariate level interactions were significant for 
visual and action details. A p-value provides information about the statistical relevance, but 
not about the practical importance of an effect (Fritz, Morris, & Richler, 2012; du Prel, 
Hommel, Röhrig, & Blettner, 2009). In this article, the practical relevance of the effect was of 
the interest and d-values are indicators of practical relevance (Fritz et al., 2012). 
In the report everything condition, the effect sizes were 1.96, 95% CI [1.18,2.73] for visual, 
and 2.16, 95% CI [1.35,2.95] for action details. In the spatial questions condition, the effect 
sizes were 1.30, 95% CI [0.61,2.93] for visual, and 2.09, 95% CI [1.30,2.79]) for action 
details. Although the effect sizes were large in both initial reporting conditions, they were 
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somewhat lower for visual details in the spatial questions than in the report everything 
condition, indicating partial support for Hypothesis 3. 
 
4.3.3 Difference between the immediate and delayed interviews (Hypothesis 4) 
 To examine how the amount of details changed between the immediate and delayed 
interviews in truthful and deceptive reports, a MANOVA with Veracity and Initial Interview 
as the between-subjects factors, and Time of Interview as the within-subject factor, and 
visual, spatial, temporal, and action details as the dependent variables revealed a significant 
multivariate Veracity × Initial Interview x Time of Interview interaction effect, F(4, 73) = 
4.89, p = .001, 𝜂p
2   = .21. At a univariate level, the interaction effects were significant for 
temporal, F(4, 76) = 11.51, p = .001, 𝜂p
2   = .13, and action details, F(4, 76) = 12.74, p = .001, 
𝜂p
2   = .06. The interaction effects were not significant for visual, F(4, 76) = 0.33, p = .570, 𝜂p
2   
= .004, or spatial details, F(4, 76) = 1.11, p = .296, 𝜂p
2   = .01.   
Simple effects analysis revealed that in the spatial questions condition, truth tellers 
showed a significant decline between the immediate and delayed interviews in reporting 
visual details, F(1, 76) = 12.67, p = .001, d  = 0.73. However, truth tellers reported fewer 
spatial, F(1, 76) = 4.61, p = .035, d  = 0.47, temporal, F(1, 76) = 17.09, p < .001, d  = 0.71, 
and action details, F(1, 76) = 31.73, p < .001, d  = 1.03 in the immediate than in the delayed 
interviews. In the spatial questions condition, liars showed a significant decline between the 
immediate and delayed interviews in reporting visual details, F(1, 76) = 20.65, p < .001, d  = 
0.91. Liars showed no significant decline in reporting spatial, F(1, 76) = 0.73, p = .397, d  = 
0.25, d  = 0.21, temporal, F(1, 76) = 0.52, p = .472, d  = 0.22, or action details, F(1, 76) = 
0.15, p = .702, d  = 0.14.  
To test Hypothesis 4 directly, the statements only in the report everything condition 
were analysed. The examination of the number of details in the spatial questions condition is 
 
122 
 
not relevant because in this condition different types of question were used in the immediate 
and delayed interviews. Therefore, reporting differences between the statements could 
emerge as a result of different questioning rather than as a direct result of delay. 
 Simple effects analysis revealed that truth tellers showed a significant decline 
between the immediate and delayed interviews in reporting temporal details, F(1, 76) = 9.96, 
p = .002, d  = 0.45, and action details, F(1, 76) = 5.60, p = .021, d  = 0.25.  Truth tellers 
showed no difference in reporting visual, F(1, 76) = 0.37, p = .546, d  = 0.07, and spatial 
details, F(1, 76) = 0.10, p = .749, d  = 0.03. Liars showed no significant decline in reporting 
visual, F(1, 76) = 1.36, p = .247, d  = 0.27, spatial, F(1, 76) = 1.27, p = .264, d  = 0.21, 
temporal, F(1, 76) = 0.07, p = .797, d  = 0.03, or action details, F(1, 76) = 0.11, p = .746, d  = 
0.07. Thus, Hypothesis 4 was supported. 
 
4.3.4 Consistency between the immediate and delayed interviews (Hypothesis 5) 
An ANCOVA with Veracity and Initial Interview as the between-subject factors was 
conducted with reminiscences as the dependent variable and total detail at immediate 
interview as a covariate. The reason for including this covariate was that the number of 
reminiscences in the delayed interview depends on the amount of detail provided in the 
immediate interview. That is, the more details provided in the immediate account, the less 
opportunity to add new details in the delayed account. There was a significant main effect for 
Veracity, F(1, 75) = 13.48, p < .001, 𝜂p
2   = .15. Truth tellers reported more reminiscence 
details (M = 29.86, SD = 15.81, 95% CI [24.85,34.87]) than liars (M = 15.55, SD = 15.50, 
95% CI [10.67,20.42]) in the delayed interview. The Initial Interview main effect was also 
significant, F(1, 75) = 4.83, p = .031, 𝜂p
2   = .06. Participants reported more reminiscent details 
in the spatial questions (M = 26.09, SD = 14.13, 95% CI [21.97,30.66]) than in the report 
everything condition (M = 19.09, SD = 14.30, 95% CI [14.48,23.70]). The Veracity × Initial 
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Interview interaction effect was significant, F(1, 75) = 4.17, p = .045, 𝜂p
2   = .05. Planned 
comparisons revealed that truth tellers and liars reported a similar number of reminiscences in 
the report everything condition, but that truth tellers reported more reminiscences than liars in 
the spatial questions condition, see Table 4.37. The reminiscent detail results partially support 
Hypothesis 5. 
     
Table 4.3 
Between-statement consistency characteristics as a function of veracity and initial interview 
condition 
 Truth Lie    
Measure M SD 95% CI M SD 95% CI F p d 
Report everything  
Reminiscence 22.91 17.10 14.88,30.94 15.27 14.58 8.78,21.77 1.80 .183 0.48 
Repetition 81.85 18.07 73.36,90.33 62.32 13.77 55.46,69.17 10.58 .002 1.22 
Omission 11.41 18.07 2.92,19.89 30.93 13.77 24.08,37.79 10.58 .002 1.22 
Spatial questions 
Reminiscence 36.81 13.70 31.00,42.62 15.82 14.67 9.29,22.34 22.63 <.001 1.48 
Repetition 63.31 14.45 57.17,69.45 51.63 15.47 44.75,58.52 6.28 .014 0.78 
Omission 29.94 14.45 23.80,36.08 41.62 15.47 34.73,48.50 6.28 .014 0.78 
 
The same ANCOVA with repetitions as the dependent variable and total detail at 
immediate interview as a covariate revealed a significant main effect for Veracity, F(1, 75) = 
14.36, p < .001, 𝜂p
2   = .16. Truth tellers reported more repetitions (M = 72.58, SD = 16.76, 
95% CI [67.29,77.86]) than liars (M = 56.98, SD = 16.32, 95% CI [51.83,62.12]) in the 
delayed interview. The Initial Interview main effect was also significant, F(1, 75) = 17.74, p 
                                                                
7 Veracity effects without entering Total detail at immediate interview as a covariate are presented in Table 4.4 
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< .001, 𝜂p
2   = .19. Participants reported more repetitions in the report everything (M = 72.08, 
SD = 15.04, 95% CI [67.21,76.95]) than in the spatial questions condition (M = 57.47, SD = 
14.91, 95% CI [52.89,62.05]). The Veracity × Initial Interview interaction effect was not 
significant, F(1, 75) = 1.29, p = .259, 𝜂p
2   = .02. Planned comparisons revealed that truth 
tellers reported more repetitions than liars in both initial reporting conditions, see Table 4.3. 
The repetition results do not support Hypothesis 5.     
 
Table 4.4 
Between-statement consistency characteristics as a function of veracity and initial interview 
condition (without the addition of covariates) 
 Truth Lie    
Measure M SD 95% CI M SD 95% CI F p d 
Report everything  
Reminiscence 25.22 16.21 18.80,31.64 14.20 6.73 8.11,20.29 6.16 .015 0.89 
Repetition 123.67 50.00 109.27,138.06 42.90 20.96 29.24,56.56 65.73 <.001 2.11 
Omission 35.17 28.70 25.29,45.05 19.90 15.40 10.53,29.27 4.99 .029 0.66 
Spatial questions 
Reminiscence 36.91 17.87 31.10,42.72 14.70 10.69 8.61,20.79 27.64 <.001 1.51 
Repetition 65.09 21.78 52.07,78.11 31.45 23.68 17.79,45.11 12.61 .001 1.48 
Omission 30.96 15.60 22.02,39.90 30.15 22.99 20.78,39.52 0.15 .902 0.04 
 
The same ANCOVA with omissions as the dependent variable and total detail at 
immediate interview as a covariate revealed a significant main effect for Veracity, F(1, 75) = 
14.36, p < .001, 𝜂p
2   = .16. Truth tellers omitted less details (M = 20.67, SD = 16.76, 95% CI 
[15.39,25.96]) than liars (M = 36.28, SD = 16.32, 95% CI [31.13,41.42]) in the delayed 
interview. The Initial Interview main effect was also significant, F(1, 75) = 17.74, p < .001, 
𝜂p
2   = .19. Participants made fewer omissions in the report everything (M = 21.17, SD = 
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15.04, 95% CI [16.30,26.04]) than in the spatial questions condition (M = 35.78, SD = 14.91, 
95% CI [31.20,40.36]). The Veracity × Initial Interview interaction effect was not significant, 
F(1, 75) = 1.29, p = .259, 𝜂p
2   = .02. In support of Hypothesis 5, planned comparisons 
revealed that truth tellers made fewer omissions than liars in both initial reporting conditions, 
see Table 4.3. These consistency results thus partially support Hypothesis 5. 
 
4.3.5 Exploratory analysis of the number of details in the immediate accounts 
 Although the hypotheses focused only on the delayed accounts, it was also considered 
important to examine the effect of the two interview techniques on the immediate statements 
made by truth tellers and liars.  
 
Figure 4.2. Illustration of the veracity and type of interview interaction effect in the 
immediate interview 
 
A MANOVA with Veracity and Initial Interview as the between-subjects factors and 
visual, spatial, temporal, and action details as the dependent variables revealed a significant 
multivariate effect for Veracity, F(4, 73) = 15.08, p < .001, 𝜂p
2   = .45. Univariate Veracity 
main effects were significant for visual, F(1, 76) = 30.20, p < .001, 𝜂p
2   = .28, spatial, F(1, 76) 
= 32.85, p < .001, 𝜂p
2   = .30, temporal, F(1, 76) = 54.60, p < .001, 𝜂p
2   = .42, and action 
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details, F(1, 76) = 50.88, p < .001, 𝜂p
2   = .40. There was a significant multivariate Initial 
Interview effect, F(4, 73) = 23.64, p < .001, 𝜂p
2   = .56.  
 
Table 4.5 
Details in the immediate interview as a function of veracity and initial retrieval condition 
 Truth Lie    
Detail M SD 95% CI M SD 95% CI F p d 
Report everything 
Visual 67.72 29.81 58.03,77.41 32.55 15.30 23.36,41.74 27.51 <.001 1.48 
Spatial 33.67 18.69 28.47,38.87 13.50 9.30 8.57,18.43 31.38 <.001 1.37 
Temporal 16.00 8.01 13.79,18,22 3.80 2.55 1,70,5.90 63.18 <.001 2.05 
Action 41.44 18.61 36,23,46,66 12.95 7.45 8.01,17.89 62.41 <.001 2.01 
Spatial questions 
Visual 60.68 15.10 51.92,69.45 45.00 20.55 35.81,54.19 6.05 .016 0.87 
Spatial 17.45 6.28 12.75,22.16 9.15 6.95 4.22,14.09 5.88 .018 1.25 
Temporal 5.00 4.08 2.99,7.01 1.55 2.64 0.00,3.65 5.59 .021 1.00 
Action 12.91 8.61 8.20,17.62 5.90 6.74 0.96,10.84 4.18 .044 0.91 
 
At a univariate level, the Initial Interview main effects were significant for spatial, 
F(4, 76) = 17.13, p < .001, 𝜂p
2   = .18, temporal, F(4, 76) = 39.14, p < .001, 𝜂p
2   = .34, and 
action details, F(4, 76) = 51.11, p < .001, 𝜂p
2   = .40. The univariate Initial Interview main 
effect was not significant for visual details, F(4, 76) = 0.34, p = .561, 𝜂p
2   = .004. A 
multivariate Veracity × Initial Interview interaction effect was also significant, F(4, 73) = 
5.74, p < .001, 𝜂p
2   = .24. At a univariate level, the interaction effects were significant for 
visual, F(4, 76) = 4.44, p = .038, 𝜂p
2   = .06, spatial, F(4, 76) = 5.70, p = .019, 𝜂p
2   = .07, 
temporal, F(4, 76) = 17.07, p < .001, 𝜂p
2   = .18, and action details, F(4, 76) = 18.63, p < .001, 
𝜂p
2   = .20 (see Figure 4.2). 
The interaction effects are more informative than the two main effect components 
results. The immediate accounts results suggest that the effects were somewhat larger for 
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visual, spatial, temporal, and action details in the report everything than in the spatial 
questions condition, see Table 4.5.      
 
4.4 Discussion 
 
 The current study examined the impact of an immediate reporting of information 
(report everything vs. spatial questions) on the delayed accounts of truth tellers and liars. As 
predicted, truth tellers reported more visual, spatial, temporal, and action details after the 
delay than liars, when asked to report everything they remembered in the initial interview. 
Since Harvey et al. (2017) found no difference between truth tellers and liars after a delay 
when interviewed only once, this finding suggests that truth tellers benefited from the initial 
memory enhancement. That is, an extensive immediate retrieval attempt (report everything) 
could increase activation levels of details during the delayed recall (Anderson, 1983). Thus, 
large amounts of visual, spatial, temporal, and action details could be accessible for truth 
tellers when they were interviewed after a delay. Liars reported fewer of these details than 
truth tellers because they had to manage the output of the amount of information (Granhag & 
Hartwig, 2008). This is a common strategy used by liars because revealing too many details 
of the event increases the risk of providing investigators with new leads (Vrij, 2008). 
  Truth tellers also reported more visual, spatial, temporal, and action details than liars 
in the delayed accounts, when asked only spatial questions in the immediate interviews. A 
possible explanation for this finding derives from activation theory of memory (Anderson, 
1983). Specifically, truth tellers in the spatial questions condition could concentrate on 
reporting visual and spatial details because of the nature of the questions in the immediate 
interview. As these details were associated with the other details in their episodic memory of 
the break-in, temporal and action details may have been easily accessible in the delayed 
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interview. Therefore, the difference between truth tellers and liars was not only in reporting 
visual and spatial details, as predicted, but also in reporting temporal and action details, 
which was not predicted. Liars reported fewer visual, spatial, temporal, and action details 
than truth tellers in the spatial questions condition, probably because of the different 
strategies they employed (Hartwig et al., 2007). 
  Although truth tellers differed from liars in both initial reporting conditions in the 
delayed interview, it was expected that using the report everything mnemonic in the 
immediate interview would magnify these differences. Discrimination was indeed larger for 
reporting visual details in the report everything than in the spatial questions condition. Truth 
tellers had a more extensive immediate reporting attempt in the report everything condition. 
As a result, visual details using this mnemonic could be more accessible in truth tellers’ 
memories than visual details in the spatial questions condition, which resulted in larger 
differences between truth tellers and liars in the delayed interviews. This explanation 
becomes more compelling when considering the number of details reported by truth tellers 
and liars in the immediate accounts. Results in the exploratory analysis showed that the 
differences between truth tellers and liars were larger for visual, spatial, temporal, and action 
details in the report everything than in the spatial questions condition. 
In the current study was found that truth tellers showed a decline in reporting 
temporal, and action details. Perhaps there was no decline found in the amount of visual and 
spatial details for truth tellers because of extensive immediate retrieval practice that could 
strengthen their recall after the delay. Liars produced a ‘stability bias’ between the immediate 
and delayed interviews in visual, spatial, temporal, and action details. Consistent with 
previous research (Harvey et al., 2017), the findings of the study provided further support for 
the notion that liars may experience difficulties in understanding the degree to which real 
memories can change over time.     
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Regarding the consistency characteristics, truth tellers reported more reminiscences 
than liars in the spatial, but not in the report everything condition. It seems that when the type 
of interviewing changed from spatial questions to report everything, truth tellers were able to 
add more details in the delayed interview. As the statements of truth tellers were less 
complete when asked spatial questions rather than report everything in the immediate 
interview, they could have had more opportunities to provide additional details in the delayed 
accounts. This result is consistent with Hope et al. (2014) where participants provided more 
reminiscences with an interviewing format that promoted less complete initial accounts.  
Truth tellers reported more repetitions than liars after the delay in both initial 
reporting conditions. Results showed that truth tellers already reported more details than liars 
in the immediate accounts. Therefore, it seems that for truth tellers, the immediate reporting 
of the details strengthened their memories of those details to be recalled after the delay. 
An interesting result was found in terms of omitted details after the delay. Liars 
omitted more than truth tellers in the delayed accounts in both initial reporting conditions. As 
noted above, perhaps truth tellers omitted fewer details than liars after the delay because of 
the relatively extensive immediate retrieval practice in both conditions. Alternatively, a 
possible explanation for liars having a larger number of omissions than truth tellers derives 
from avoidant strategies commonly used by liars in interviews (Granhag, Clemens, & 
Strömwall, 2009; Hartwig et al., 2007). Specifically, liars are motivated to avoid providing 
details that could possibly incriminate them, resulting in the “keep the story simple” strategy 
(Strömwall, Hartwig, & Granhag, 2006). Moreover, liars might have omitted more details 
than truth tellers in order to avoid the risk of contradicting themselves (Granhag & 
Strömwall, 1999). 
Findings from the current study have important implications from an applied 
perspective. The results suggest that interviewing techniques eliciting complete accounts 
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from interviewees at an early stage (e.g. report everything mnemonic) are promising in 
discriminating truth tellers from liars at later stages of the investigation. Thus, the current 
study shows that techniques promoting extensive free recall about the event in question are 
not only beneficial in terms of retrieval performance (Hope et al., 2014; Pescod et al., 2013), 
but also in detecting deception. A comparison of the d-values showed that a report everything 
mnemonic technique produced larger differences between truth tellers and liars than spatial 
questions. 
This study had a few limitations. First, it involved a relatively small sample size. 
However, post hoc power analyses showed that this study had acceptable power (Cohen, 
1992) for the obtained effect sizes that were statistically significant. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that the study was not underpowered. 
 Second, it did not include a control condition, making it impossible to determine 
whether truth tellers reported more details in the delayed interviews than liars only because of 
the immediate retrieval practice. However, the results showed that the difference between 
truth tellers and liars was lower with less complete (spatial) immediate retrieval practice. 
Therefore, it is difficult to think of a theoretical reason as to why the inclusion of a control 
group would diminish the positive effects of the immediate report everything instruction on 
the delayed accounts in terms of deception detection.   
However, it is important to note that some important manipulations were not 
successful (e.g. self-reported stress and confidence levels before the interviews were similar 
across veracity groups), whereas the cognitive credibility assessment proposes that lying is 
more mentally demanding than telling the truth (Vrij, 2015). Nevertheless, truth tellers and 
liars indicated high motivation levels before both interviews, which is a critical requirement 
to resemble real life settings. 
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Different statistical analyses from Studies I and II were conducted in this study. 
Although mixed-factor experimental designs were employed across the three studies, in 
Studies I and II numerous mixed ANOVAs were conducted and in Study III mixed 
MANOVAs were conducted to analyse the results. The hypotheses in the first two studies 
addressed the differences between truth tellers and liars in terms of the amount of specific 
details reported. Therefore, mixed ANOVAs were carried out separately to examine the 
effects for different dependant variables (visual, spatial, temporal, and action details). 
However, in Study III the main focus was a comparison of two types of interviewing to 
differentiate truth tellers and liars in terms of the amount of multiple details reported. Thus, 
instead of separate ANOVAs, more generalised MANOVAs were carried out in Study III.          
In conclusion, the findings of this study send a straightforward message to 
practitioners in terms of credibility assessment. It is important to conduct a first interview 
after an event as soon as possible, and to use a questioning format that enhances complete 
retrieval from the interviewee at the beginning of the investigation. In the legal system the 
same individuals tend to be interviewed more than once, and so immediate, high-quality 
questioning can be helpful during subsequent interviews to discriminate between truthful and 
deceptive accounts. This recommendation could apply to various settings, including 
interviews with cooperative witnesses or suspects, or in intelligence-gathering interviews.    
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Chapter 5: Deception detection in repeated interviews: Mnemonic 
Techniques and Lie Detection: Accuracy of Truth and Deception 
Judgements in Repeated Accounts 
(Study IV) 
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Abstract 
 
This study was an examination into whether the use of memory-enhancing techniques 
(mnemonics) in interviews can be helpful to distinguish truth tellers from liars. In the previous 
study (Izotovas et al., 2018), it was found that when mnemonic techniques were used in the 
interview immediately after the event, truth-tellers reported more details than liars in those 
immediate interviews and again after a delay. Moreover, truth-tellers, but not liars, showed 
patterns of reporting indicative of genuine memory decay. 
In the current experiment, participants (n = 92) were asked to read the repeated 
statements reported by participants in the Izotovas et al.’s (2018) study and decide whether 
the statements they read were truthful or deceptive. One group of participants (informed 
condition) received information about the findings of the previous study before reading the 
statement. The other group received no information before reading the statement (uninformed 
condition). After participants made veracity judgements, they were asked an open-ended 
question asking what factors influenced their credibility decision. Although truthful 
statements were judged more accurately in the informed condition (65.2%) than in the 
uninformed condition (47.8%), this difference was not significant. In both conditions 
deceptive statements were detected at chance level (52.2%). Participants who relied on the 
self-reported diagnostic verbal cues to deceit were not more accurate than participants who 
self-reported unreliable cues. This could happen because only the minority of participants 
(27.4%) in both conditions based their decisions on diagnostic cues to truth/deceit. 
 
 
 
 
134 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
In investigative interviews questions about the credibility of witnesses or suspects 
frequently arise (Granhag & Strömwall, 2004; Vrij, 2008, 2015). However, studies have 
shown that both laypeople and professionals are in general poor at detecting lies, with 
accuracy typically not much better than chance level when assessing speech or behaviour 
(Bond & DePaulo, 2006). Moreover, accuracy at deception detection is not associated with 
the factors such as observers’ years of professional experience, individual differences or 
confidence in the veracity judgements made (Masip, Garrido, & Herrero, 2006; Vrij, 2008). 
A meta-analysis examined possible reasons for this low accuracy rate (Hartwig & Bond, 
2011). The most compelling reason was that cues to deception are typically weak. That is, 
liars and truth tellers often display similar (non)verbal responses. However, recent research 
has shown that higher accuracy rates can be achieved when specific interview techniques are 
used (Hartwig et al., 2014; Vrij et al., 2017; Vrij & Granhag, 2012), because these techniques 
elicit or enhance speech differences between liars and truth tellers. One of the approaches is 
Cognitive Credibility Assessment (CCA; Vrij, 2018). With this approach, accuracy rates just 
above 70% can be obtained (Vrij et al., 2017). One of the elements of the CCA is 
encouraging interviewees to provide more information (Colwell, Hiscock, & Memon, 2002; 
Geiselman, 2012; Vrij et al., 2017). This can, amongst other ways, be achieved by using 
mnemonics (Fisher & Geiselman, 1992). Previous studies have shown that the use of 
mnemonics may increase the verbal differences between truthful and deceptive statements 
(Bembibre & Higueras, 2011; Hernández & Alonso-Quecuty, 1997; Vrij et al., 2009), 
because truth tellers, who are recalling genuinely remembered events, benefit more from such 
memory enhancement techniques than liars, who are fabricating. Liars may lack the 
imagination or cognitive resources to report as many (plausible) details as truth tellers, or 
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may be unwilling to do so out of fear that these additional details give leads to investigators 
that they can check (Vrij et al., 2017). 
In the current study, whether observers would be able to spot these enlarged 
differences between truth tellers and liars was examined. In Study I of this thesis, the effects 
of different mnemonic techniques on immediate and delayed statements reported by truth 
tellers or liars were examined. It was found that truth tellers provided significantly more 
information than liars, both in the immediate interview, and after a two-week delay (Izotovas 
et al., 2018). Amongst the three mnemonics tested (context reinstatement, sketching and 
event-line), the event-line was the most effective mnemonic in discriminating between 
truthful and deceptive statements, achieving large effect sizes in terms of the amount of 
different types of detail (visual, spatial, temporal, and action) reported in the immediate 
(Cohen’s d ranging from 1.08 to 1.47) and delayed statements (Cohen’s d ranging from 0.78 
to 1.40).  
In addition, truth tellers experienced more of a decline than liars in reporting details 
when comparing the immediate and delayed interviews in the event-line condition (Izotovas 
et al., 2018). In other words, truth tellers showed patterns of reporting details indicative of 
genuine memory decay/forgetting, whereas liars showed patterns of a ‘stability bias’, defined 
as a metacognitive error to correctly understand the nature of memory decline over time 
(Kornell & Bjork, 2009). 
Previous research has shown that accuracy in detecting deception improves when 
people rely on the correct verbal cues (Bogaard & Meijer, 2018; Hauch et al., 2016; Mann et 
al., 2004). In the current study, of particular interest was whether observers’ understanding of 
the Izotovas et al. (2018) findings was related to their lie detection performance. Therefore, 
one group of participants were informed about the previous findings and then asked to take 
this into account when making their veracity judgements in the subsequent lie detection task.  
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Two hypotheses were tested. First, it was predicted that the accuracy rates in 
identifying both truth tellers and liars would be higher in the informed group than in the 
uninformed group. Second, it was predicted that accurate participants would rely more on the 
diagnostic verbal cues to deceit than inaccurate participants. 
 
5.2 Method 
 
5.2.1 Participants 
A total of 92 volunteers participated in the study. The mean age of participants was M 
= 21.97 years (SD = 6.43) and 82.6% were female. Participants were recruited via posters, 
flyers, and the University’s volunteer database. Fluent English speakers were required to take 
part in the study because their task was to evaluate the verbal content of the statements. 
Participants were awarded with £5 after they completed the experiment. The experiment was 
accepted by the Science Faculty Ethics Committee of the University. 
The documented lists of the participants who already completed Studies I and II were 
checked before inviting each volunteer to take part in this experiment. Participants who had 
taken part in one of the previous studies of this thesis were not eligible to partake in Study 
IV.  
 
5.2.2 Design 
A 2 (Veracity: Truthful interviewee vs deceptive interviewee) X 2 (Instruction: 
Informed group vs uninformed group) experimental design was used with Veracity and 
Instruction as between-subjects factors. Dependent variables were participants’ veracity 
judgements and the answers given to questions in a questionnaire: self-reported level of 
confidence, and perceived cues that affected their decisions. Participants were randomly 
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assigned to the Informed (n = 46) and Uninformed (n = 46) groups. They were asked to read 
the statements reported either by truthful (n = 23) or by deceptive interviewees (n = 23). The 
allocation to the Veracity condition also occurred randomly. 
 
5.2.3 Stimulus material 
Forty six verbatim transcripts (23 truthful, 23 deceptive) obtained from a previous 
study (Izotovas et al., 2018) were used in the current experiment. In that study participants (n 
= 143) watched a video-recorded staged break-in to an apartment. They were instructed to 
tell the truth or lie about the event in the video. Each participant was interviewed twice about 
the event: Immediately and after a two-week delay. At the beginning of the immediate 
interview participants were asked to report everything they could remember about the event 
(free recall phase). After this they were given one of three mnemonics (context reinstatement, 
sketch, or event-line) and asked to describe the event again (mnemonic phase). In the delayed 
interview of the previous experiment, participants were asked to provide only a free recall. 
Only the transcripts of the 46 interviews using the event-line mnemonic were used in the 
current experiment.    
 
5.2.4 Procedure  
Each participant was randomly given one of the 46 set of transcripts. They were 
informed that they would now read two statements made by one person who might be lying 
or telling the truth about an incident, a break-in into an apartment. Participants were also 
notified that the first interview was conducted immediately after the alleged event, and the 
second interview two weeks later.  
Informed group. Participants in the informed group were instructed that i) the 
amount of detail (e.g., descriptions of people and objects, spatial arrangements, events and 
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activities) in the statement may be considered an indicator of truthfulness (that is, truth-tellers 
commonly report more details than liars), and ii) although the statements of truth tellers are 
usually richer, they tend to show a natural memory decline over time, whereas liars tend to 
report a similar amount of detail, no matter how much time has passed by since an event. 
Participants were instructed to take this into account when making their veracity judgements.  
Uninformed group. The uninformed group was only asked to read two interview 
transcripts from one interviewee and no instructions about the credibility cues was given. 
After reading the two statements, all participants were asked to make a veracity 
judgement (whether the statements were provided by a truth teller or liar). They were also 
asked to what extent they thought the statements were truthful/deceptive (1 = totally 
deceptive, 7 = totally truthful), and how confident they felt about their decision (1 = not at 
all, 7 = totally).    
The informed participants only were also asked to rate: i) the extent to which their 
decision about the credibility of the statements was based on the amount of details in the 
immediate and the delayed statements (1 = not at all, 7 = totally), and ii) the extent to which 
their decision about the credibility of the statements was based on the difference in the 
amount of information provided in the immediate and the delayed statement (for truth-tellers: 
decline in details; for liars: similar amount of details) (1 = not at all, 7 = totally). These two 
items were used as manipulation checks. Finally, the informed participants were asked in an 
open-ended question what other factors influenced their credibility decision. The uninformed 
participants were just asked this latter open-ended question about what factors influenced 
their credibility decision. 
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5.2.5 Coding of perceived cues 
 Participant’s self-reported cues that affected their veracity decisions were classified 
into categories. The terms for the categories derived from previous deception research 
(DePaulo et al., 2003; Vredeveldt et al., 2014, Vrij, 2008). The responses of the informed and 
uninformed groups regarding perceived cues were classified into categories. One coder, blind 
to veracity condition, made the following classification of the reported cues (some typical 
examples are provided in brackets): Richness of detail  (“Detailed describing and remember 
colours and places and sequence of rooms”), Lack of detail (“The story was not very detailed 
with aspects of the area and rooms”), Change of details, contradictions (“He said in the first 
one there was two phones a Samsung, but this changed to an iPhone”), Coherent order 
(“Making sure the order was roughly the same”), Incoherent order (“The fact that the events 
were not in the exact order”), Consistency (“The details were the same the whole way 
through which made it more convincing”), Omissions (“Admitted not remembering certain 
things after the time period, such as the card number”), Reminiscences (“Explained seeing 
notice boards, phones and laptops which were not previously mentioned”), Plausibility (“The 
statements seemed to be realistic”), Confidence (“The second interview seemed more 
confident”), Speech errors, hesitations (“His grammar and his stuttering makes him out to be 
not fully honest about the events”), and responses that could not match to any of the 
categories were coded as Other (“Personal experience as a witness, having to describe details 
in a stressful situation”). To measure inter-rater reliability, a second coder was given the list 
of categories and asked to allocate each response to a category. In total, 77.4% of the 
responses were classified into the same categories by both coders, showing a satisfactory 
inter-rater reliability. Discrepancies in coding were identified and resolved between the two 
coders.      
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Based on meta-analyses and reviews of deception detection research (DePaulo et al., 
2003; Vredeveldt et al., 2014, Vrij, 2008), the perceived cues categories into reliable cues, 
unreliable cues, and unknown cues to truth/deceit were further classified, see Table 5.1. Note 
that some of the same cues were classified as either reliable or unreliable depending on 
participants’ veracity decisions. For example, the cue ‘richness of detail’ was classified as 
reliable if the decision was made as truthful. However, this cue was treated as unreliable if 
the decision was made as deceptive, because a large amount of details in a statement is 
considered as an indication of truthfulness rather than deception (DePaulo et al., 2003; Vrij, 
2008).       
 
5.3 Results 
 
5.3.1 Manipulation checks 
 When making veracity judgements, participants in the informed condition reported to 
have shown a tendency to rely on the amount of details (M = 5.52, SD = 1.01, 95% CI 
[5.24,5.80]), and decline (for truth-tellers)/stability of details (for liars) between the 
immediate and delayed accounts (M = 5.54, SD = 1.11, 95% CI [5.24,5.85]) when making 
their veracity judgements (measured on 7-point Likert scales). These results indicate that 
participants in the informed group followed the instructions given to them about the verbal 
cues to deceit. Self-reported confidence levels about veracity judgements did not differ 
between the informed (M = 4.67, SD = 1.25, 95% CI [4.33,5.02]), and uninformed groups (M 
= 4.85, SD = 1.11, 95% CI [4.51,5.16]), t(74) = 0.71, p = .483, d  = 0.15.  
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5.3.2 Accuracy of veracity judgements    
The accuracy rates obtained by the informed and uninformed groups were compared. 
In the informed group, 65.2% of truthful statements were correctly classified compared to 
47.8% in the uninformed group. This difference was in the predicted direction, but not 
statistically significant, χ2 (1) = 1.42, p = .234. The accuracy rate for deceptive statements 
was identical in the informed and uninformed groups: 52.2%, χ2 (1) = 0.00, p = 1.00. Overall, 
in the informed group, 58.7% of the statements were correctly classified compared to 50.0% 
in the uninformed group. Although in the predicted direction, these rates did not differ 
significantly from each other, χ2 (1) = 0.70, p = .404. Hence, no support for Hypothesis 1 was 
found. 
 To further examine the accuracy of judgements in the informed and uninformed 
groups, the 7-point scale veracity scales (the extent to which the participants rated the 
statements to be deceptive/truthful) were analysed. For this purpose, inaccurate truthful and 
accurate deceptive judgements were converted. For example, if a participant rated a 
deceptive statement as 7 totally truth, his/her answer was converted into score 1, totally 
incorrect, and, if a participant rated a deceptive statement as 1 totally lie, the answer was 
converted into score 7, totally correct. In other words, the higher the score the more correct 
the participants were in their responses. An independent samples t-test showed that the 
accuracy rates between the informed group (M = 4.15, SD = 1.53, 95% CI [3.68, 4.59]) and 
uninformed group (M = 3.98, SD = 1.59, 95% CI [3.53, 4.41]) did not differ significantly, 
t(90) = 0.54, p = .594, d = 0.11. These results showed no support for Hypothesis 1, although 
the mean values speak in the predicted direction.  
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5.3.3 Judgements based on perceived deception cues 
 The frequencies of reported cues and their classification into reliable, unreliable, and 
unknown cues to truth/deceit in the informed and uninformed groups are shown in Table 5.1. 
There was a significant difference in frequencies of reported cues between the groups, χ2 (2) 
= 25.65, p = .007. In the informed group, speech errors, hesitations, 20.0% (truth and lie 
decisions combined), were the most frequently reported cue. In the uninformed group, 
consistency, 26.6% (truth and lie decisions combined), was the most frequently reported cue. 
When the rates of both groups and veracity decisions were combined, the distribution 
of the cues differed from chance, χ2 (11) = 70.13, p < .001, with consistency, 21.0%, speech 
errors, hesitations, 16.9%, change of details, contradictions, 14.5%, and richness of detail, 
14.5%, the most prevalent reported cues. 
 
Table 5.1  
Frequencies of participants in the informed and uninformed groups of self-reported cues to 
truth/deceit and their reliability. 
  Informed group Uninformed group Total 
     
Perceived cue Reliability 
of cue 
Frequency % within 
group 
Frequency % within 
group 
Frequency % within 
decision 
Decision: 
Truth 
       
Richness of 
detail 
Reliable 3 6.7 9 11.4 12 9.7 
Plausibility Reliable 2 4.4 3 3.8 5 4.0 
Reminiscences Reliable 1 2.2 2 2.5 3 4.3 
Incoherent 
order 
Reliable 1 2.2 1 1.3 2 1.6 
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Omissions Reliable 1 2.2 1 1.3 2 1.6 
Consistency Unreliable 2 4.4 20 25.3 22 17.7 
Speech errors, 
hesitations 
Unreliable 5 11.1 3 3.8 8 10.1 
Coherent 
order 
Unreliable 4 8.9 2 2.5 6 7.6 
Confidence Unreliable 4 8.9 0 0.0 4 3.2 
Lack of detail Unreliable 1 2.2 1 1.3 2 1.6 
Change of 
details, 
contradictions 
Unreliable 1 2.2 0 0 1 1.3 
Other Unknown 3 6.7 0 0 3 4.3 
Decision: 
Lie 
       
Lack of detail Reliable 0 0 3 3.8 3 4.3 
Change of 
details, 
contradictions 
Unreliable 4 8.9 13 10.5 17 13.7 
Speech errors, 
hesitations 
Unreliable 4 8.9 9 11.4 13 10.5 
Reminiscences Unreliable  2 4.4 4 7.4 6 4.8 
Richness of 
detail 
Unreliable 0 0 5 5.1 5 4.0 
Consistency Unreliable 3 6.7 1 1.3 4 3.2 
Coherent 
order 
Unreliable 1 2.2 0 0 1 0.8 
Omissions Unreliable 0 0 1 1.3 1 0.8 
Other Unknown 3 6.7 1 1.3 4 3.2 
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The extent to which the participants based their decisions on reliability of cues were 
then examined. After creating three categories – reliable cues, unreliable cues and unknown 
cues – the frequencies between these categories were compared, see Table 5.2. Although the 
distribution between the informed and uninformed groups differed significantly, χ2 (2) = 8.05, 
p < .018, the majority in both groups reported unreliable cues. When frequencies of both 
groups were combined, the distribution differed from chance, χ2 (2) = 90.79, p < .001, with 
unreliable cues being the most frequently reported cues across participants.    
 
Table 5.2  
Frequencies of reliability of perceived cues in the informed and uninformed groups 
 Informed group Uninformed group Total 
Perceived cues Frequency % Frequency % Frequency % 
Reliable cues 8 17.8 19 24.0 27 21.8 
Unreliable cues 31 68.9 59 74.7 90 72.6 
Unknown cues 6 13.3 1 1.3 7 5.6 
 
Table 5.3  
Frequencies of reliability of perceived cues and truth/lie accuracy rates 
                     Decision 
 Accurate (truth and lie 
combined) 
Inaccurate (truth and lie 
combined) 
Perceived cues Frequency %  Frequency %  
Reliable cues 17 63.0 10 37.0 
Unreliable cues 45 50.0 45 50.0 
Unknown cues 6 85.7 1 14.3 
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Finally, whether decisions based on reliable or unreliable cues were related to 
accuracy in the binary veracity judgements was examined. For this the answers for the 
uninformed and informed groups were merged and the ‘unknown cues’ category disregarded. 
The accuracy rates between the two categories reliable and unreliable cues were compared. 
The results are presented in Table 5.3.  
Results showed that participants who mentioned reliable cues were not more accurate 
than those who mentioned unreliable cues, χ2 (1) = 1.40, p = .237. Thus, Hypothesis 2 was 
not supported. 
 
5.4 Discussion 
 
In the current study the informed and uninformed participants were not statistically 
significantly different in their veracity judgements. One possible explanation is that the 
instruction given to the informed group was not effective to achieve improvements in 
deception detection accuracy. Previous training in interviewing to detect deception resulted in 
enhanced accuracy, but it involved at least a few hours of training (Hartwig, Granhag, 
Strömwall, & Kronkvist, 2006; Luke et al., 2016; Vrij, Leal, Mann, Vernham, & Brankaert, 
2015), and considerably longer than the brief instruction participants in the current study 
received.  
Although participants in the informed group indicated that they relied on the 
information provided in the instruction, their accuracy was not higher than participants in the 
uninformed group. However, the self-reported cues showed that the majority of participants 
relied on unreliable cues, including the informed ones. This finding is consistent with 
previous research that shows that laypeople and practitioners tend to hold incorrect beliefs 
about deception (Global Deception Research Team, 2006; Strömwall, Granhag, & Hartwig, 
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2004; Vrij, 2008). The results for the informed group support that such views are difficult to 
change.  
Reliability of the reported cues was also not related to the accuracy of judgements. 
That is, participants who reported reliable cues were as inaccurate as participants who 
reported unreliable cues. This result could perhaps be best explained by the finding that the 
number of reported reliable cues was very low in general. 
One limitation of this study was that lay people, mostly students, took part. It is 
unknown how professionals (e.g., police officers) would perform in this study. In addition, 
participants were given only brief instructions about the veracity cues to base their 
judgements on. Apart from short guidance, it is unknown how the instruction in the informed 
group was perceived. For example, how and when the observers interpreted small or large 
amount of details in the reports, what kind of details they put emphasis on while reading the 
statements, whether participants read the entire interviews attentively, etc. These 
considerations should be addressed in future lie detection studies.   
In conclusion, the current study showed that even when observers are given 
information about reliable cues to deception, they still used unreliable cues when making 
veracity judgements. Future studies could focus on examining the ways to prevent people 
from making veracity decisions based on unreliable cues.  
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Chapter 6: General Discussion 
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6.1 Summary of the findings 
 
The aim of this thesis was to examine how different mnemonic techniques used in an 
interview conducted immediately after an event affected truth tellers’ and liars’ responses in 
the immediate and delayed interviews. In Tables 6.1 and 6.2 summaries of the findings are 
presented. In these tables the magnitude (effect sizes) of the differences between truth tellers 
and liars with respect to the amount of reported details and consistency measures are shown. 
Cohen’s d effect size tells us by how many standard deviations the means of the groups 
differed.  
According to the general guidelines, the sizes indicate small (0.2), medium (0.5), or 
large (0.8 and above) effects (Fritz et al., 2012). Thus, the larger the effect size, the bigger 
difference between truthful and deceptive responses was obtained.        
With respect to the amount of reported visual, spatial, temporal, and action details, the 
achieved effect sizes ranged from medium to large for the immediate (0.52-2.05) and delayed 
responses (0.58-2.16) across three studies in which participants were questioned using 
mnemonic techniques. The only veracity effect not found to be statistically significant was 
for the amount of visual details in the delayed interview in Study II. In terms of consistency 
characteristics, significant effect sizes were obtained only in Study III. In sum, the findings 
suggest that truth tellers and liars differed substantially in the amount of provided information 
immediately and after a two-week delay. However, there were fewer differences between 
truth tellers and liars with respect to their consistency between the immediate and delayed 
statements. The interpretation of the findings will be elaborated on below. 
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Table 6.1 
Summary of the Cohen’s d effect sizes of the amount of reported details using different 
mnemonic techniques. A positive d score indicates that truth tellers reported more details 
than liars. Scores in bold refer to significant differences.  
 Visual Spatial Temporal Action 
Immediate interviews     
Study I      
Context reinstatement (CR) 0.52 0.83 1.56 1.60 
Sketch 0.68 1.34 2.09 1.61 
Event-line 1.13 1.23 1.08 1.47 
Study II     
Sketch 0.88 1.27 0.91 1.00 
Study III     
Report everything 1.48 1.37 2.05 2.01 
Spatial questions 0.87 1.25 1.00 0.91 
Delayed interviews     
Study I      
CR 0.58 0.74 1.21 1.19 
Sketch 0.73 1.11 1.76 1.43 
Event-line 1.14 1.40 0.78 1.15 
Study II     
Sketch 0.51 0.93 0.75 0.91 
Study III     
Report everything 1.96 1.73 1.83 2.16 
Spatial questions 1.30 1.49 1.90 2.06 
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Table 6.2 
Summary of the Cohen’s d effect sizes of the consistency variables between statements. 
Positive scores show that truth tellers provided more details than liars. Negative scores show 
that liars provided more details than truth tellers. Scores in bold refer to significant 
differences.  
 Reminiscence Repetition Omission 
Study I     
CR 0.14 0.12 0.12 
Sketch 0.07 0.29 0.29 
Event-line 0.09 0.14 0.14 
Study II    
Sketch 0.54 0.09 0.09 
Study III    
Report everything 0.48 1.22 -1.22 
Spatial questions 1.48 0.78 -0.78 
 
6.2 Veracity and the immediate interviews 
 
In Study I, truth tellers reported more visual, spatial, temporal, and action details than 
liars when asked to report everything they remembered in the immediate interviews. As 
expected, these differences were found across all three mnemonic conditions. This finding is 
in line with previous research that has shown truth tellers to be more detailed than liars when 
interviewed shortly after the event (Vrij, 2008; 2016). In Study I, both veracity groups were 
tasked to be believed by the interviewer in order to get full compensation for participation. 
Furthermore, participants were told that they would be believed if the interviewer felt that 
they reported everything they remembered. However, even this instruction to report in as 
much detail as possible was not sufficient for liars to provide as many details as truth tellers 
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did in their immediate accounts. Liars could experience more difficulties than truth tellers to 
follow the interviewer’s instruction due to lack of imagination, or information-management 
issues, because reporting too many fabricated details would give possible leads to the 
interviewer that they were lying (Granhag & Hartwig, 2008; Vrij et al., 2017).  
Examination of participants’ responses to mnemonic techniques separately showed 
that there was no difference in the amount of visual, spatial, temporal, and action details 
between truth tellers and liars when the CR mnemonic was administered. In other words, 
using this mnemonic alone was ineffective for facilitating discrimination between truth tellers 
and liars. A comparison between the three mnemonic techniques showed that CR elicited a 
lower amount of detail than the sketch or event-line (for truth tellers and liars combined). 
This suggests that truth tellers benefitted the least from the CR mnemonic. Liars could be less 
affected by specific mnemonic technique administered due to the information-management 
strategies they typically employ (Hartwig et al., 2010). That is, liars might stick to their 
fabricated stories, regardless of the mnemonic (CR, the sketch, or the event-line) given to 
them. The event-line mnemonic was the most effective in distinguishing truth-tellers and 
liars. The stimulus event (break‐in) shown to participants was dynamic. Perhaps the event-
line facilitated reporting different activities more than CR or the request to sketch, which 
particularly benefitted truth tellers.  
In Study II, where only the sketch mnemonic was used, truth tellers provided more 
visual, spatial, temporal, and action details in the immediate interviews than liars. Although 
this finding was predicted, it is worthwhile discussing the difference between veracity groups 
regarding the amount of temporal and action details. Specifically, in the sketch instruction 
participants were asked to draw and then describe in as much detail as possible the layout and 
the location of the objects of the place where the break-in happened. No instruction to 
provide temporal and/or action information was given to the interviewees. Nevertheless, truth 
 
152 
 
tellers reported more temporal and action details than liars while describing the sketch. It 
seems that truth tellers mentioned additional information not asked for in the instruction, 
whereas liars merely followed the instruction. Liars reported very few temporal and action 
details compared to visual and spatial details, which supports this interpretation of the 
findings. A reluctance to reveal additional details found in this study reflects the avoidance 
strategies typically used by liars (Hartwig et al., 2010). 
When different immediate interviewing formats were compared in Study III, truth 
tellers provided more visual, spatial, temporal, and action details than liars in both 
interviewing conditions. However, the difference between veracity groups was larger when 
the broader report everything instruction was used compared to when the more specific 
spatial questions were asked. This finding suggests that instructions to report as many details 
as possible is more efficient for lie detection purposes than asking more specific questions. 
The result is consistent with previous research that compared different questioning 
approaches (e.g., the Cognitive Interview (CI) vs. standard questions) (Bembibre & Higueras, 
2011; Hernández & Alonso-Quecuty, 1997), and is in line with the Cognitive Credibility 
Assessment (CCA; Vrij, 2018) approach.  
In summary, the experiments conducted in this study showed that truth tellers 
provided more detailed accounts than liars when interviewed shortly after the event, but that 
the difference between truth tellers and liars was affected by the technique employed in the 
interview. 
 
6.3 Veracity and the delayed interviews 
 
In Study I truthful statements contained more visual, spatial, temporal, and action 
details than deceptive statements across three mnemonic conditions in the delayed interviews. 
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These results indicate that the credibility cue amount of detail remained diagnostic even after 
a delay. Similar findings were obtained in a recent study, in which participants were 
interviewed immediately and two weeks later (Nahari, 2018). However, in Study I larger 
differences than expected were found between truth tellers and liars in the delayed interviews. 
Specifically, in the sketch condition truth tellers produced more temporal and action details 
than liars after the delay. Differences only in the amount of visual and spatial details were 
expected because of truth tellers’ immediate recall practice of these details in the sketch. In 
the same manner, in the event-line condition differences between truth tellers and liars after 
the delay in the amount of temporal and action details only were expected. 
However, truth-tellers also reported more visual and spatial details than liars in this 
condition after the delay. A possible explanation is that before the administration of each of 
the three mnemonic techniques, participants were asked in a free recall to describe what they 
had seen. Perhaps truth tellers could maintain good memories of visual, spatial, temporal, and 
action details after the delay because of immediate practice of these details in the free recall. 
Memory research has shown beneficial effects of initial testing on subsequent recall of 
learned information (Roediger & Butler, 2011; Pansky & Nemets, 2012). Immediate 
reporting of visual, spatial, temporal, and action details could strengthen truth tellers’ 
memory traces, thus, enhancing access to these details after a delay.  
To understand better the effects of mnemonics, the immediate and delayed interviews 
in Study II included the sketch instruction only. As in the immediate sketch descriptions, 
truth tellers provided more spatial, temporal, and action details than liars after the delay. No 
difference was found in the amount of visual details after the delay, and this was unpredicted. 
Two explanations for the unpredicted finding are possible. First, since the sketch instruction 
focuses on visual details, liars may have been particularly encouraged to provide such details. 
Second, liars might have thought it a ‘safe’ strategy to report visual details because it does 
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not give too many leads to investigators. For example, liars can provide visual details that are 
typically found in a staff room e.g. information about furniture, kitchen utensils, or electric 
devices. Accounts that include such information are less likely to contradict factual evidence. 
However, reporting too many spatial, temporal or action details might have put liars at risk of 
revealing self-incriminating evidence. For example, information about locations of objects, 
specific times and/or activities can be potentially checked by investigators (e.g. CCTV 
records or asking neighbours who could have witnessed the event in question). It is known 
that liars tend to avoid reporting self-incriminating evidence (Granhag & Hartwig, 2008). 
In Study III, in both report everything and spatial questions conditions delayed 
truthful statements contained more visual, spatial, temporal, and action details than delayed 
deceptive statements. However, the differences between truth tellers and liars regarding 
visual and action details were larger when the report everything mnemonic rather than the 
spatial questions were employed in the immediate interview. These findings could be 
explained by examining liars’ and truth tellers’ responses in the immediate interview. Liars’ 
responses were unaffected by the type of questioning in the immediate interview, but truth 
tellers provided less information (visual and temporal details, in particular) in the spatial 
questions condition than in the report everything condition. Thus, truth tellers who provided 
less detailed statements in the immediate interview, also provided less detailed responses 
after the delay, resulting in less pronounced differences between truth tellers and liars after a 
delay. In summary, the results demonstrated that truthful accounts were more detailed than 
deceptive accounts after the delay, and that the extent of the differences between truth tellers 
and liars was influenced by the techniques used in the immediate interviews.  
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6.4 Comparison between immediate and delayed statements 
 
In this thesis how the amount of reported details by truth tellers and liars changed between 
immediate and delayed interviews was of interest. Recent deception studies introduced the 
concept ‘stability bias’, which refers to liars’ difficulty to understand the nature of human 
memory, particularly the tendency to overestimate memory performance (Harvey et al., 2017; 
Nahari, 2018). This suggests that the forgetting curve – the tendency to forget details over 
time- typical for truth tellers, would be less pronounced or even absent in liars. In Study I, 
truth tellers in the CR condition reported fewer temporal details in the delayed than in the 
immediate interviews. In addition, in the event-line condition truth tellers provided fewer 
visual details in the delayed than in the immediate interviews. Liars did not show a decline in 
the amount of any types of detail after the delay in these two mnemonic conditions. However, 
in the sketch condition, both truth tellers and liars showed a decline in reporting information. 
Truth tellers provided fewer temporal and action details, and liars provided fewer visual and 
action details in the delayed compared to the immediate interviews. In other words, when 
looking at the general reporting patterns of truth tellers and liars in each mnemonic condition, 
it became clear that both veracity groups showed a decline, including non-significant, in 
reporting details in the delayed interviews compared to the immediate interviews. Therefore, 
based on the findings of Study I, it cannot be concluded that only truth tellers showed a 
decline in reporting information after the delay. 
Studies II and III showed more evidence for the predictions regarding how truth 
tellers and liars report information over time. In Study II, truth tellers provided fewer action 
details in the delayed than immediate sketch descriptions, whereas liars did not show such a 
decline in any types of detail. In addition, truth tellers and liars showed slightly different 
tendencies of reporting information between immediate and delayed interviews. There was a 
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marginal decline in the amount of visual, spatial, and temporal details in truthful responses 
after a delay, but a marginal increase in the amount of visual, spatial, temporal, and action 
details reported by liars after a delay. In Study III, truth tellers reported fewer temporal and 
action details in the delayed than immediate interviews, whereas liars did not show such a 
decline in the amount of any types of reported detail. In addition, truth tellers showed a 
marginal decline in reporting visual and spatial details after a delay, whereas liars showed a 
marginal increase in reporting visual, spatial, temporal, and action details after a delay. 
The different findings between Study I and Studies II and III can only be speculated 
about.  Observation of the means of visual, spatial, temporal, and action details reported by 
liars in the immediate interview suggests that in Study I the scores were considerably higher 
than in Studies II and III. Therefore, in Study I, liars could more easily afford to report fewer 
details in the delayed statements without thinking it would make them appear suspicious than 
in Studies II and III. Liars believe that reporting a sufficient amount of details is important for 
them to be believed (Hartwig et al., 2007; Nahari et al., 2014). Moreover, liars could also 
experience forgetting (Nahari, 2018) and this is more likely when a lot of details were given 
initially. Nevertheless, this interpretation should be considered with caution and requires 
further examination. Overall, the findings of this thesis showed that in terms of the amount of 
details provided over time, truth tellers more often than liars showed a decrease in reporting 
information after a delay. Truth tellers could be affected by a time delay more than liars. If 
truth tellers relied on their memories and this resulted in less information remembered after 
two weeks, liars could be primarily preoccupied to provide convincing stories, regardless of 
the time interval between an event and interview. In order to be convincing, the fabricated 
story needs to contain sufficient amount of detail.    
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6.5 Consistency between immediate and delayed statements 
 
In Studies I and II truth tellers and liars provided a similar amount of reminiscences, 
repetitions, and omissions when the immediate and delayed statements were compared, 
indicating that both veracity groups were equally consistent between their accounts. These 
results are in line with the literature (Granhag & Strömwall, 2002; Vredeveldt et al. 2014, 
Granhag et al., 2016). Perhaps it was not a difficult task for liars to be as consistent as truth 
tellers because in both studies the immediate and delayed interviews contained the same 
instructions. Inconsistencies can emerge if the interview format changes, but may be less 
likely when it is held constant (Deeb et al., 2017; Leins et al., 2012). Furthermore, responses 
in the post-interview questionnaire revealed that in both studies liars thought more often 
about their fabricated story than truth tellers about the actual event between the immediate 
and delayed interviews. This suggests that liars were employing a ‘repeat’ strategy more 
often than truth tellers, which could facilitate consistency. However, these outcomes of the 
responses in the post-interview questionnaire should be interpreted with caution. It is 
reasonable to doubt the ability of participants’ to accurately estimate how many times they 
remembered the story during a two-week period.  
Similar to Studies I and II, the results of Study III revealed that truth tellers and liars 
reported a similar amount of reminiscences between the two interviews in the report 
everything condition. However, truth tellers mentioned more reminiscent details than liars in 
the spatial questions condition. Perhaps truth tellers had the opportunity to provide additional 
details in the delayed interview because they were instructed to report all they could 
remember in that interview. Thus, details which were not mentioned in the immediate 
interview when spatial questions were asked were reported in the delayed interview. 
However, given liars’ strategy to keep it simple and to repeat what they said before (Granhag 
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& Hartwig, 2008; Granhag & Strömwall, 1999), they could not report too much additional 
information in the delayed interview. Additionally, in Study III truth tellers provided more 
repetitions and omitted fewer details than liars in the delayed interview in both questioning 
conditions. These outcomes suggest that liars used a ‘keep the story simple’ strategy 
(Strömwall et al., 2006), because omitting details after a delay might prevent liars from 
contradicting themselves (Granhag & Strömwall, 1999). Overall, the findings of these studies 
suggest truth tellers were as consistent as liars between the immediate and delayed accounts, 
which is consistent with previous research (Vredeveldt et al., 2014).  
Some of the consistency findings may seem to contradict the observations made 
before in this thesis, thus deserve further comment. Specifically, it was concluded that truth 
tellers, but not liars, showed a decline in reporting details between the immediate and delayed 
interviews. However, in this section it was mentioned that in Study III liars omitted more 
details than truth tellers, and truth tellers produced more repetitions than liars. This suggests 
that liars showed a larger decline in reporting details than truth tellers. The reason for these 
seemingly conflicting results is the different statistics used for the analyses of amount of 
detail and consistency variables. Therefore, these two analyses should be interpreted 
independently from each other. In the amount of detail analysis, the actual amount of reported 
visual, spatial, temporal, and action details were compared. When the between-statement 
consistency characteristics were assessed, total amount of detail in the immediate interview 
was used as a covariate. It is reasonable to assume that without entering the covariate, truth 
tellers would produce more reminiscences, repetitions, or omissions than liars, but this would 
be the result of truth tellers’ initial statements being richer in detail rather than the result of 
difference in consistency between truth tellers and liars. This possibility was tested which 
confirmed that in Studies I, II, and III truth tellers showed the tendency to produce more 
(in)consistency characteristics compared to liars. 
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6.6 Observers’ accuracy of veracity judgements 
     
In this thesis whether the actual differences between truth tellers and liars with respect 
to amount of details reported could be accurately detected by observers was also examined. 
In Study IV, participants either did or did not receive an instruction about the findings 
of Study I. Participants in the informed condition should have considered these findings when 
making veracity judgements. It was found that the informed and uninformed participants did 
not differ in their accuracy of veracity judgements.  
Although participants in the informed group indicated that they relied on the 
information provided in the instruction, their accuracy was not higher than participants in the 
uninformed group. This can be explained by the self-reported responses, which showed that 
the majority of informed and uniformed participants relied on unreliable cues when making 
their judgements, such as ‘speech errors, hesitations’, or ‘consistency’. This finding is in line 
with previous research showing that laypeople and practitioners tend to hold incorrect beliefs 
about deception (Global Deception Research Team, 2006; Strömwall et al., 2004; Vrij, 2008). 
The results for the informed group support that such views are difficult to change. Different 
explanations have been proposed about the origin of the incorrect beliefs to deception. For 
example, the moral explanation refers to the stereotypical view that lying is bad (Vrij, 2008). 
If lying is bad, then people should feel ashamed and/or nervous about it and, therefore, 
display signs of nervousness (e.g., commit speech errors) (DePaulo et al., 2003). The current 
study showed that signs related to nervousness (speech errors, hesitations) were amongst the 
most prevalent cues mentioned by participants. In addition, the exposure explanation suggests 
that stereotypical behaviours associated with deception are prominent in the popular media 
(Vrij & Granhag, 2007). For example, a popular crime drama TV series ‘Lie to Me’ depicted 
the main character as a highly skilful security officer in detecting deception. However, many 
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of the interviewing tactics and ‘signs of deception’ shown in these series were not consistent 
with scientific evidence (DePaulo et al., 2003; Hartwig & Bond, 2011; Vrij & Granhag, 
2012).  
A possible explanation for poor accuracy rates is that the instruction given to the 
informed group was not effective to achieve improvements in veracity judgements. Previous 
studies that resulted in enhanced lie detection accuracy involved at least a few hours of 
training including theoretical information about reliable and unreliable cues to deception, 
practical examples, exercises, and feedback on trainees’ performance (Hauch et al., 2016; 
Luke et al., 2016; Vrij et al., 2015), and considerably longer than the brief instruction 
participants in Study IV received.  
The reliability of the reported cues was also not related to the accuracy of judgements. 
That is, participants who reported reliable cues were as inaccurate as participants who 
reported unreliable cues. This result could perhaps be best explained by the finding that the 
number of reliable cues reported by observers was very low in general. In conclusion, the 
results of Study IV showed that even when observers were given information about reliable 
cues to deception, they still used unreliable cues when making veracity judgements, which 
negatively affected their veracity judgements. 
 
6.7 Empirical and practical contributions 
 
The research conducted for this thesis advances knowledge about deception in three 
ways. First, the results of this thesis replicated previous findings that truthful statements 
contain more details than deceptive statements when participants are interviewed 
immediately after an event (Amado et al., 2016; DePaulo et al., 2003; Vrij, 2008). The 
current research has also provided evidence that truth tellers are able to report more details 
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than liars after a two-week delay. Not many studies have examined the credibility cue 
‘amount of detail’ after a passage of time, when an immediate interview was also conducted 
(Granhag & Strömwall, 2002; Granhag et al., 2003; Nahari, 2018). Furthermore, no deception 
studies addressed the differences between truth tellers and liars in delayed interviews, after 
using mnemonic techniques in the immediate interviews. Second, in the current research, 
truth tellers and liars have shown somewhat different patterns of reporting information over 
time. The tendency of truth tellers to provide more details in the immediate than in the 
delayed interview resembled memory decay (Ebbinghaus, 1885/1913). However, liars 
showed a weaker tendency to demonstrate such a decline in reporting information, a 
phenomenon termed ‘stability bias’ in the deception literature (Harvey et al., 2017). Third, 
the findings indicate that truth tellers were as consistent as liars between their statements 
(Vredeveldt et al., 2014). This is an important finding and confirms that unless specific 
techniques (e.g., SUE; Granhag & Hartwig, 2015) designed to induce inconsistencies in liars- 
are used in interviews, ‘(in)consistency’ should be considered as an unreliable cue to detect 
deception. 
In terms of practical relevance, the current findings suggest that the way someone is 
interviewed initially has an effect on credibility assessments in subsequent interviews. 
Previous studies demonstrated the benefits of high-quality immediate interviewing in terms 
of interviewees’ memory performance (Gabbert et al., 2009; Hope et al., 2014), but this may 
also apply to credibility assessments. The findings in this thesis might be relevant in different 
interviewing settings. For example, it might be useful for frontline officers or emergency call 
handling officers to obtain high-quality and complete accounts from witnesses or victims for 
possible repeated interviewing at the later stages of the investigation. The same could be 
applied with interviewing suspects, who especially tend to be interviewed more than once 
during the course of criminal investigations (Kassin et al., 2007); or within the intelligence 
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settings (e.g., when interviewing informants). However, the findings of this research should 
be implemented with caution regarding suspect interviewing situations. Specifically, 
interviewing the suspect early after an event without having sufficient evidence may hamper 
the entire investigation and so when someone gets arrested shortly after an incident, it is 
normal practice for police officers to spend time gathering case evidence planning interview 
tactics, etc. Hence, there will always be (at least) a short delay between an incident and 
interviewing a suspect.  Nevertheless, given the findings of this thesis, practitioners need to 
be aware that delaying interviews with suspects may negatively affect his/her memory and, 
thus, their ability to detect deception.    
The effect sizes of the differences between truth tellers and liars showed that report 
everything, sketch, and event-line mnemonic techniques were effective to detect deception. 
Thus, it is recommended that for credibility assessment purposes every interviewee should be 
invited to recall in as much detail as possible all they remember. Mnemonic techniques such 
as sketch and event-line should be also incorporated in interviewing settings for verbal lie 
detection. It can be argued that using techniques developed to enhance truth tellers’ reporting 
of information can also, to some extent, increase the amount of information in liars’ 
statements and may complicate deception detection. The more details liars provide, the more 
credible they may appear. Indeed, the absence of a specific threshold (cut-off score) in the 
amount of detail when the interviewees are lying and when telling the truth does not allow to 
make straightforward correct veracity judgements (Vrij, 2016). However, elicitation of more 
details from both truth tellers and liars gives an opportunity to the investigator to check these 
details, or compare them with the new evidence that appeared. 
Finally, brief information about deception cues demonstrated to be ineffective in 
improving observers’ accuracy in veracity judgements. Although in Study IV veracity 
judgements were made by lay participants, findings of this study could give insight into how 
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to develop or improve training programmes on interviewing/deception detection for legal 
professionals. For example, training could involve not only informing trainees about reliable 
cues but also informing them about unreliable cues. Such training also could include 
information about the reasons why some cues are reliable and other cues are unreliable.  
 
6.8 Methodological considerations 
 
The main aim of this thesis was to examine how different mnemonics employed in an 
immediate interview affect reporting specific types of detail in both immediate and delayed 
interviews. As a result of this aim Studies I, II, and III did not contain standard control groups 
in which participants would be provided with the instructions eliciting less complete 
accounts. An absence of control conditions made it impossible to conclude whether the use of 
mnemonic techniques in the immediate interviews as such, have influenced the interviewees’ 
responses. This approach to the design of the studies can be considered a limitation in that it 
confines us to conclude that these effects would not be achieved without the use of 
mnemonics in the immediate interview. However, it is reasonable to assume that mnemonics 
used in the initial interviews were helpful to detect deception in the delayed interviews for 
two reasons. First, research has shown that liars tend to show a stability bias (Vrij et al., 
2009; Harvey et al., 2017; Nahari, 2018), whereas truth tellers’ memory of an event becomes 
weaker over time, resulting in them reporting fewer details over time (Ebbinghaus, 
1885/1913; Lawson & London, 2015; Tuckey & Brewer, 2003). The combined effect is that 
over time the difference between truth tellers and liars in reporting details becomes less 
pronounced. It can be assumed that in the absence of immediate interviewing, the two-week 
delay employed in these experiments was a considerable amount of time to show a substantial 
decrease in recalled information for truth tellers. However, in all three experiments, truth 
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tellers’ decline in reporting details was rather small, with the result that truth tellers reported 
more details than liars even after a delay. The results further showed that the majority of 
details truth tellers reported in the delayed interviews were repetitions of what they said in the 
immediate interviews. This suggests that truth tellers had relatively good memories of their 
initial responses. Second, a comparison between two types of immediate questioning in Study 
III showed that the report everything mnemonic was more effective (although modestly) than 
asking spatial questions to discriminate between truth tellers and liars after the delay. Given 
the magnitude of the effect sizes, it can be argued that in the spatial questions condition the 
differences between truth tellers and liars in the delayed interviews were also large. Indeed, 
the way these questions were formulated (e.g., ‘describe the interior of the staff room’) 
suggests that they were in line with investigative interviewing guidelines, and after asking 
such questions relatively complete answers could be expected (Oxburgh et al., 2010). 
Nevertheless, no reason can be identified why the quality of the immediate interview (e.g., 
eliciting short answers from the interviewees) would not affect deception detection after the 
delay. 
In Studies I to III, all participants were instructed that the apartment they broke in to 
was a staff room of a community centre. This was to minimise the risk of liars telling an 
embedded lie. However, this instruction could not eliminate the possibility for some 
participants of using embedded lies. For example, some interviewees could report details of 
staff rooms they have genuinely visited. However, the obtained effect sizes of the differences 
between truth tellers and liars with respect to the amount of reported details suggest that 
possible use of embedded lies did not substantially influence the direction of the findings of 
this research. 
Noteworthy, in each experiment interviewers conducted interviews with more than 
one participant. This could be considered as a limitation because the interviewer could figure 
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out whether a person was telling the truth or lying after interviewing a few participants. 
Specifically, reports of all truth tellers were similar because their accounts were based on a 
genuine memory of the same event (i.e., a video of the break in), whereas each lying 
participant had to create an individual cover story that would be different to the video break 
in. Thus, it is reasonable to presume that the interviewers became aware of the veracity 
conditions in the process of data collection, which could have unintentionally impacted the 
way in which they interviewed. However, the interviewer is believed not to have affected the 
results of Studies I, II and III for two reasons. First, all interviewers (research assistants who 
were university students or staff members) were trained by the author of the thesis prior to the 
beginning of data collection of each study. Specifically, in every interview they were strictly 
required to use prepared scripts. Moreover, the interviewers were instructed to actively listen 
to the responses of the interviewees’, make pauses long enough to continue or finish the 
interview only when being sure that the participant’s response had been fully provided. 
Second, even if the interviewers started realising who truth tellers and liars were in the 
process of questioning different participants, they were still blind to the aims and hypotheses 
of the experiments. Therefore, it is believed the risk of the interviewers’ knowledge to 
somehow affect the responses of the interviewees (e.g., liars’ reporting fewer details than 
truth tellers) was low.    
A staged filmed event was used as a stimulus material across the three experiments. 
Participants were instructed to passively watch the staged event and to pretend their active 
involvement in the break-in. The benefit of such a controlled setting is that all participants 
witnessed exactly the same event, ruling out differences in exposure between participants or 
conditions. However, it is unknown whether real participation in the break-in would have 
resulted in different outcomes in the three experiments. It may have affected the amount of 
details reported in an undefined manner: It could result in more details being reported due to 
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participants paying more attention to the event, or fewer details being reported due to 
distractions.  
Another aspect of ecological validity is that the majority of participants across the 
studies comprised students or members of the general public rather than legal professionals. 
Samples with more representative participants (e.g., intelligence officers with a greater 
insight into covert operations than laypeople) would bring more value into the current 
findings. It is unknown how the knowledge and/or experience in the subject matter would 
affect deceptive responses. Again, the amount of details reported may be affected in an 
undefined direction: liars could provide convincing accounts with many details, or, in 
contrast, be more careful and report fewer details to avoid the risk of incriminating 
themselves. 
 
6.9 Future directions 
 
The research conducted for the current thesis provides a basis for future research to 
examine, in greater detail, the mnemonic techniques to detect deception in repeated 
interviews. This line of research could be further extended in several areas. 
Future studies could focus on different interviewing situations, such as, the time span 
between the critical event and questioning, also the number of interviews. Specifically, 
further deception studies could examine the effects of mnemonic techniques on repeated 
statements: i) when the first interview takes place after an extended period of time, that is, 
more than the timespan during the studies of the thesis; and, ii) when someone is interviewed 
on more than two occasions. These two scenarios are common in real life criminal 
investigations. They are worthy of examination because the negative effect of time delay 
(without retrieval practice) on memory and verbal deception detection is known (Ebbinghaus, 
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1885/1913; Harvey et al., 2017; Roediger & Butler, 2011). On the other hand, positive effects 
of mnemonic techniques to enhance reporting of information after a delay have been 
identified (Dornburg & McDaniel, 2006; Larsson, Granhag, & Spjut, 2003; Rivard et al., 
2014). 
Further, the use of mnemonic techniques in repeated interviews could be examined in 
high-stake situations. For liars, the consequences of being caught in real criminal cases are 
typically serious. The need for applied research has previously been advocated by scholars in 
legal psychology (Oxburgh, Walsh, & Milne, 2011; Porter & ten Brinke, 2010). Although it is 
difficult to consider a theoretical reason why the identified verbal differences between truth 
tellers and liars would not be present in real life circumstances (e.g., liars employing counter-
interrogation strategies to a lesser degree than in the laboratory experiments), studies 
containing high-stake lying scenarios would promote ecological validity. It is also reasonable 
to expect that increasing ecological validity would encourage stakeholders to apply evidence-
based findings within legal settings (Blair & Kooi, 2004). Furthermore, examining such 
situations can be beneficial. Specifically, some studies showed police officers were 
considerably more accurate when detecting high-stakes deception (Wright Whelan, Wagstaff, 
& Wheatcroft, 2015; Wright & Wheatcroft, 2017). However, the development of experimental 
set-ups may be complicated due to ethical considerations. Yet future laboratory studies could 
raise the stakes within ethical boundaries. A solution to these issues could be to increase 
participant rewards from modest (i.e., a prize worth of cinema ticket) to more solid 
compensation for participants trying their best to convince the interviewer.  
Additionally, completion of a field study could be an important further step in verbal 
lie detection. This could involve, for example, real (recorded and/or transcribed) repeated 
interviews with suspects, in which the investigator(s) use information-gathering approaches 
including the mnemonic techniques. These interviews would meet the stringent criteria to 
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establish ground truth in order to compare truth tellers and liars. Such research would demand 
a thesis of its own, yet could greatly contribute to the verbal lie detection scientific literature. 
The effectiveness of deception detection may depend on the conditions in which an 
event was encoded in memory (Harvey et al., 2017). There are plethora of everyday situations 
in which the encoding quality for the event experienced can be impeded e.g., as a result of 
incidental focus to specific details (Carlson, Dias, Weatherford, & Carlson, 2016), intoxication 
(Hagsand, Hjelmsäter, Granhag, Fahlke, & Söderpalm‐Gordh, 2013), or poor viewing 
conditions (Wells & Olson, 2003). The role of mnemonic techniques to distinguish truth tellers 
and liars when encoding conditions are complicated is currently unknown. 
In light of recent atrocities related to extremist organizations around the globe, 
deception researchers have also begun to address the issue of false intentions (Granhag & Mac 
Giolla, 2014; Sooniste, Granhag, & Strömwall, 2017; Vrij, Granhag, Mann, & Leal, 2011). In 
a recent study, CI showed benefits to detect false intentions (Sooniste, Granhag, Strömwall, & 
Vrij, 2015). This research could be extended to examine the effects of mnemonic techniques 
on repeated accounts across the passage of time when a critical event is planned, for example, 
few months in advance. 
Finally, measuring the difference between truth tellers and liars in reporting visual, 
spatial, temporal, and action details is not entirely useful in real life investigations. Specifically, 
these types of details as such do not yield too much valuable information for criminal 
investigations. In the current thesis, these types of detail were examined because this was a first 
step to understand the effects of mnemonic techniques, used in the immediate interviews, on 
deception detection in delayed interviews. Thus, it was primarily focused on the quantity of 
details in the statements reported by truth tellers and liars. Future studies using mnemonic 
techniques could examine qualities of detail that have more forensic relevance, such as 
verifiable details (Nahari et al., 2014), or salient details (Deeb et al., 2018; Sakrisvold, Granhag, 
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& Mac Giolla, 2017) and their consistency between interviews. Examination of the quality of 
details may be important when extent of lying in deceptive stories is low. Studies conducted in 
the current thesis considered the self-reported extent of liars’ being truthful in the interviews 
(as asked in the post-interview questionnaires). However, the majority of liars’ stories 
contained fabrications (approx., 70-80%). Future deception studies focusing on the effects of 
mnemonic techniques could develop more challenging scenarios, in which liars would falsify 
only a minimal amount of information. Given the aims of the thesis, only between-statement 
consistency characteristics were examined. In future similar research, the other types of 
consistencies, within-statement, statement-evidence, or within-group, could be tested. As 
practitioners in criminal justice tend to put emphasis on (in)consistency as an indicator to detect 
deception (Bogaard et al., 2016), these examinations could extend the knowledge about 
consistency as a deception cue. Statement-evidence consistency may especially be of practical 
interest because in this situation the information reported by truth tellers and liars can be 
compared with real facts known about a criminal case.   
 
6.10 Conclusions 
 
The research presented shows that when mnemonics were used during the immediate 
interview, the verbal cue richness of detail remained a diagnostic cue to deceit even after a 
delay. In addition, truth tellers more often than liars showed a decline in reporting details 
after a delay. Truth tellers showed patterns of reporting indicative of genuine memory decay, 
whereas liars showed patterns of ‘stability bias’, a failure to accurately estimate memory 
decay (Harvey et al., 2017). Also, this research replicated previous findings demonstrating 
that truth tellers and liars are equally consistent when interviewed twice (Vredeveldt et al., 
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2014). Finally, it was found that lay observers showed poor accuracy in detecting truths and 
lies, and a strong reliance on incorrect stereotypical cues when making these judgements.  
Overall, the findings indicate that mnemonic techniques such as a report everything, a 
sketch, or event‐line in a first interview conducted shortly after the event are promising tools 
to deception detection in immediate and delayed interviews. This thesis contributed to the 
understanding of verbal deception detection in a repeated interviewing context. 
Future research in the area of memory-based lie detection should continue to examine 
the effects of different mnemonic techniques in repeated interviewing in various investigative 
contexts, exploring various types of verbal information in the reports of interviewees.        
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